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During this work, principal measurements and calculations were made in customary units
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1.0 SUMMARY
This report covers a portion of the final program element in the Integrated Application of
Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic Transport Project, a part of
the NASA Energy Efficient Transport Program. It documents the design and acquisition
of the Test ACT System; planned continuation of that project includes laboratory testing
and, later, flight test.
The work reported here was done by an integrated engineering and fabrication
organization drawn from the Preliminary Design department of Boeing Commercial
Airplane Company and Collins Air Transport Division of Rockwell International. In the
period November 1981 to June 1983, this organization accomplished the following:
• Selected the system concept and the test airplane
• Performed the system design
• Designed and analyzed the control laws and tested them by piloted simulation
• Designed, fabricated, and bench tested the computer hardware, both digital and
analog
• Designed, integrated, and verified the digital system software
• Selected and procured the system sensors
• Designed, fabricated, and bench tested the man-machine interface equipment for the
flight crew and the test engineering personnel
• Designed modifications to the test aircraft, adding redundant secondary servos for
elevator position commands
• Planned laboratory and flight test programs
• Documented all of the above steps
The end product of this work is an active controls system composed of pitch-augmented
stability, pitch fly by wire, and wing-load alleviation, including both maneuver-load
control and gust-load alleviation, for the Boeing 757-200 flight test airplane. The
electronic equipment is mounted in consoles so it can be readily tested in the laboratory
and then moved into the airplane with a minimum of dismantling.
The system is now installed in a i='repared position at the Boeing Digital Avionics Flight
Controls Laboratory for a series of detailed tests. This laboratory testing began with
hardware and software open-loop testing and will progress through failure detection,
system integration, and finally into closed-loop testing, with increasing fidelity in
simulation of flight operations, all in preparation for later installation and flight test in a
757-200 airplane.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 IAAC PROJECT OVERVIEW
The Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced
Subsonic Transport Project has had three major objectives. The first objective was
assessment of benefits to a commercial transport of the full application of active controls
that are designed into the airplane from the beginning of a production program. The
second objective "vas identification of the risks associated with the use of Active Controls
Technology (ACT). The third objective is reduction of these risks, through test and
evaluation, to a level commensurate with commercial practice-to the degree possible
within the project's funding limitations.
This project was organized into three major elements, as shown at the top of Figure 1
(ref. 1). The first major element, Configuration/ACT System Design and Evaluation,
included establishment of the design criteria appropriate for an ACT airplane (designed
from the outset to utilize active controls), design of an ACT airplane configuration to
meet the selected criteria, design of an active controls system based upon current
technology, and selection and evaluation of a Final ACT airplane configuration. The
results of these studies are documented in References 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
In parallel with these tasks, the second major element, Advanced Technology ACT Control
System Definition (fig. 2), included exploration of optimal control synthesis methods,
alternative means of implementing the ACT functions using advanced technology, and an
examination of the integration of ACT, control, and guidance functions. The results of
these studies are documented in References 2, 3, and 8.
The final major element, Test and Evaluation, is shown in Figure 3. The components of
this element, first conceived in the development of the Project Plan (ref. 1) and also
shown in the figure, address reduction of the risk associated with implementation of
active controls on a commercial transport. Subsequent to publication of the Project Plan,
it was concluded that it would be inappropriate to conduct the wind tunnel tests described
in that plan under NASA funding. The software-implemented fault tolerance (SIFT) and
fault tolerant multiprocessor (FTMP) projects sponsored by NASA Langley Research
Center and currently under test in the Langley AIR LAB have been considered throughout
the IAAC Project, but did not directly influence the Test ACT system architecture.
3
CY 78 CY79 CY80 CY81 CY82 CY83 CY84 CY8S
~~tt8~~f:i:~~~~ii~~jl2r~;~i~~{j~~
::::::: Design and Evaluation :::;:::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::;
Test and
Evaluation
Advanced Technology ACT
Control System Definition
r-------------------------------------------,
•
I
•
I
_ rI
I
·I
I
•
I
•
I
-----~
I
•
I
·I
Final ACT
Configuration
ORO
Update
Initial ACT Configuration
Conventional
Baseline
Configuration
~-----~- ------ -----------------
I EVALUATION
L. _
I CRITERIA
• Wing Planform Study
~~~~~~~~~!~~----------------------. ,. --~--.-,
I PreliminaryACT Control ACT System Technology Base
• System~S.U~~E!!!..T!SH!!~.2~_A£~~!!.T~~'-..!'.!~:.M..D!~t!!.~O~ _
I
To:
Advanced Technology
ACT Control System
To:
Test and
Evaluation Element
Figure 1. Configuration/ACT Design and Evaluation Element
4
CY78 CY79 CY80 CY81 CY82 CY83 CY84 CY8S
Configuration/ACT System
Design and Evaluation
Test and
Evaluation
r-------+ To:
Test and
Evaluation
Element
Demonstration
~--.tACT System
Architecture
From:
Configuration/ACT
System Design and
Evaluation Element
._._._._.__.-....,
I
I
I
I
-----------------~
-------------------------------~
Functional System and Simulation System Ii Analysis Definition Requirements Evaluation !
i..!~T/C~NTR~L/GU~DANC~ SYS!EM . ._._. _ . __ . __ . _._._. _. _._.J
,._._. ._. - '-1 'DEMONSTR'ATIONACT'-'
I I SYSTEM DEFINITION
I ACTI Airplane
I Definition
I I
I L_A~d~v~a~n~ce=d~S:!y~s~te~m~Tr~a~d~e':S~tu~d~,e:.:s_r-rl---....J
'1 ADVANCED L _
TECHNOLOGY
~C~ON~OLSYSTEM
Figure 2. Advanced Technology ACT Control System Definition Element
5
CY78 CY79 CY8D CY81 CY82 CY83 CY84 CY8S
Configuration/ACT System
Design and Evaluation
.JAdvanced Technology ACT
Control System Definition
I
I
WIND TUNNEL TEST~ Static Wind
Tunnel Test
Wind 1.- ---1
Tunnel r-'------,
1""1-+ Model ~ Model
Design Fabrication ~
Dynamic
Wind
Tunnel Test
Final ACT I
Re-Evaluation
t
Overall
Evaluation
+
Flight
Test
Airplane
Modification
Laboratory
Evaluation
of Combined
System Elements
t------~..~ -------------Piloted '//// '/////
~//////////////.1-1-+ Simulation WPreliminary
Evaluation v/~ ~/ ~4----------.~~ Lab Checkout ~ ~ Flight Test WHANDLlNGQUALITIES~~ to; '/ Plans Wh~ and Evaluation
1-- - - - - --';;'~~~p~Jiain~~~~~,/-~r/.~~"~"/~/~'~.fi0~~~//";;~'~/"/-B'/-~'/~/-~!===:l'///- '/. '//. /////SIFT/FTMP r/. ////
Lab ~ '///////. ////////.'//- 1/ ,-- --,
Evaluation ~0 Test System Systems ~ Laboratory 1
ULTRA-RELIABLEI ~~ Specification Electronics ~ Evaluation
...~~~?a'/-~~'~/.~'~/·'~/.b~F~a~br~ic~a~ti;o;;n~~COMPUTER I '//// /h
CONCEPTS ~v/y/~// ~//nn,-- ---,
777/77/7'n'n7/7J7,. '777 '///'/' ~
ACT SYSTEM //1 T t ACT ~~ System
HARDWARE/ es v.,I'/..I1',~/~-~ Actuation
SOFTWARE SY:ite~ f'l'ffffh Fabrication 41 Laboratory I L-J
ACQUISITION ,//~:;::tlon~. L--__.-_~ ~ I Evaluation ~
AND TEST ": n, W///////ff//~'- ""-------' L. ---'
From: Fr~m: "- :ij'~hp' f P .
Configuration/ACT Advanced Technology ~~cortlondob ~~:c~
System Design and ACT Control System @ overe Y IS eport
Evaluation Element Definition Element
Time ---.....-
Figure 3. Test and Evaluation Element
6
A piloted simulation evaluation has been completed, the results of which are reported in
Reference 9. The work covered by this report is shown cross-hatched in the figure and
includes selection of a test airplane and system concept, design and fabrication of the
Test ACT System electronic elements, and initial laboratory and flight test planning.
2.2 TEST ACT TASK OVERVIEW
The approach to this element of the IAAC Project was to O} develop the design
requirements and objectives for a Production ACT System intended to be certifiable in
the 1990s, (2) develop the system requirements from the design requirements and
objectives, (3) identify the specific exceptions to the Production ACT System
requirements that are necessitated by the guidelines in the following paragraph, (4) design
and build a flightworthy active control system (Test ACT), with fly-by-wire (FBW)
implementation of pitch axis manual control, and (5) conduct laboratory and flight tests of
the Test ACT System, with the aim of resolving the technical risks associated with a
commercial application of this technology.
The Test ACT System development proceeded under the following ground rules:
a. The Test ACT System shall implement:
• Pitch-augmented stability (PAS)
• Wing-load alleviation (WLA)
• Fly-by-wire primary pitch control (elevator)
b. The Test ACT System shall be designed for flight test in the Boeing-owned 757 - 200
(NAOO O.
c. No change shall be made to primary control surface actuators.
d. Capability for inflight reversion to mechanical pitch control shall be retained.
e. The Test ACT System electronics shall be installed in consoles so the equipment can
be tested in the laboratory and then installed in the flight test airplane with minimum
disassembly.
7
In the early stages of work on the Test ACT System, Boeing prepared a request for
proposal on the electronic parts (computers and dedicated sensors) of the system and
submitted it to the following:
*• Bendix Corporation
. *
• General ElectrIc Company
*• Honeywell Incorporated
• Hydraulic Research
• Parker Bertea Aerospace
*• Rockwell-CoUins Air Transport Division
• Sperry Flight Systems
• Teledyne Controls
* Submitted proposal.
That was followed by discussions with potential subcontractors, preparation of proposals,
and selection of the subcontractor, Rockwell International Corporation, Collins Air
Transport Division. Boeing retained responsibility for the overall system architecture,
mechanical modifications, and additions to the test airplane; installation of the system in
the test airplane; laboratory test; and flight test. The electronics system design and
evaluation were shared between Boeing and the subcontractor. In the accomplishment of
this work, Boeing and Collins have operated as an integrated team; this report describes
the product of that team effort, with no special attention given to the division of
responsibilities between the prime contractor and the subcontractor.
This report covers the design, development, and fabrication of the system, up to the start
of laboratory testing at Boeing.
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3.0 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
3.1 DEFINITIONS
In this report certain common words are given special meaning that is not contained in
their dictionary definitions. These singular usages are defined below. The first two are
adjectives that categorize the flight safety implications of control functions.
Critical-any function whose loss can result in a potential hazard, avoidable by
appropriate pilot action.
Crucial-any function whose loss can result in an immediate, unconditional flight
safety hazard.
The foHowing two terms are used here as names of function categories and of
corresponding controHers and control elements, such as computers.
Essential-those functions and control elements that are crucial; they must be
~
operating if safe flight is to continue.
Primary-those functions and control elements that are critical; their loss is not
necessarily threatening to flight safety but would normally require revision to the
flight plan.
The foHowing definitions distinguish two similar control systems treated in this document.
Production ACT System-the Active Controls Technology (ACT) control system
having the same functions as Test ACT and of such design and redundancy as to have
predicted dispatch and inflight reliability that shall meet the IAAC requirements
stated herein.
Test ACT System-the ACT System that is the subject of this report. Although its
Primary sensor redundancy is not sufficient to meet the IAAC reliability standards, it
is sufficiently reliable for flight test and evaluation of anticipated Production ACT
problem areas.
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Aac
ACC
ACL
ACT
AED
AFDS
ALGOL
alt
A/P
APP
ARINC
C
CAPS
CAS
CDR
CFT
cg
CPU
CRT
CRU
CSEU
CY
O/A
DADC
3.2 ABBREVIAnONS
ampere
alternating current
Active Controls Computer
accelerometer
Active Controls Technology
ALGOL Extended for Design
Autopilot/Flight Director System
algorithmic-oriented language
altitude
autopilot
approach
Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
Celsius
Collins Adaptive Processing System
Control Augmentation System; computed airspeed
Critical Design Review
column force transducer
center of gravity
central processing unit
cathode ray tube
cruise
Control System Electronics Unit
calendar year
digital to analog
Digital Air Data Con,puter
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DAFCL Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory
dB decibel
dc direct current
deg degree of arc
DID Design Implementation Document
DOF degree of freedom
ORO Design Requirements and Objectives
DTP Detailed Test Procedure
EAS equivalent airspeed
EHSV electrohydraulic servovalve
EICAS Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System
EMI electromagnetic interference
ESS Essential
,~,
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FBW fly by wire
FCC Flight Control Computer
FCTR Flight Control Test Rig
f mode frequency
m
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
FSEU Flap/Slat Electronics Unit
FTMP fault tolerant multiprocessor
FTP Flight Test Programmer
FY fiscal year
g acceleration due to gravity
gal gallon
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GLA
GW
h
HLL
H/W
IAAC
I/O
IRS
IRU
K
kn
kN
lbf
LRU
LVDT
M
MAC
MCU
MEL
MLC
ms
MTBF
n
N
Pa
gust-load al1eviation
gross weight
height
high-level language
hardware
Integrated Application of Active Controls Technology to an Advanced
Subsonic Transport Project
input/output
Inertial Reference System
Inertial Reference Unit
gain
knot
kilonewton
pound-force
line replaceable unit
linear variable differential transformer
Mach
mean aerodynamic chord
modular control unit (ARINC dimension specification)
minimum equipment list
maneuver-load control
maximum operating Mach number
mil1isecond
mean time between failures
load factor
newton
pascal
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~, PACS Pitch Augmentation Control System
PAS pitch-augmented stability
PCU power control unit
PDR Preliminary Design Review
PFTP Preflight Test Panel
Q pitch rate
QSS steady-state pitch rate
qc calibrated impact pressure
RAM random-access memory
RFCSHL Renton Flight Control Systems Hydromechanical Laboratory
RFSC Renton Flight Simulation Center
rms root mean square
RSS reduced static stability
""...--...~,
RVDT rotary variable differential transformer
SAM Stabilizer Trim/Elevator Asymmetry Limit Module (part of CSEU)
SAT System Acceptance Test
SCD Specification Control Drawing
SIFT software-implemented fault tolerance
SIMeON simulation console
SPM Stabilizer Position Module
SSFD signal selection and fault detection
STCM Stabilizer Trim Control Module
S/W software
TAC Test ACT Console
TACP Test ACT Control Panel
TED trailing edge down
~,
13
TEU trailing edge up
UAT Unit Acceptance Tests
Vc calibrated airspeed; computed airspeed
VGND speed when on ground
VMO maximum operating airspeed
Vs stal1 speed
VT true airspeed
WLA wing-load al1eviation
WSI work station interface
3.3 SYMBOLS
°E elevator deflection
°EC elevator command
Os stabilizer deflection
A change in quantity
~ root-mean-square turbulence intensity
(J pitch attitude
A failure rate
a real part
°GUST rms isotropic gust level
T time constant
¢ rol1 angle
w imaginary part
14
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4.0 REQUIREMENTS
Early in the Test ACT Program, system requirements were established to govern the
engineering work. These included requirements of reliability and dispatchability and also
limitations on what could be done to modify the proposed test airplane. This section is a
brief summary of those requirements. More detailed requirements are contained in "ACT
System Requirements" (ref. 10) and a Test ACT Specification Control Drawing.
Section 4.1 of this document states requirements for a Production ACT System.
Section 4.2 cites the waivers from Production ACT requirements that apply to Test ACT
and lists appropriate Test ACT implementation requirements.
4.1 PRODUCTION ACT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
4.1.1 PITCH-AUGMENTED STABILITY
The prime objective of the Production ACT System is to enable an airplane to be flown
with reduced or negative longitudinal static stability. The pitch-augmented stability
(PAS) function of the Production ACT System shall enable flight with Level 1 flying
qualities (fig. 4) throughout the flight envelope and design center-of-gravity range.
4.1.2 WING-LOAD ALLEVIATION
The wing-load alleviation (WLA) function consists of maneuver-load control (MLC) and
gust-load alleviation (GLA). Maneuver-load control uses symmetrical deflection of
outboard ailerons to shift wing loads in the inboard direction and thus reduce wing bending
moments that result from loads generated during controlled maneuvers. Gust-load
alleviation generates aileron deflections to reduce wing loads produced by atmospheric
disturbances. The Production ACT System shall incorporate both forms of WLA.
4.1.3 PITCH FLY BY WIRE
Pitch axis fly by wire (FBW) shall be provided in the Production ACT System to enable a
pilot to control the elevators to maximum positive and negative deflections, with no
mechanical column-to-elevator cOll?ling and comfortable column feel forces.
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ADEQUACY FOR SELECTED TASK OR
REQUIRED OPERATION*
AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS DEMANDS ON THE PILOT IN SELECTEDTASK OR REQUIRED OPERATIONS*
HANDLING
QUALITIES
LEVEL
Excellent -
highly desirable
Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance
Good -
negligible deficiencies
Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance 2
Fair - some mildly
unpleasant deficiencies
Minimal pilot compensation required for
desired performance 3
*Definition of required operation involves designation of flight phase and/or subphases with accompanying conditions.
YES Minor but annoying Desired performance requires moderate 4deficiencies pilot compensation
Deficiencies
warrant Moderately objectionable Adequate performance requires 5 2
improvement deficiencies considerable pilot compensation
Very objectionable but Adequate performance requires extensive 6
0- YES
tolerable deficiencies pilot compensation
Adequate performance not attainable with
Is adequate
Major deficiencies maximum tolerable pilot compensation 7
Controllability not in question
performance NO Deficiencies
attainable with a tolerable require Major deficiencies Considerable pilot compensation is required 3pilot workload? improvement for control 8
Major deficiencies Intense pilot compensation is required to
retain control 9
NO Improvement Control will be lost during some portion of reqUired
mandatory Major deficiencies operation
Figure 4. Revised Cooper-Harper Rating Scale, Annotated
)
/~ 4.1.4 RELIABILITY AND SAFETY
The Production ACT System shall be designed in accordance with the failure survival
specifications of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular 25.1309b
(ref. 11) as follows:
• Any condition that can prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane
shall be extremely improbable. This is interpreted to be loss of the Essential System.
Probability of such a condition will be shown by analysis to be less than 10-9 during a
I-hr flight.
• The occurrence of any other failure condition that can reduce the capability of the
airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions shall be
improbable. This is interpreted to be loss of Primary PAS. Such a probability will be
shown by analysis to be less than 10-5 during a I-hr flight.
• No single Production ACT System failure shall preclude continued safe flight and
landing.
4.1.5 SCHEDULE RELIABILITY
Schedule reliability is defined as the probability of starting and completing a scheduled
revenue flight without an interruption chargeable to an aircraft system or component
primary malfunction (not secondary or consequential) involving cancellations, air
turnbacks, diverted landings, and delays greater than 15 min. Dispatch reliability includes
only cancellations and delays greater than 15 min.
The Production ACT System shall meet the following schedule reliability requirement:
• Schedule interruptions caused by ACT equipment shall not exceed 65 per 100 000
departures.
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4.2 TEST ACT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The overriding requirements applying to these systems are cited in Section 4.1.4. The
extreme reliability required of a full authority elevator controller gives rise to
subordinate requirements, some of which are stated in the following paragraphs as they
apply to the Test ACT System. The complete statement of requirements for Test ACT is
contained in the System Requirements document (ref.10) and several procurement specifi-
cations. Some of the more fundamental requirement items are given in the following
paragraphs.
4.2.1 SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The system design applicable to the Test ACT System shall be such that the performance
requirements of Section 4.1 can be met. The system requirements shall include, but not
be limited to, the following:
• The control computers shall provide the system monitoring, redundancy management,
and reconfiguration required to meet the performance specifications of Section 4.1.
• The system shal1 have an automated preflight test capability that determines, in less
than 3 min, the dispatch status of Test ACT and indicates it to the crew.
• Preflight test coverage shall be sufficient to meet the inflight reliability and safety
requirements stated in Section 4.1.
• System faults detected by automatic tests and monitors shal1 be automatically stored
in system memory and readily recalled by maintenance personnel.
• The system shall incorporate control and display panels enabling the flight crew to:
• Exert necessary control over the operation and testing of the system
• Monitor system status and all adjustments caused by faults and automatic
reconfiguration
• Make preplanned changes to the system for flight test investigations
18
• The system shall be designed such that a generic software error cannot result in a
hardover elevator command.
• The electronics shall be contained in two consoles, each limited to the following
dimensions:
• Height l.3m (53 in.)
• Length l.lm (42 in.)
• Depth 0.8m (32 in.)
The maximum weight shall be 181 kg (400 lb).
4.2.2 MECHANICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The mechanical backup control requirement and the problems of installing Test ACT into
an existing airplane create special electrical and mechanical implementation
requirements. Those of the mechanical category follow:
• Both mechanical and FBW controls shall be available during flight.
• The design shall be such that a single disconnect in the elevator linkage will not
disable more than one elevator.
• The maximum hysteresis, deadband, and linearity between commanded and measured
elevator positions shall be in accordance with Figure 5.
• The feel system parameters and tolerances shall be designed per Figure 6.
Requirements for force transducers are defined in References 2 and 3.
• The FBW control column shall be mass balanced so that the column force resulting
from inertial forces generated by accelerated flight within the design envelope will
not exceed 13.3N (3.0 lb). The column and its feel system shall be damped to avoid
column overshoot.
19
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Figure 5. Hysteresis, Deadband, and Linearity Requirements-FBW Mechanical Path
Implementation of PAS and pitch FBW in accord with the above statements necessitates
redundant elevator secondary servoactuators. Requirements applying to those
servoactuators include the following:
• The actuators have the authority to drive the power control units (PCU) and the
elevators to 30-deg trailing edge up and 20-deg trailing edge down.
• Maximum no-load surface rate is at least 55 deg/sec. ElectrohydrauJic valve'
characteristic~ are the same as those of the current 757 rollout guidance actuator,
modified as required for increased flow.
• Torque output of each actuator is such that no more than two actuators are required
to handle all anticipated loads, including jam override capability.
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Figure 6. Control Column Feel System Requirements
• When connected in a control loop with a loop gain of 30 rad/sec, the secondary
actuator meets the stability, frequency response, null shift, and hysteresis
requirements of the existing 757 rollout guidance actuator.
Requirements are not stated for aileron secondary servoactuators. Only electronic WLA
commands will be evaluated during flight testing; i.e., actuator commands will be
monitored but not routed to control surfaces.
4.2.3 ELECTRONIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The design and fabrication requirements of the electronic parts were imposed to ensure
adequate reliability. These requirements are as follows:
21
• Materials and processes employed in the design of the equipment shall be consistent ---
with those approved for the 757/767 Autopilot/Flight Director System.
• The design of the equipment shall be adequate to ensure operation within the design
limits during and/or after exposure to altitude, temperature, vibration, and g loads
applicable to 757/767 airplanes.
• The equipment shall operate properly when supplied with power of 757/767 standards.
• The computer power supply shall operate from either or both of two 28V de power
sources. The power supply shall provide seven dc-regulated voltages for logic circuits
and two semiregulated single-phase 400-Hz ac sources of power required to excite
system sensors.
• The power supply shall sustain all loads during zero power input from both sources for
a period of 50 ms. Current sensing of each source to the power supply shall ensure
both a limit on initial inrush of current and a current balance between the two
sources.
• The system wiring shall be designed to minimize susceptibility to electromagnetic
interference.
4J Connector and wiring separation between channels and circuit segregation on the
printed circuit boards shall be retained to prevent a short from resulting in the
failure of the system to perform its design functions.
o The software design procedures shall be consistent with 707/727/737 software
standards.
• The software shall be verified by functional test, functional walkthrough, and module
inspection.
e The control computers shall have the speed and capability required to perform in real
time all calculations required to implement simultaneously the control laws,
monitors, and redundancy management functions.
22
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5.0 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section identifies the main features of the Test ACT system architecture and relates
their choice to the critical issues faced in the system design.
The system mechanizes flight-crucial pitch aXIS stability augmentation and fly-by-wire
(FBW) longitudinal control; hence the pitch control system must have a probability of
total function loss of less than 10-9 in a flight of 1-hr duration. It also mechanizes wing-
load alleviation (WLA), speed stability augmentation, and elevator offload functions
requiring a function loss rate less than 10-5• These facts yield the critical issues of the
system architecture and result in the features described below.
5.1 ARCHITECTURE ISSUES
In the course of work by the Boeing-Collins team toward selection of the system
architecture, the following items were identified as issues of prime importance:
.~ • What redundancy management plan, system elements, and interfaces will serve to
achieve a probability of function loss less than 1 X 10-9 in a l-hr flight?
• What redundancy level is required to preserve airline schedule reliability?
• What system architecture will minimize susceptibility to generic hardware and
software faults?
• What monitors can be allowed to shut down a channel of crucial function control?
• Assuming a two-level system, composed of Primary and Essential computer sets:
• Is switching between levels allowable?
• In which level is preflight test performed?
• Are both levels full authority?
• How should the Essential part be implemented:
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Digital or analog?
Cross compared or "brick walled"?
Sensors dedicated or shared with the other level?
• Can gain variation be allowed in the Essential set?
• Should digital computer operation be synchronous or asynchronous?
• Should preflight test be automatic or manual?
• What are the system voting planes?
These critical issues are discussed later in this section. A number of lesser issues arose in
the system design process, including these:
•. Should redundant Primary system sensors be connected one-for-one with the
computers, or "cross strapped"?
• Shall the system when "down moded" (reduced in redundancy by apparent component
fault) be allowed to "up mode" if component recovery occurs?
• How much redundancy is needed in the servoactuator shutdown function?
• Must there be an Essential channel oscillatory failure monitor?
• What servoactuator tests are needed?
• What down-mode strategy is employed?
• How is preflight test of the analog channels accomplished?
These and other design decisions are addressed in Section 5.1.
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5.1.1 RESOLUTION OF CRITICAL ISSUES
Functional Partitioning-The challenge of the 10-9 function loss has been a key feature of
the IAAC Project since its inception. Early in the project, it was determined that an
integrated active control system, using a single set of redundant digital computers serving
all functions, was better than a segregated one using a separate computer set for each
function. The digital computer served admirably to combine in one machine the diverse
operations of control law computation, self-test, monitoring, voting, and redundancy
management. On the other hand, the computer's complexity raised serious doubts that it
could be made to meet the specified reliability. In light of that, the principle of
partitioning by criticality of functions was applied and has been retained in all project
phases, including Test ACT. Since fly by wire is a beneficial function with the same
criticality as that of pitch augmentation, it was added as a functional requirement; but
the less critical WLA and speed stability augmentation are kept separate from the
Essential pitch control system. This functionally partitioned approach ensures that a less
critical function cannot compromise the safety of a crucial function and thereby reduces
risk. Functional partitioning therefore was an early architectural decision.
Digital Primary-For the Primary system, the versatility and computation power of the
digital computer were judged necessary. The interface with digital state sensors (air data
and inertial) is easier and more reliable with digital computation. Also, redundancy
management and built-in test requirements make digital capability almost mandatory.
This left open the question of what was to serve as the ultrareliable backup system, now
called the Essential system, for the functions requiring the less than 10-9 probability of
function loss.
Backup System-The requirement for crucial function reliability is a probability of loss of
function less than 10-9 in a I-hr flight. Based on the projected reliability of components
such as sensors, computers, and actuators, an Essential system that could survive two
similar failures (fail op2) was required. The next decision was that the fail op2 fault
tolerance requirement would be met with a four-channel (quadruple) system. While a
three-channel system can be fail op2 if sufficient inline monitoring is provided, that
introduces the major risk of uncertainty in providing and proving coverage for the second
fault. The quadruple concept aVOlds this risk by detecting all faults by either voting or
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comparison monitoring. This approach is widely accepted as providing essentiaUy 100%
coverage. The penalty of this approach is the cost of the fourth channel and supporting
systems such as electric and hydraulic power.
Protection Against Generic Faults-A major issue to be addressed was the generic fault
problem. How do you prove to the required extreme confidence level that a software
error or latent fault cannot result in failure of aU redundant channels? Solutions to this
problem take two forms: (1) fault avoidance by vigorous design and test and (2) fault
tolerance. The next major architectural decision was that Test ACT would be designed to
tolerate generic faults. The basic way to survive a generic error is to provide dissimilar
redundancy.
Several quadruple, dissimilar, standby computer concepts were developed using both
digital and analog computers for the standby system. They used the basic principles of
generic fault detection by reasonableness or "red line" monitoring (ref. 12) and also
generic fault isolation by switching control from the failed digital computer set to a
dissimilar system providing "get home" capability. Since the airplane may be
10ngitudinaUy unstable, it was assumed that the pilots could not perform the switching
operation; it would have to be computer controlled.
This concept was examined in depth. Aside from the obvious implementation complexity
and some concern over generic faults such as lightning that could disable aU digital
computers, the primary technical issue emerged as a lack of confidence in the switching
function. For example, what sort of monitor can, with extreme reliability, detect generic
faults? And how do you know that the standby system is working when it is used only
under extremely rare conditions?
The Collins proposal addressed the switching dilemma with a concept based on the
following premises. First, simple analog systems can be designed and tested to be immune
. to generic faults. Second, the "simple" analog computer (supported with dedicated, high-
reliability, feedforward and feedback sensors) can do aU crucial functions operating
continuously and provide at least "get home" flying qualities. The plan uses digital
Primary computers with additional feedback variables and gain scheduling to provide
additive control commands, yieldi'1g very good handling qualities for normal conditions.
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Digital command authority is limited by the analog computer such that even a hardover
generic digital fault is fail-safe (failure transients kept below passenger Injury or
structural damage levels). The digital computers also perform most of the test and
monitor functions.
Essential System Monitors-The concept just described is founded upon simplicity of the
analog Essential channel, a low channel failure rate (MTBF more than 10 000 hr), and
careful avoidance of any path by which failure of one channel can contaminate another
channel. Cross-channel communication was found to be incompatible with these objec-
tives; the Essential system has to be "brick walled"; Le., the channels are isolated from
one another through all electric paths. This requires that all monitoring is done in line
rather than cross channel; and all input voting must be performed individually in each
channel. This leads to the questions of what monitors in the system are "executive" (i.e.,
able to shut down an Essential channel) and where are the voting planes of the system in
general.
The monitor philosophy is based on the same rationale that led to the choice of brick-
,---. walled analog Essential control computers; namely any executive monitor must be simple,
analog, and in line. Thus the executive monitors are all in either the power supplies or in
the Essential computers and comprise the power monitor, the LVDT common mode
monitors, the rate gyro spin monitor, and the servoactuator detent monitor.
Voting Planes-The choice of voting planes was aimed at promoting reliability by
minimizing the impact of failed components. Inputs to the Primary digital system are
obtained from autonomous input/output circuits and communicated cross channel such
that a failed central processor does not deny its sensor input signal to other channels.
Primary elevator commands are voted in the Essential analog computer, as are the three
flap position discrete inputs, so that the brick-walled analog channels all see the same
values for those inputs. The ultimate voting plane is the secondary servoactuator
summing shaft-the final system output. Here the four Essential channel signals are force
voted. The detent of a failed channel actuator is overcome by the other three actuators
in the first failure case, or by the other two in case of a second failure. If the detent
offset exceeds 2.5-deg equivalent elevator deflection for 3 sec, the servoactuator detent
monitor disengages the failed channel.
Primary Redundancy-Earlier IAAC studies indicated that the critical function probability
of loss rate less than 10-5 in a I-hr flight can be met with a three-channel Primary system
architecture. That requires that all. three channels are available for dispatch, a
stipulation which would affect schedule reliability. The preferred solution, given that
four electric power supplies are already needed for· the Essential system, is a quadruple
Primary system that may be dispatched with one channel down.
Preflight Test-Meeting the prescribed reliability levels of the Primary and Essential
systems requires a certain known availability level of redundant channels at takeoff. The
Primary system must have three of the four channels available, and the Essential system
all four. Knowing this requires a thorough preflight test before each departure. How
should preflight test be performed? If it is automatic, where is its control lodged?
Early IAAC system studies yielded these conclusions:
• Preflight test should not add significantly to the time now required for the cockpit
preparation routines of a commercial airliner.
• It should add little or nothing to the work required of the pilot.
Corollary conclusions were that preflight test should require no more than 2-min elapsed
time and should be automatic to the maximum practical degree.
In proceeding with detailed specification of Test ACT preflight test, the design team
observed that a small measure of flight crew participation is needed. The crew should
initiate the test so that it may be done at a convenient and appropriate time; and, since a
complete checkout includes control surface motion, the crew must ascertain airplane
ground clearance before that part of the test occurs. These factors led to the design
decision to automate preflight in two stages, each initiated by a pilot. The first is an all-
electronic part, called "Passive"; the second, involving control surface motions, is called
"Active" and calls for a pilot's application of fore and aft forces on the control column. In
all other respects, preflight test is conducted automatically; assuming the pilots respond
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promptly to indications requesting "Start Active," "Pull Column," and "Push Column," the
complete test requires less than 2 min.
The preflight test sequence is of sufficient complexity such that it could not be done in a
simple analog computer; it must be controlled in the Primary system. This requires
special care in testing Essential analog functions to preserve the "brick walled" character
of Essential channels. This is achieved by allowing the crucial functions of an analog
channel to be interrogated by only one Primary.
Essential Gain Variation-From the point of view of preserving simplicity of the Essential
computer, it is clearly desirable that it operate in all flight modes at constant gain. It
soon becomes evident that the Primary elevator command limit of 2.5 deg, chosen to limit
hardover response to 19 normal acceleration in 3 sec under cruise condition, would not
allow the system to produce Level I handling qualities at low speed. This made two limit
levels, and a high-reliability means of switching between them, necessary in the Essential
system. The switching requirement was met by means of voting among three available
"flaps down" discrete signals, and using the voted discrete to change the limit from 7 deg
at low airspeed to 2.5 deg at high airspeed and vice versa. Given this reliable speed
change signal, it was practical to solve the low-speed/high-speed problem in the Essential
control laws by switching gain in the feedforward and feedback paths while keeping the
low-gain (high-speed) line continuous in both circuits. In the transition to low speed, the
flap discrete brings in additional gain.
Asynchronous Primary Computers-Asynchronous operation of the redundant digital
computers was chosen for this application. Low bandwidth inputs and high sampling rates
minimize the time offset disadvantage of asynchronous operation. The wide fault
threshold normally characteristic of asynchronous operation is not needed here because
the digital signals are not isolated by comparison monitoring. Asynchronous operation
also avoids the synchronizer as a possible single-point failure source. The option of
synchronized computer operation for future tests was retained by designing and including
a synchronization circuit card in each computer box.
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5.1.2 SUMMARY
Architecture merits that resulted from the evolution described previously are as follows:
• The system can survive a worst case generic digital fault.
• The system can tolerate any two similar failures with no reduction in performance.
(Because of the voting planes, even greater tolerance for dissimilar failures is
provided.)
• The high-reliability analog portion of the system is always "on line" and requires no
switching.
• Digital computers are used for their unique control law and redundancy management
capability.
o The concept provides very high fault isolation coverage.
In summary, the selected system is hybrid and combines the safety of simple analog
computers with the performance and versatility of digital computers.
5.2 TEST ACT CONFIGURATION
The Test ACT System Configuration is shown in Figure 7. Test ACT is separated by a
heavy dashed line from airplane equipment with which it interfaces. The redundancy
limitations of the Primary system, described in Section 4.2, are shown in the boxes
representing 757 sensors at the left and the trim system at the bottom of the figure.
Note that the Essential sensors for column force and dedicated pitch rate are quadruple.
(The term "dedicated" distinguishes the quadruple pitch-rate gyro inputs from the lower
reliability Primary pitch-rate signals coming from triple Inertial Reference Systems
(IRS».
The general arrangement of Figure 7 is conventional for control systems; i.e., in general
sensors are situated at the left, tLe computers in the center, and the servoactuators at
the right side. An exception is the placement of the dedicated pitch-rate sensors in the
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Figure 7. Test ACT System Block Diagram
middle of the Test ACT System part of the diagram, just above the Essential analog
computers. The autopilot Flight Control Computer (FCC) and the Control System
Electronics Unit at the bottom of the diagram are both control computers that are part of
the existing test airplane equipment. Control and display panels and the system console
are in the Test ACT System box at the upper left. For the sake of diagram clarity, all
redundant connections, whether dual, triple, or quadruple, are represented by single lines.
5.2.1 ESSENTIAL SYSTEM
The part of the Test ACT System that must perform with extremely high reliability, as
discussed in Section 5.0, is the Essential system, comprising the column force sensors,
dedicated pitch-rate sensors, Essential analog computers, and elevator secondary
actuators. This is the quadruple, simple, brick-walled, high-reliability system that always
operates to provide acceptable airplane handling characteristics in the pitch axis,
regardless of center-of-gravity location. The FBW function is generated by the column
force sensors and a simple, dual-gain feedforward control law in the analog computers
coupled to the elevator servos. Short-period pitch stability augmentation is provided by
the pitch-rate gyros and a simple dual-gain feedback control law. Both of those control
functions are available for safe flight if the entire Primary system fails. In normal
operation those controls are supplemented by Primary system commands to provide
Levell flying qualities in pitch. By keeping the Essential system very simple and free of
elaborate gain schedules and reconfiguration provisions, the estimated reliability meets
the requirement quoted in Section 4.1.4.
5.2.2 PRIMARY SYSTEM
The Primary system utilizes the airplane sensors shown at the left in Figure 7 plus the
wing accelerometers, the quadruple Primary digital computers, and the airplane trim
system to perform the functions of speed stability augmentation, elevator offload, and
wing-load alleviation. As shown in the diagram, the wing-load alleviation function is
carried through computation of the servo command, which is monitored and made part of
the redundancy management process in the computer; but no aileron secondary servos are
installed and hence there is no airplane response to that function. Since autonomous input
processing is provided to preservE. sensor redundancy in the event of Primary central
processor failure, the sensor-to-computer coupling plan is fundamentally one-for-one.
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The test airplane's shortage of Primary sensors requires that limited cross-strapping be
employed to serve each computer with direct coupling to a complete sensor set; for
example, the center IRS is connected to two Primary computers.
The Primary system also contributes to short-period pitch augmentation and the fly-by-
wire feedforward control law; for the latter it requires column force sensor input. For
the Primary computers, that column force signal is supplied from the Essential computers;
this is done for reliability reasons. Column force is a buffered output from the Essential
computers to the Primary, so that a catastrophic failure in the Primary input system
cannot affect the Essential column force input. That scheme also saves one set of
demodulators.
The Primary computer is a minicomputer derived from the Collins FCC 701, the
Autopilot/Flight Director System computer for the Boeing 757 and 767 airplanes. Its high
throughput and memory capacity enable it to be programmed for these diverse functions:
• Control laws for the active control and fly-by-wire functions listed above
• Primary system redundancy management and reconfiguration control
• Preflight test of the complete Test ACT system, including the Essential channels
• Self-test and self-monitor functions
• Sensor signal selection and failure detection
• Flight crew communication and control via three flight deck panels
• Simulated maintenance interface via the Test ACT Console
Redundancy management design issues include such questions as the down-mode strategy
for sequential failures in sensor sets; the choice made for Test ACT is "4-3-2-0"; i.e., no
operation on a sensor signal is allowed if only a single valid input is available. This relates
also to the question of whether or not sensor upmode is allowed; the answer is a qualified
"yes," requiring a renewed valid signal from both inline monitor and comparison monitor.
Preflight test control is another large assignment for the Primary computer. Since the
ultimate voting plane is the detent vote at the actuator force summing shaft, proper
detent operation is crucial and a "soft detent" test must be a part of preflight. This
requires that three Primary computers disengage their respective Essential servoactuators
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while the fourth Primary tests its associated actuator detent. Two solenoid valves in
series provide redundant capability for servo shutdown. The detent comparator includes a
means of Essential channel oscillatory failure detection.
The "Test ACT Console" block in Figure 7 represents the Test ACT System structure. In
the laboratory, the console is the housing and mounting for all of the system except the
servos; in the test airplane it carries all of the system except the servos, the system
sensors, and the three flight deck panels. This arrangement minimizes the
interconnection changes needed in the move from laboratory to airplane.
The connection from the Flight Test Programmer to the autopilot FCC is a discrete signal
to (1) disable the cruise autopilot computer when Test ACT is operating and (2) engage the
autopilot actuator as a detent in the Test ACT series summing linkage. That signal passes
through the ACT STATUS switch, the element by which the pilots can promptly disable
Test ACT and revert to mechanical control of the pitch axis. In such case, the single-
channel cruise autopilot also becomes available. Because Test ACT employs two autopilot
servo positions in the test airplane, the multiple-channel autoland autopilot is not
available.
A single line is employed in Figure 7 to indicate one of the system's most important
features; i.e., when Test ACT is operating the elevator secondary actuators are always
under the control of the analog Essential computers.
5.3 OPERAnON MODES
The operational modes sequence (fig. 8) represents normal operation of a production
system. A few seconds after electric power is applied to the system, the automatic
power-up test sequence is completed, the "NO GO" status indicator on the preflight test
panel is illuminated, and the "PRESS PASSIVE" message appears to the crew on the Engine
Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). A pilot then initiates the passive preflight
test by pushing the "PASSIVE" button on the preflight test panel. (The "PASSIVE" term
refers to the fact that there is no control surface motion during this first portion of
preflight test.) The PASSIVE test sequence, requiring less than 30 sec, is described in
detail in Section 6.3.1.2. In the absence of faults, the end of this sequence is signified by
the appearance of an illuminated "A.RM" indication in the pushbutton for the active test
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Figure B. Test ACT System Operational Modes
sequence on the Preflight Test Panel. When the pilots have verified airplane ground
clearance, they can initiate the active phase of preflight test involving the motion of
control surfaces. This phase, also described in Section 6.3.1.2, requires a pilot to puB and
push the control column in response to appropriate crew prompt messages displayed upon
EICAS. Assuming no failure has been encountered, this test phase ends with the
appearance of the green "GO" indication on the Preflight Test Panel. The complete
preflight test series requires less than 2 min.
The system now is in takeoff status; the Essential system is in operation, but Primary PAS
and WLA are inactive to ensure that they do not cause undesired response to accelerations
encountered in ground taxi and roUing. Since the flaps are down in a takeoff position, the
Essential system is on its high gain setting. During the takeoff roB, when airspeed
exceeds 26 m/sec (50 kn), preflight test is locked out. At liftoff, Primary PAS and WLA
are activated through "EASY ON" circuits such that they do not inject a step signal into
the control surface actuators. During climb, when the flaps arc fuUy retracted, the
Essential and Primary systems are switched to the low gain setting; this status wiH be
maintained until the approach to landing when the airplane is again at low speed, flying
with flaps down. As the airplane touches down in the landing phase, Primary PAS and
WLA are deactivated, again to prevent undesirable control surface motions in response to
ground accelerations. As the airplane slows down to 21 m/sec (40 kn), preflight test
becomes available so that the system can immediately be prepared for the next flight leg.
In the early stages of Test ACT flight test, takeoff and landing wiH be done with positive
pitch stability and with the system deactivated. In such cases, preflight test wiU be run;
then prior to takeoff, the servos will be disengaged by means of the ACT STATUS switch
on the Flight Test Programmer (sec. 6.3.1.3).
5.4 CONTROL LAWS
The control laws implemented in both digital Primary and analog Essential computers are
shown in Figures 9, la, and 11. They are tailored to the test airplane and to the
operations plan shown in Figure 8. Since the Primary computer is digital and the Essential
computer analog, the column force detent is implemented in both forms and shown in
Figure 9 in both machines. Analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog converters are not
included in these diagrams. The "Easy On/Off" blocks shown are provided to ensure that
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discrete switching functions occurring at operation mode changes such as lift-off, flaps
up, and flaps down do not introduce step changes in elevator command.
Control law synthesis is described in Section 10.2.
5.5 HARDWARE CONFIGURATION
5.5.1 ELECTRONIC HARDWARE
The Test ACT System electronic hardware is shown in Figure 12. It includes all of the
Collins-supplied elements of the actual control system except the wing accelerometers.
On top of the computers in that photograph are three control and display panels that will
be installed in the test airplane flight deck. Figure 13 provides a closer view of these
panels. The Flight Test Programmer (FTP), occupying the center panel in that figure, is
needed in the Test ACT System only; the Test ACT Control Panel (TACP) and the
Preflight Test Panel (PFTP) would have counterparts in the Production ACT System
installation.
Figure 14 shows the Test ACT Console (TAC), which houses the control system
electronics, plus the equipment for controlling and communicating with the system in
laboratory and flight test operations. The TAC is shown in its laboratory test
configuration; the column force sensors are mounted on top of console No.2, with a lever
for force application. The three flight deck panels are installed at the upper right in
console No.1. The Active Controls Computers (ACC) occupy the left half of console
No.2, and the balance of the equipment provides means of instrumenting system
conditions, loading and reading software, simulating faults, controlling power supplies, and
conducting other test operations.
5.5.2 MECHANICAL HARDWARE
Mechanical modifications to the airplane affect two subsections of the pitch control
system, located under the flight deck floor and aft of the pressurized cabin. Those
modifications have been designed; they are described and illustrated in Section 8.0 and
Appendix D.
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6.0 SYSTEM DESIGN: ELECTRONIC HARDWARE
Figure 7, the block diagram of the Test ACT System as a whole, is a good aid in
recognizing the interrelationship of the diverse elements described in the following
paragraphs.
6.1 COMPUTERS
The Test ACT System employs two control elements: the Primary digital computer and
the Essential analog computer. These two computers are housed in one chassis to make
use of existing equipment and to avoid the added cost and development time of a new
chassis. The 757/767 Flight Control Computer {FCC-700 forms the framework, but the
delivered unit is called an Active Controls Computer (ACC), as shown in Figure 15.
The ACC represents a high-technology design that provides for a flexible implementation
of the Test ACT requirements. It is partitioned into 19 circuit cards, 3 interconnect
cards, and a power supply packaged in an 8-MCU assembly, as shown in Figure 16. The
hardware is divided into functional elements to meet the requirements of safety
segregation, hardware tasks, and module testability.
Circuit segregation, a very important consideration in the hardware design, is accom-
plished by use of card boundaries and component isolation within the card. Major
functional elements are located on individual cards, providing, when feasible, a natural
separation. Where there are several redundant functions per card, components are
physically segregated as much as possible.
6.1.1 PRIMARY COMPUTER
Figure 17 shows the partitioning of the Primary and Essential computers in the ACC. The
Primary computer is designed around a dual-bus architecture, consisting of a high-speed
computer bus (transfer bus) and a dedicated input/output (I/O) bus.
The I/O bus is managed by the I/O controller, which handles the transactions for serial
input/output data, discrete inputs, and analog inputs. Five circuit cards interface with
this bus: the I/O data path card, the I/o control card {both of which make up the I/O
45
Figure 15. Active Controls Computer - Cards A6, A8, A9, A12, and A20 Removed
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controller), the analog input card, the digital/discrete input card, and the Aeronautical
Radio Incorporated (ARINC) 429 I/O card. Transactions that take place via the I/O bus
are independent of the central processing unit (CPU).
However, the CPU, which consists of control and data path circuit cards, manages devices
that interface with the transfer bus. Ten peripheral cards are tied to this bus and are
under control of the CPU. They provide the functions of:
• Program memory
• Read-write memory
• Servo interfaces
• Computer timing
• Wing-load alleviation (WLA) engage arm and trim logic
• Pitch-augmented stability (PAS) and WLA caution and warn outputs
• System monitoring
• Cross-channel data reception
• Synchronization
• Bus termination
The basic architecture of the Primary computer is the same as that of the FCC-70 1. This
is very important to the Test ACT Program in that it provides the low risk of a known,
working digital system. It also allows the use of existing development tools, such as the
Collins Adaptive Processing System (CAPS) Test Adapters, from the Autopilot/Flight
Director System (AFDS) Program. Additional expense is avoided by using existing
software tools, such as the ALGOL Extended for Design (AED) compiler and link editor, to
change the AED source code to the CAPS relocatable object code.
6.1.2 ESSENTIAL COMPUTER
The Essential analog portion of the ACC has two main functions: computation of the
Essential control laws and the wa:-ning and engage logic. As shown in Figure 17, the
Essential control law functions are distributed between two cards. Essential No. I (card
A6) contains the pitch-rate and column force input filtering and control law
implementation, including flap pt:sition gain switching. Essential No. 2 contains the
Primary command signal selection and the servo amplifier electronics. ACC card A9
contains the Essential warning and engage electronics.
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The Essential control laws are implemented with analog circuitry. Certain gains and
filters have been identified as candidates for change during the laboratory test and flight
test program phases. For these, the mounting of the resistors and capacitors has been
arranged to allow replacement of the components without damage to the printed circuit
boards.
6.1.3 POWER SUPPLY
Early in the development of the ACCs, it was determined that the FCC power supply,
with its single ac power source, did not have sufficient reliability to serve as the ACC
power supply. In order to meet the Test ACT reliability requirements, dual airplane 28-V
dc power sources for the power supply module were needed. This power supply module is
designed to perform satisfactorily with either dc source unavailable.
The power supply module, supported by the aircraft power system, supplies all voltage
necessary to power the ACC and to provide excitation and/or power for the system
sensors of the Test ACT System.
Because of space limitations in the FCC chassis, it was not possible to incorporate
independent power supplies for the Primary and Essential computers. The resulting single
supply module was designed to serve both and still fulfill the requirements imposed on an
independent Essential supply, which are:
• To provide regulated power to the computers
G To provide 26-V ac, 400-Hz sensor excitation
• To provide 115-V ac, 400-Hz power for the rate gyros
The FCC power supply, fed by 115V ac, 400 Hz, has two major sections: a primary ac-to-
dc power converter and a secondary stepdown, dc-to-dc voltage regulator. For the ACC-
regulated power requirement, the primary section was replaced by two step-up, dc-to-dc
power converters; the secondary section remained the same. To fulfill the sensor
excitation requirement, a new dc-to-ac power converter design was required.
Because power supplies of the "sw:tching regulator" type are inherently noisy in terms of
electromagnetic radiation, the power supply module design incorporates shielding and
electromagnetic interference (EMI) filters to alleviate the problem. The completed
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design was subjected to Collins' standard qualification testing (based on Radio Technical
Committee for Aeronautics document, 00-160, ref. 13) to ensure that radiation did not
exceed acceptable limits. The design was also tested for electromagnetic susceptibility
over the ambient temperature range and was found to be acceptable.
Avionics systems typically monitor the power supply and use power status information in
engage, annunciation, and other decision logic. To aid in evaluation of system response to
Primary and/or Essential power failures, the "power valid" signals for the Primary and
Essential computers have been kept independent.
6.2 SENSORS
6.2.1 SYSTEM SENSORS
The Test ACT System employs redundant system sensors, shown inside the dashed box of
Figure 7, as well as airplane sensors (sec. 6.2.2) already installed in the test airplane. The
system sensors serving the Essential computers are pitch-rate gyros and control column
force transducers; those for the Primary computers are wing accelerometers.
A rate gyro generates an analog output proportional to the angular rate of change about a
specified axis. In the Test ACT application, the pitch-rate gyro measures the airplane
angular rate about the lateral axis and provides a two-wire analog output used as feedback
in the Essential PAS short-period stabilization loop.
The control column transducers issue an ac voltage proportional to the applied force used
in the Essential fly-by':'wire (FBW) function.
The accelerometers produce an analog output proportional to the acceleration along the
axis that is perpendicular to the mounting surface. In Test ACT, the accelerometer
measures the acceleration of the outboard wings normal to the reference plane and
provides an input to the gust-load alleviation (GLA) function control law.
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6.2.1.1 Pitch-Rate Gyros
In the Test ACT System, the pitch-rate gyro is a combination unit composed of a
miniature rate gyro attached to a mounting base that contains electronics for self-
monitoring and preflight test. This assembly is shown in Figure 18. The rate gyros are
Smith's Industries 7195-9 air-bearing gyros. Their predicted mean time between failures
(MTBF) is greater than 20 000 operating hours and has been confirmed in service.
Figure 18. Pitch-Rate Gyro
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Operating experience to date indicates that the most probable gyro failure mode is motor
failure to start. To detect this mode, a dedicated spin monitor in the mounting base
senses phase lock of the rotor and stator. A rotor that is not spinning at proper speed will
be out of synchronism and will be detected. Because a slow or nonspinning rotor is a
passive failure of the sensor (Le., it is not observable at the analog output until a pitch
event occurs), the monitor state is provided as discrete output. In the Test ACT Program,
this discrete is used by the Essential computer as a condition in the Essential servo engage
logic.
A torque coil is installed on the gyro to allow a ground check of the precession sensing
mechanism. By means of a test circuit in the mounting base, the rate gyro may be
commanded to produce an output equivalent to a known value of pitch rate. Proper
response to the torque command indicates proper operation of the gyro output provisions
downstream of actual gyroscopic precession. This response is not affected by rotor speed;
it is no substitute for the spin monitor described above.
6.2.1.2 Control Column Force Transducers
The column force transducer (fig. 19) is constructed by Kavlico to Boeing 757 aircraft
drawing 5253T40 1, with changes that provide four independent electrical outputs per
transducer.
Figure 19. Column Force Transducer
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The linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) force transducers do not include
monitoring or self-test provisions. Their outputs are three wire, which allow user
monitoring of open or shorted signal paths. Check of the actual force sensing will be
accomplished by a ground check force on the control column.
6.2.1.3 Wing Accelerometers
The wing accelerometer (fig. 20) is a dc analog unit purchased from the Systron-Donner
Corporation and packaged per Collins specifications. It does not include monitoring or
self-test provisions, but the nominal I-g output due to gravity provides· a convenient
method of checking accelerometer operation. The unit has a predicted MTBF of 60 000
operating hours, supported by field data on 1 year of service.
Figure 20. Accelerometer
6.2.2 AIRPLANE SENSORS
This section discusses those airplane sensors used in the 757-200 production configuration.
The sensors are connected to the Test ACT computers as shown in Figures 21 through 24,
and their signal and discrete information is utilized in the control laws, as shown in
Figure 25.
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6.2.2.1 Inertial Reference System
There are three Inertial Reference Systems (IRS) on the 757. These strapdown systems
use laser gyros, accelerometers, and digital computation to determine the airplane pitch,
yaw, and roll attitudes and rates; accelerations; and speeds. This information is
transmitted over an ARINC 429 bus.
55
Digital Air Data Computer L
Inertial Reference System L 5 PrimaryStabilizer Position L ..
Flap Position L
... No.1
Elevator Surface Position 1
Inertial Reference System C
4Stabilizer Position C
..
Primary
Flap Position C ·r .. No. 2
Elevator Surface Position 2
Inertial Reference System R
Stabilizer Position R 4 Primary
..
Flap Position R 7 ... No.3
Elevator Surface Position 3
Digital Air Data Computer R 2 Primary
Elevator Surface Position 4 No.4
Figure 22. Primary Sensor Interface
Pitch, yaw, and roll attitude and pitch-rate information are fundamental parameters in
the Primary control laws, whereas body normal acceleration is used in the WLA control
laws. The information from all three IRSs is available to each of the four ACCs via the
cross-channel buses.
IRS connections are shown in Figure~ 21 and 22; signal routing is shown in Figure 25.
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6.2.2.2 Digital Air Data Computer
Impact pressure and static pressure are measured by means of pitot-static probes on the
aircraft. The Digital Air Data Computer (DADe) then transforms the pressure signals
into digital information and computes airspeed, Mach number, altitude, and rate of climb.
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Figure 25. Airplane Sensor Signal Distribution
There are two DADCs on the test aircraft, information from which is transmitted via an
ARINC 429 bus to two ACCs, as shown in Figure 22.
Impact pressure is used in the WLA and Primary PAS control laws for gain scheduling,
while true airspeed is the feedback variable employed for speed stability in the Primary
control laws.
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6.2.2.3 Flap Position System
The flap position system is part of the 757 high-lift control system. Its information is
derived from synchros and resolvers located on the inboard and outboard trailing-edge
flaps. The Flap/Slat Electronics Units (FSEU) generate discrete and position information
for use by other avionic components of the aircraft. The flap position signal is a dc
voltage.
Flap pOSItIOn and flaps-up discrete information is used in Test ACT computations to
schedule gains of the control laws for optimum stability. In the Test ACT Configuration,
flaps-up discrete information from each of the three FSEUs goes into the Essential
control laws of all four ACCs. A ground is provided on the console to simulate a fourth
source of flap discrete information. In the event of a failure of one of the flap discretes,
the system goes to the lower gain, flaps-up configuration.
Flap position sensor connections are shown in Figures 21 and 23.
6.2.2.4 Air-Ground System
The 757-200 air-ground system uses proximity switches that are activated by nose gear
oleo compression, right landing gear truck tilt, and left landing gear truck tilt.
Connection of the air-ground system to the Test ACT computer is indicated in Figures 21
and 24.
Air-ground logic is used to lock out WLA, Primary PAS, and automatic stabilizer trim on
the ground and preflight test in flight. It also initializes the signal selection and fault
detection (SSFD) logic.
Both on-ground signals are hardwired to each of the four Essential computers, and each
Primary channel gets information from these relays via cross-channel buses.
6.2.2.5 Stabilizer Position Sensors
Stabilizer position is a fundamental parameter in the speed and elevator offload control
laws. All computers receive this information by direct connection to a position sensor
and/or by cross-channel buses, as indicated in Figure 22.
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Stabilizer position signals are derived from the Stabilizer Position Module (SPM). Three
identical SPMs are installed in the electric system card file, which is in the electronic
equipment bay. They use an ac signal from a rotary variable differential transformer
(RVDT) located in the position transmitter module to produce a dc voltage proportional to
stabilizer position. Each SPM has both a stabilizer position and a monitor channel. The
position channel output drives four output buffer amplifiers whose output is grounded if a
fault is detected.
6.2.2.6 Elevator Surface Position Sensors
The elevator surface position sensors are dual synchros, one mounted on each elevator and
hardwired to each Primary computer. The surface position signal will be derived from
two windings of the synchro, and a third will be used for monitoring. Figures 21 and 22
show the surface position sensor connections.
Elevator position information is not presently used in the Test ACT control laws. It is a
provisional signal that may be employed in flight test if unacceptable limit cycling
develops.
6.3 CONTROL AND WARNING PANELS
6.3.1 TEST ACT PANELS
Two of the Test ACT flight deck panels, the Test ACT Control Panel (TACP) and the
Preflight Test Panel (PFTP), are located in the pilots' overhead panel. The Flight Test
Programmer (FTP) is used only during flight test and is located in the control stand.
6.3.1.1 Test ACT Control Panel
Physical Characteristics-The TACP (fig. 13, left) consists of seven switches and
annunciators, hardwired to their associated connectors and circuitry, with discrete
components mounted on a circuit board secured to the chassis.
Operation-Figure 26 shows the TACP layout with two functional groups: Essential
PAS/FBW and Primary PAS/WLA advisories.
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Figure 26. Test ACT Control Panel-Front Panel Layout
Essential PAS/FBW-The TACP contains a split-legend switchlight associated with each of
the four Essential channels. While the switchlight is in the "on" position detent, a
dedicated discrete output is provided to the respective ACC, indicating that engagement
of that Essential channel is enabled. This switch is expected to remain in the "on"
position, except when a failure has occurred; then it may be desirable to manually disable
a channel or to make an attempt to reengage after an automatic disconnect. During
normal operation :he switchlights are not illuminated.
When an ACC computer detects an Essential channel fault, it provides an automatic
disconnect of that channel. The ACC also outputs a fail discrete to the TACP, which is
used to illuminate that channel's "fail" message, located in the lower half of the
associated switchlight. This annunciation is advisory and does not require flight crew
action.
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Placing the Essential PAS switch in the "off" posItiOn removes the dedicated enable
discrete output to the associated ACC, thus removing power from the arm and engage
relays and disabling servo reengagement. When the switch is in the "off" position, it also
locally extinguishes the associated "fail" annunciation and illuminates the "off"
annunciation.
Cycling the switch back to the "on" position reapplies the enable discrete to the ACC and
initiates Essential channel servo reengagement. This action also locally extinguishes the
"off" annunciation and returns control of the "fail" annunciation to the ACe's dedicated
fail discrete.
All Essential PAS/FBW "off l ! annunciations are white, while the "fail" annunciations are
amber. The four switch functions of the system are guarded to preclude inadvertent
manual disengagement of any Essential servo.
Primary PAS/WLA: Manual Primary PAS Disconnect Switch-This switchlight is provided
to allow a manual disconnect of all four of the Primary PAS inputs to the Essential
channels.
The PAS "fail" annunciation is driven directly by discrete outputs from any of the four
ACC computers. This advisory may be used as a cue to the flight crew to override the
Primary PAS system by pressing the switchlight. (As flight safety is provided by hardware
limiters in each ACC, flight crew action is not a safety requirement.)
When the PAS switch is pressed, a dedicated PAS "on l ! discrete is removed from each
ACC. Pressing the PAS switch also extinguishes the "fail ll annunciation and illuminates
the "off" annunciation. It is expected that this switch will normally be left in the "on"
(detented) position. Because the PAS switch is guarded, inadvertent operation is unlikely.
Primary PAS/WLA: Primary WLA Status-The TACP provides independent status annunci-
ation and manual disconnect provisions for each WLA servo system. Two ACC computers
are associated with each servo system. In normal operation, a dedicated "on" discrete is
output from the TACP to supply power to the WLA engage relay of each of the ACCs.
Upon detection of a failure, the ACCs provide an automatic disconnect and output a fail
discrete to the TACP. These fail ciiscretes are inputs to a hardware "OR" gate such that
either ACC may directly illuminate its associated "fail" advisory annunciation.
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Manual disconnect of a failed WLA system is provided by pressing the associated WLA
switchlight. This action removes the dedicated "on" discrete from the ACC, locally
extinguishes the "fail" annunciation, and illuminates the associated "off" annunciation.
6.3.1.2 Preflight Test Panel
Physical Characteristics-The PFTP (fig. 13, right) consists of two switches and three
annunciators, hardwired to their associated connectors and circuitry, with discrete
components mounted on a circuit board secured to the chassis.
Preflight Test Operation-Figure 27 shows the PFTP layout. This panel provides preflight
test initiation and status advisories, as well as a monitored discrete output to drive an
external "no dispatch" warning.
To preclude the need for redundancy or monitored annunciations, preflight test steps
occur in a specific order, with each step indicated by a pair of annunciation changes.
Thus, the flight crew can verify correct test sequencing and detect annunciators that may
be failed "on" or "off" due to system or PFTP failures.
--.
ACT PREFLIGHT TEST PANEL
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Figure 27. F;eflight Test Panel-Front Panel Layout
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The preflight test sequence is described in the following:
At the termination of a flight leg or at aircraft power-up, the PFTP "no go" status
annunciator is illuminated to indicate that a preflight test has not been completed since
the last flight.
The preflight test circuitry within the PFTP is enabled by the presence of two of four
ACC discretes that indicate they are operating in the "on ground" mode. Preflight test
availability is indicated by the first crew prompt message appearing on the Engine
Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) (sec. 6.3.2); testing is initiated by depression
of the passive test switch, which operates a PFTP lamp test. The "no dispatch" output is
monitored to verify its operation; assuming its warning is functional, the PFTP monitors
discrete inputs from the ACCs. When three of four ACCs indicate their test is in process,
the PFTP maintains the electrical position of the passive test switch via an internal
solenoid and illuminates the passive test "run" annunciation. This same three-of-four
logic is also used to remove the independent channel's "stim enable" lockout, thus enabling
preflight test stimulation by the individual ACCs.
The PFTP continues to monitor the ACC test discretes. Upon indication that at least
three ACCs have successfully completed their passive tests and that no ACC has detected
a passive fault, the passive test "run" annunciation is extinguished and the active test
"arm" annunciation illuminated. This signal and the second crew prompt message on
ElcAS serve as flight crew cues to initiate the active preflight test when external
conditions allow control surface movement. The flight crew initiates the active test by
depressing the "active" pushbutton. This results in the removal of the active test "arm"
annunciation and illumination of the active test "run" annunciation. The sequence of
active test elements and crew prompts is controlled by the ACCs.
Upon determination that three or four ACCs have successfully completed the preflight
test, as indicated by the ACC test status discretes, the PFTP (1) releases the passive
preflight test switch, (2) locks out the stim enable discretes, (3) illuminates the "go"
dispatch annunciator, and (4) extinguishes the "no dispatch" warning output and "no go"
dispatch status annunciation.
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The dispatch status annunciation is interlocked to the solenoid-held "run" switch such that
a "go" annunciation is only possible in the released position and a "no go," with remote "no
dispatch," is always provided in the held position.
The failure of any two ACCs to complete their preflight test successfully will terminate
that test and result in a continuous "no go" status annunciation; the "no dispatch" warning
will remain illuminated.
No manual reset is provided for a "no go" indication. Clearing the "no go" or "no dispatch"
annunciation requires reinitiation and successful completion of the entire preflight test.
If takeoff is initiated without test completion, testing is aborted at ground speed greater
than 26 m/sec (50 kn). An automatic reset of the "go" annunciation will be provided at
liftoff (Jess than two of four ACCs indicate "on ground" mode).
As shown in Figure 27, the passive and active preflight test request switches are guarded
to preclude inadvertent activation.
"No Dispatch" Warning Output-The PFTP provides combining logic and a current sink
drive to control a remotely located red array (or equivalent) "no dispatch" warning. This
warning will be annunciated during preflight test and will be extinguished upon its
successful completion by three or more ACCs. Failure of two or more ACCs to complete
preflight test successfully will result in a continuous "no dispatch" warning. No manual
reset is provided for this annunciation. Resetting requires reinitiation and successful
passing of preflight test. If takeoff is initiated without successful completion, the
warning is extinguished at liftoff.
6.3.1.3 Flight Test Programmer
Physical Characteristics-The FTP (fig. 13, center) consists of a single pushbutton switch,
a 16-position rotary switch, and a toggle switch, all hardwired to the FTP rear connector.
Operation-The FTP provides two functions within the Test ACT System: a capability to
select and initiate preprogrammed flight test conditions and a Test ACT System arm and
disconnect function. The FTP layL'ut is shown in Figure 28.
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Test Selection-Preprogrammed test conditions are chosen by placing the 16-position
selected configuration switch in the position corresponding to the desired test. The
positiOn of this switch is continuously provided to the four ACCs by a binary code
representation from four discretes. When the selected configuration switch is moved to a
position other than position I (baseline), the "arm" annunciation in the status switch will
illuminate, indicating a test configuration may be initiated.
Test Initiation-Initiation of the selected test is accomplished by depressing the status
pushbutton switch. A common initiate test request is provided to all ACCs via redundant
discrete interfaces. Initiation of a test extinguishes the "arm'l status annunciation and
illuminates an amber "on" annunciation that will remain until the test is terminated.
Test Termination-Test termination is provided by a second depression of the status switch
or by rotation of the selected configuration switch to a different position. At
termination, the "on'l annunciation is extinguished, and the "arm" annunciation is
illuminated if the selected configuration switch is in any position other than I (baseline).
Test ACT System Arm and Disconnect of FBW Functions-Emergency disconnect of the
Test ACT System is provided by placing the ACT status switch in the "off'l position. This
simultaneously causes a servo disconnect of all PAS servos by removing the excitation to
the individual servo arm and engage relays located within the ACCs. Dedicated discretes
are also provided to transfer trim control to the AFDS when the Test ACT System is
disconnected and to inhibit the autopilot when it is engaged.
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The Test ACT System PAS servos are armed by setting the ACT status switch to the
"arm" position. This enables an independent automatic engagement of all servos if the
other manual inflight engage requirements are completely met. Arming the Test ACT
System also sends a single discrete output to inhibit the AFDS.
The ACT status toggle switch is guarded to preclude inadvertent placement of the switch
in the "arm" position.
6.3.1.4 Dedicated Warning Indicators
The Test ACT System will have two warning (red) indicators placed above the glare shield.
These two warnings will be "total loss of Essential PAS/FBW" and "total loss of Primary
PAS."
6.3.2 AIRPLANE SYSTEM
This section describes the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) that will
be used by Test ACT for annunciations to the pilots.
EICAS is an indication and alerting system that receives, processes, and displays all
engine information required by the flight crew; it also receives and processes information
from airplane subsystems and then displays necessary crew alerting messages (warnings,
cautions, and advisories). For Test ACT, EICAS will be used to annunciate crew-prompt
messages to the pilots during preflight test. The test phases are begun manually; for
active preflight test, the crew must provide certain initial conditions, specific flap
settings, and a column pull through. These crew actions are prompted with the first set of
messages in Table 1. EICAS will also be used to annunciate system failures in the form of
caution and advisory messages; they are listed in Table 1.
6.4 TEST ACT CONSOLE
The Test ACT Console (TAC) (fig. 14) consists of a pair of multibay racks designed to
house the Test ACT computers and associated equipment for software loading and system
evaluation. It will be used first tor system test in the laboratory and later will be
mounted in the test airplane for flight test operations.
68
Table 1. EICAS Messages for Test ACT
CREW PROMPTS
1. Press passive
2. Clear surfaces, hydraulics on, flaps zero, press active
3. Extend flaps
4. Pull column
5. Push column
6. Test complete
CAUTIONS
1. One failure from loss of Essential PAS/FBW
2. Total loss of WLA
3. No dispatch
ADVISORIES
1. Maintenance required
2. Full-time no dispatch
6.4.1 CONSOLE CONCEPT
The standard Boeing flight test rack affords convenient means of housing the equipment
and enabling the shift from lab to airplane with minimal disassembly. Two such racks
together form the Test ACT Console. The individual racks plus their contents are labeled
console No. 1 and console No.2.
All hardware in these consoles is designed to be rugged in order to retain a safe cabin
environment in flight test.
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6.4.2 SYSTEM HARDWARE CONTENT
For laboratory use, the console will house all the Collins-supplied Test ACT System
hardware listed below:
LRU
Active Controls Computer
Test ACT Control Panel
Preflight Test Panel
Flight Test Programmer
Pitch-rate gyro
Column force transducer
Wing accelerometer
Type No. Quantity
ACC-70l 1+
TACP-70l I
PFTP-70l 1
FTP-701 I
31+5-A9 1+
CFT-IOO 2
ACL-III 8
These units are powered and interconnected within the console. Interconnect points are
provided to tie the console to the laboratory where remaining system components (such as
servos, trim systems, IRSs, DADCs, etc.) are provided in either real or simulated form.
Tie points for the console interconnect are contained in a junction box to which all sensor,
control, and aircraft interfaces are connected. It provides military-type twist-lock
connectors for the interfaces to allow mobility of the console and its components. Circuit
breakers for the 28-V dc ACC input power are mounted in the box, providing protection
either in the laboratory or in the aircraft. Wiring is physically arranged to meet safety
segregation requirements of the Test ACT System. The junction box is mounted in
console No.2 behind the breakout panels.
When the consolp. is moved to the airplane, sensors and control panels will be removed and
installed in their appropriate locations; the ACCs will remain in the console. Other
aircraft systems and sensors will be connected to the console via the same interface
points used in the laboratory.
6.4.3 TEST SUPPORT HARDWARE
The Test ACT Console also contains equipment that is not required for the system to
perform its functions but rather supports the testing of the system.
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6.4.3.1 ACC Breakout Panels
A breakout panel for each of the four ACC units provides "break-in" and "break-out" test
points between the ACC and other line replaceable units (LRU) in the Test ACT Console
and lab interface. The front of the panel provides test points for every contact of each
ACC connector. Plugs are installed to enable breaking of the signal path for fault
simulation or alternate signal injection. During flight these plugs are positively retained
by a clear plastic cover panel (entire breakout panel may be bypassed for safety in flight).
The ACC breakout also has test points that are brought from inside the computer to the
panel unit via the test access card.
6.4.3.2 Power Control Panel
In the laboratory environment, all power to the Test ACT Console is distributed by the
power control panel. This panel provides breaker protection for 115-V ac, 60-Hz
equipment and breaker protection and switching for the 28-V dc power to the ACCs, FTP,
PFTP, and TACP. The latter is arranged to duplicate the aircraft installations, enabling
valid testing of various power configurations. All power is routed through a normally open
power relay that is electrically held closed to operate the console. An emergency
disconnect button is provided to open the power relay and quickly remove power from
console equipment.
During flight test, power to ACC breakers in the junction box will come directly from the
aircraft through cockpit breakers, bypassing the power control panel. The power relay
will no longer affect the computers, thus eliminating the possibility of a single-point total
loss of power. Power will still be provided for the Hew lett-Packard terminal and the
master processor. Because these will only be used for data gathering in flight, loss of
their power would not affect Test ACT System performance.
6.4.3.3 CAPS Test Adapters
The Collins Adaptive Processing System (CAPS) Test Adapters are provided as a software
development tool for CAPS processors. Each adapter interfaces with a CAPS processor
and transfer bus inside an ACC via a test access slot and a transfer bus cable. The Test
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Adapter may become a "master" on the bus and, as such, may command read and write
operations by any "slave." It may also monitor all processor transactions on the bus.
Because the adapter has control of the bus and can halt it as a result of operator
instructions, the adapter will be disconnected during flight test to preclude inadvertent
external interference with bus operations.
The CAPS Test Adapter provides the following functions:
• Halt-Stops all bus activity.
• Reset-Resets the CAPS processor.
• Run-Allows bus activity to continue.
• Bus step-While halted, executes single instructions.
• Exam-Reads contents of particular bus locations.
• Deposit-Loads data into particular bus locations.
e Monitor-Monitors reads and/or writes of particular locations.
o Breakpoint-Halts bus actIVIty at the occurrence of a read and/or write of a
preselected particular location; also, sets the halt to occur only if the information
does or does not match a preselected value.
• History-Examines and continuously saves the last 16 bus transactions (address, data,
and read or write) during a halt.
• Analog outpu t-Four buffered digital-to-analog (0/A) converters provide analog out-
puts proportional to a digital value that is read from or written to four selected
addresses.
The CAPS adapter also interfaces with the master processor via the master processor bus.
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6.4.3.4 Master Processor
The master processor, with its operating system software, performs three major tasks: (1)
interaction with the Hewlet-Packard terminal via an RS-232 bus, (2) interaction with the
CAPS Test Adapters, and (3) collection of inflight fault information via ARINC 429 buses.
The processor monitor program responds with printed messages to commands keyed into
the terminal. Under control of the terminal, the monitor program handles various
operations such as tape-to-memory load operations, memory verification operations, and
many of the other functions provided by the CAPS Test Adapter panel (sec. 6.4.3.3).
As mentioned previously, the master processor functions as a data collection point for
flight test fault information. The processor will receive data from each of the four
computers via four ARINC 429 receivers. In a portion of the normal application program,
the ACCs transmit preselected failure data to the master processor. These data are
formatted and stored by the monitor program and are available for display.
6.4.3.5 Terminal
The Hewlett-Packard HP-2645A terminal provides I/O capability for the digital test
equipment in the TAC. It consists of a keyboard, a cathode ray tube (CRT) display, and a
dual minicassette magnetic tape drive. The keyboard is used to input manual commands
to the master processor via RS-232 Standard. During laboratory test, software input
comes from cassette cartridges; the CRT displays output data.
6.4.3.6 Line Replaceable Unit Mounting Racks and Forced Air Cooling System
The TAC has aircraft-type mounting shelves with rear connectors and hold-down
mechanisms. Each shelf provides positive pressure cooling air to the bottom of the
computers. The sources of this ambient temperature air are 400-Hz fans, one mounted on
each shelf. The four computer shelves are mounted on a carriage that may be extended
from the console, allowing access to the sides of the units for test purposes.
The TAC contains a Test ACT annunciation panel that indicates loss of computer cooling
air. These indicators, whose inforrr.ation comes from air flow sensors, are easily visible to
the test engineer in his normal test flight position. The panel is also the laboratory
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mounting fixture for the FTP, PFTP, and TACP. No forced air is provided to these units
since the design aHows sufficient free air flow for self-cooling.
To facilitate laboratory simulation, the flight sensors (accelerometers, rate gyros, and
column force transducers) are mounted above the breakout panels. A mechanism is
provided to allow the console operator to apply force to the column force transducers.
6.4.3.7 Flight Test Instrumentation Interfacing
By means of a circuit card in each ACC, the Test ACT Console supplies four high-speed
ARINC outputs for instrumentation use. With appropriate programming of these cards,
internal software variables are transmitted, and a buffered output of each ARINC cross-
channel bus is provided.
6.4.3.8 Collection Panel
The collection panel provides stop, step, and start coordination among the CAPS Test
Adapters. If the master adapter panel is armed in the "first stops all" mode, any CAPS
adapter halting one CAPS processor will cause all four ACC CAPS processors to halt
simultaneously. Once halted, all four processors may be stepped by pressing the "all step"
switch on the collection panel. Conversely, they may be started simultaneously by
pressing the "all start" switch. An "all stop" switch causes the halt of all four ACC CAPS
processors.
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7.0 SYSTEM DESIGN: PRIMARY SOFTWARE
Primary software implements all Test ACT Primary control law functions, plus the testing
and management of the Test ACT System components. The functions are executed both
in preflight test and during flight and include test options that are selectable in flight.
7.1 SOFTWARE ORGANIZATiON
The Primary software is composed of seven functions: executive, control law
computation, redundancy management, failure detection, flight deck interface, Test ACT
Console (TAC) outputs, and test option control (fig. 29). Each of these is described in
subsequent paragraphs. Approximately 16 000 words of software are distributed among
the functions, according to the percentages shown in Figure 30.
Primary
Software
I
Executive
Control Law
Computation
1
Redundancy
Management
Failure
Detection
I
Flight Deck
Interface
Test ACT
Console
Outputs
I
Test Option
Control
Figure 29. Primary Software Functions
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Processor
Executive
Test Option
Control
Redundancy
Management
23%
Fault Detection 54%
- Preflight Test 14%
- Periodic Test 16%
- CPU Test 21%
- Power-Up Test 3%
Figure 30. Test ACT Software Summary
7.1.1 EXECUTIVE
The executive function consists of the top-level Active Controls Computer (ACC)
software and is broken down into the following:
• System states and task scheduling
• Hardware in terrupt servicing
o Initialization
The executive establishes the mul tirate structure for foreground software functions and
controls the execution of background computations. Executive processes fall into two
categories: interrupt-mode processes, which include all operating system tasks required to
service central processing unit (CPU) interrupts, and user-mode processes, including all
tasks necessary to perform real-time and background scheduling and execution of
operational tasks.
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.'--- 7.1.2 CONTROL LAW COMPUTATION
The control laws are divided into three major parts to implement the Primary control
requirements:
• Aileron commands for wing-load alleviation (WLA), including both maneuver-load
control (MLC) and gust-load alleviation (GLA)
• Elevator commands for fly-by-wire control augmentation and stability augmentation
• Stabilizer trim commands to avoid saturation of the limited-authority elevator
command
Two subfunctions are used by each of the previously mentioned control law computations:
• Gain schedules and limiters that modify the control laws as a function of flight
conditions
• Control law logic, providing mode switching and transient suppression during mode
transi tions
7.1.3 REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
The redundancy management function determines the utilization of redundant system
resources. It incorporates two principal subfunctions: sensor management and output
management. Sensor management (signal selection and fault detection, described in
following paragraphs) combines redundant sensor inputs to produce high-integrity values
for sensed parameters. The output management function manages associated output
redundancy, determining ACC WLA and trim engage status and Primary pitch-augmented
stability (PAS) validity.
The signal selection and fault detection (SSFD) function is designed to operate on a set of
four continuous, redundant sensor signals. Only three of the four are required for normal
operation of the SSFD. The fourth sensor signal is labeled as a "spare" if it is valid,
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otherwise the term "no spare" is used. However, there are sensor sets in the proposed 757
flight test airplane that have a maximum of two or three sensors. The SSFD
algorithm operates on any of the variables listed in Table 2, provided at least two sensor
signals are available. There are four major functional objectives of the SSFD algorithm:
(I) to extract the most useful data from each redundant set of sensor signals, (2) to
determine and isolate any sensor signal that is outside a preset tolerance limit, (3) to
replace an isolated sensor signal with the "spare" or with the previously selected signal
output of the SSFD if no spare exists, and (4) to up mode or reinstate an isolated signal to
either the "active" or "spare" signal state when it reenters the preset tolerance limits for
a sufficient period.
The previously mentioned objectives have been achieved through the use of four major
subfunctions: (I) the signal selection function, (2) the fault detection function, (3) the
sensor selection function, and (4) the SSFD initialization function.
The signal selection function utilizes the integral equalization technique on the redundant
continuous-valued sensor signals to select the best signal. The selected signal is the mid-
value of the equalized signals among the candidate inputs.
The fault detection function assesses the validity of the preceding sensor signals using
sensor signal comparison and direct/inline monitoring of the sensor sets. Sensor signal
monitoring is based on the instantaneous and long-term deviations of the sensor signals
from the selected signal. Direct monitoring is based on such single-sensor inputs as direct
activity, sign status matrix, common-mode monitors, and range.
The sensor selection function selects the candidate inputs to the signal selection function,
which may be sensor or artificial signals. If fewer than two sensor signals are selected as
candidate signals, the sensor selection function renders the corresponding sensor set
invalid.
The SSFD initialization function establishes initial conditions of time-dependent
computations for the SSFD subfunctions.
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Table 2. Continuous-Valued Sensor Signals
Sensor
Signal Source
Elevator position (DE) Elevator surface
Flap position (DF) FSEU
Column force (FCOL) Pilot's column
Stabilizer position (DS) SPM
Normal wing acceleration (NZW) Accelerometer
Body pitch rate (QB) IRS
Pitch attitude (THETA) IRS
.~. Roll a tti tude (PHI) IRS
Body normal acceleration (NZB) IRS
Ground speed (VGND) IRS
Flight path acceleration (VTDOT) IRS
True airspeed (VTRU) DADC
Impact pressure (QC) DADC
Computed airspeed (CAS) DADC
Mach number (MACH) DADC
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7.1.4 FAILURE DETECTION
Failure detection software assesses the ability of the Test ACT System to perform .its
design functions. Major subfunctions of failure detection are:
• Power-up tests
• Fault consolidation
• Periodic tests and monitors
• Preflight tests
Together these tests and monitors assess Primary computer performance and detect
failures in the sensors, hardware monitors, Essential computers, actuators, and interfaces.
Power-up testing checks the operational capability of the ACC. Included are hardware
interface checks, data and program memory tests, performance monitor tests, and error
interrupt hardware checks. Power-up test execution occurs whenever power is applied to
the ACCs.
The periodic tests and monitors routine is divided into the following four subfunctions:
o Software-interrogated hardware monitors
o Software-controlled hardware monitors
G Software monitors
Q Software tests
Software-interrogated hardware monitors consist of those routines that periodically read
the hardware monitor's state and set a flag if a monitor trips. This subfunction monitors
Essential system sensors and Primary system buses. Software-controlled hardware
monitors require periodic software stimulus and consist of Primary computer performance
monitoring. Soft\Vare monitors evaluate the health of normally operating system
functions, whereas the software tests present data patterns that do not normally occur in
flight to test data buffers and the cpu.
Preflight tests are subdivided into ?assive and active series; each series is initiated by
engaging a switch on the Preflight Test Panel. Passive tests verify Primary and Essential
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system components that do not produce control surface movements. Active tests require
hydraulic system pressure before testing control functions that may result in aileron,
elevator, or stabilizer deflections.
Fault consolidation is a subfunction in terms of requirements only; i.e., the software
implementation of requirements is distributed among various sections. Fault
consolidation assesses the status of numerous monitors to determine:
• Primary PAS validity
• Executive monitor failures
• WLA validity
• Computer channel validity
• System dispatch status
• Assessment of maintenance requirements
• Local Essential interface validity
7.1.5 FLIGHT DECK INTERFACE
The flight deck interface functions manage the physical interfaces with flight deck
annunciations, the Test ACT Control Panel (TACP), the Preflight Test Panel (PFTP), and
the Flight Test Programmer (FTP). Flight deck interface functions consolidate inputs
from the FTP, as well as inputs and outputs for the PFTP. They use inputs from the fault
consolidation functions and other ACC software to drive maintenance and dispatch status
annunciations.
7.1.6 TEST ACT CONSOLE OUTPUTS
Test ACT Console output functions provide processing to format and transfer fault and
pertinent status data to the TAC for display, both on ground and during flight. Status
data include the following information from each ACC: computer identification, trim and
WLA control status, FTP state, and Primary computer state.
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7.1.7 TEST OPTION CONTROL
Test option control provides the software interface between the ACC and the FTP. It
responds to discretes provided by the FTP in selecting, initiating, and terminating
implementation of anyone of 16 preprogrammed test conditions within the ACC control
law functions.
7.2 SOFTWARE METHODOLOGY
All Primary software was developed under Univac's EXEC-8 operating system on a Univac
U11 00 system, located at Rockwell's Scientific Computing Center in Seal Beach,
California.
The Test ACT processor is a CAPS-6B model of the Collins Adaptive Processing System
(CAPS) family that is designed to support embedded, real-time applications programmed
in a high-level language (HLL). The Test ACT software was written in ALGOL Extended
for Design (AED), a descendant of ALGOL-60.
7.3 SOFTWARE ADAPTABLE FROM 757/767
AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM
Although most of the software for the Test ACT Program is new, two routines were
transferred from the 757/767 autopilot virtually intact. These are the power-up tests and
the CPU self-tests. The power-up tests check a number of hardware monitors, including
the random-access memory (RAM) parity monitor, computer cycle monitor, and CPU self-
test monitor. The CPU self-test verifies the functional capability of the CPU itself.
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8.0 SYSTEM DESIGN: MECHANICAL
8.1 MECHANICAL CONTROLS: TEST INSTALLATION
8.1.1 GENERAL
This section describes the design of the 757 mechanical pitch control system, as modified
for flight testing of the Test ACT System. The modifications affect two parts of the
airplane: the flight deck area below the pilots' floor and the empennage area near the
horizontal stabilizer rear spar (fig. 31). Test ACT mechanical elements include two
independent pilot pitch command paths: one for electrical flight and one for mechanical
flight, plus quadruplex electrohydraulic servos whose outputs are linked differentially with
the existing cable system to modulate the elevator surface actuator valves.
The design shown is intended to meet all requirements of Section 4.2.1. The selection of
the arrangement and components has been directed toward maximum performance and
safety of the Test ACT System. Particular emphasis has been placed on reduction of
friction and freeplay in the mechanical signal paths to simulate the very low pitch control
hysteresis that will be a primary requirement of reduced-stability airplanes. A major
objective of the Test ACT flight program will be to evaluate the effect of varying levels
of hysteresis on system performance, leading to standards for future mechanical control
component design.
Hysteresis characteristics of the basic 757 pitch system have been determined, and design
actions for improvement of the Test ACT System have been d~rived from a test program
conducted on the 757 "Iron Bird." A test summary is presented in Appendix B.
To facilitate a simple and economical test installation In the 757 airplane, certain
mechanical design ground rules were adopted:
• The normal 757 "neutral shift" function, in which the elevator is geared to the
stabilizer for greater nose-down trim effectiveness, will be deactivated for the Test
ACT Configuration. This removes the complication of trim point shift on the
mechanical system side of thE summing junction.
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Flight Deck Installations
Figure 31. Test ACT Mechanical Controls-757
)
Empennage Installations
• The normal 757 flaps-up stabilizer nose-down electrical limit will be increased from
+O.8-deg stabilizer angle to +3.8-deg stabilizer angle. This will ensure adequate nose-
down trim authority when combined with an increased elevator downrig throughout
the anticipated Test ACT flight regime.
• The Test ACT pilot station will be located at the first officer's (right-hand) seat
position. The right-hand position offers better clearance and access for the under-
floor Test ACT mechanism installation. Also, the existing 757 mechanical system
rigging datum at the left-hand column is preserved, allowing for simpler conversion
between Test ACT and conventional flight configurations.
Mechanical jam protection for elevator control is provided as follows for Test ACT:
• Electrical and mechanical control modes are each available to the other as backup
for mechanical jams upstream of the summing junction.
• Overrides that allow separate control of right and left elevators are not provided for
Test ACT.
• A jam of an elevator surface actuator valve will be overrideable by either electric or
mechanical mode during Test ACT flight.
These provisions, plus appropriate preflight inspection and full-scale exercise of the Test
ACT installations, will ensure a jam-free flight program while avoiding the complexity
and performance compromises of a total jam isolation design policy.
8.1.2 SYSTEM ARRANGEMENT
Figure 32 shows the elevator system schematic for the unmodified 757 airplane. The
system features conventional dual mechanical cable controls with a pilot/copilot breakout
forward and a limited right/left breakout aft. A dual variable feel unit controlled by dual
feel computers (not shown) attaches to the aft cable quadrants, as do triple autopilot
servos. Linkage from the aft quadrants to right and left triple-parallel actuator
installations provides valve input motion to position the single elevator surfaces on each
side. Centering springs, valve pogo links, and shearouts protect against disconnects, valve
~, jams, and freezeups at the surface actuators. Neutral shift linkage causes the feel unit to
be reindexed to increase stabilizer effectiveness in the nose-down trim range.
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Figure 32. Elevator System-Basic 757
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The elevator mechanical control schematic for Test ACT is shown in Figure 33. This
arrangement reflects the following changes and additions to the basic 757 system:
• The first officer's column is disconnected from the mechanical system by disengaging
the forward breakout and removing the right-hand body cable system input rod.
• A Test ACT pilot input mechanism is installed and connected to the first officer's
column. The mechanism consists of dual four-channel force transducers, a feel cam
and springs, and a rate damper.
• The forward right and left cable tension regulators are bused together to retain the
stiffness of both cable paths for the mechanical control mode.
• A solid bus replaces the limited breakout between the aft cable quadrants. This
provides a more rigid reaction path to ground during fly-by-wire (FBW) control.
• One pitch autopilot servo is retained in its 757 installation position, attached to the
aft cable quadrant. In addition to mechanical-mode autopilot functions, this unit
provides, through special modifications, an added increment of detent to react
summing lever loads during FBW flight.
• The production pitch control feel and centering is retained unmodified, providing
normal pilot feel functions in mechanical flight mode and, in parallel with the
autopilot servo, a detent to react FBW loads.
• The neutral shift function is deleted. This involves removal of linkage between the
stabilizer and the grounding point for the feel unit. The grounding point is then fixed
at the desired rig position with a bolt to structure.
• The four Test ACT secondary servos, the servo summing shaft, and the servo voting
detent mechanism are installed aft of the aft cable quadrant, using the support and
space provisions of the upper two pitch autopilot servos. The new servos are 757
rollout guidance actuators, modified for increased rate and output path stiffness.
• Right and left Test ACT summing lever linkages are installed. These provide the
summing function for the Test ACT servo and mechanical system inputs. It should be
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Figure 33. Elevator System-Test ACT
)
noted that normally only one input mode will be in control; however, the signals from
one mode may be offset or augmented by inputs from the other, if necessary. Each
mode has input authority of 100% of elevator. Limit stops in the mechanism prevent
the summed transmitted signal from exceeding available surface actuator input
travel.
• The surface actuators and actuator input linkages are unchanged, except for the
addition of a light, antihysteresis spring behind the control valve spool in each
actuator.
• Hydraulic systems are assigned to the various Test ACT actuators, as shown in
Figure 34. Surface actuator hydraulic assignments, which provide for all three
systems to each elevator, are unchanged from the basic 757.
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Figure 34. Test ACT System Hydraulic Schematic
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8.1.3 SYSTEM DESIGN
Figure 35 shows the current 757 control column and forward tension regulator
arrangement. The Test ACT flight deck installation is shown in Figure 36. A more
detailed description of this installation is provided in Appendix D.
Figure 37 shows the current 757 empennage pitch control installation in isometric view.
t
Breakout Unit
Figure 35. 757 Column and Tension Regulator Installation
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The major changes effected
Figure 38, in isometric form.
found in Appendix D.
by the Test ACT empennage installation are shown in
A more detailed description of that installation may be
Requirements relating to the Test ACT secondary actuators, autopilot actuator, and
primary actuators may be found in Section 4-.2.1.
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Figure 38. 757 Test ACT Elevator Control System-Empennage Installation
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Actuators selected for use on the Test ACT airplane are units currently used on the 757,
modified to comply with the requirements of Section 4.2.1. The selected actuators are:
• Test ACT servo (secondary actuator}-757 rollout guidance servo
• Test ACT autopilot/detent servo-757 pitch autopilot servo
In addition, the existing 757 elevator surface actuators are modified to add valve bias
springs. A more detailed description of these actuator modifications is contained in
Appendix D.
8.2 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT INSTALLATIONS
Figure 39 is a plan view of the Test ACT airplane showing the general location of the
equipment added to enable the Test ACT flight test. The following sections treat the
installation of individual items.
8.2.1 SENSORS
Installation of the three sets of sensors dedicated to the Test ACT System is as follows:
o Column force transducers-These force transducers are a part of the Test ACT
modification of the mechanical flight control system and are treated in Sections 8.1.2
and 8.1.3.
• Pitch-rate gyros-The set of four pitch-rate gyros is mounted on the main cabin floor
near the nominal airplane cg.
eWing accelerometers-The installation of the wing accelerometers used in wing-load
alleviation (WLA) instrumentation will be designed for the best compromise of high
sensitivity to the first wing bending mode and suppression of the higher wing
structural modes. Structural data derived in the 757 Airplane Project will be used to
analyze wing bending and determine an optimum accelerometer location. The
resulting position will probably be in the outboard wing at about 70% semispan on the
front spar or rib. The acceler,')meter axis of sensitivity will be aligned perpendicular
to the wing reference plane.
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Figure 39. Components of Test ACT System-757
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8.2.2 FLIGHT DECK PANELS
Figure 40 illustrates the location of the three Test ACT panels required in the flight deck.
They will be accessible to both pilots from their normal seated position.
Two of the panels, the Test ACT Control Panel and the Preflight Test Panel (sec. 6.3.1),
will be a part of the Production ACT System. They will be mounted in the pilots'
overhead panel, as shown at the left in Figure 40. The Flight Test Programmer is
applicable to Test ACT only and includes a "big red switch" that completely disables the
system in case of emergency. This is located in the control stand just aft of the quadrant
controls and opposite the pilots' elbows.
o
Forward
Test ACT
Control
Panel
Preflight
Test
Panel
1
Forward
\)
v
Quadrant
Controls
Flight
Test
Programmer--t---_I Ii:ttp{{
Pilots' Overhead Panel Control Stand
Figure 40. Contra: Panel Placement in the 757 Flight Deck
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8.2.3 CONSOLE AND CABLES
Figure 41 illustrates the two possible arrangements of the Test ACT Console in the aft
part of the main cabin. The location of console No.1, on the left side of the cabin a short
distance aft of the left emergency egress door, has been established. At this stage in the
test aircraft operations planning, it is not possible to determine positively the location of
console No.2; two locations are shown in the diagram. The preferred location near
console No. 1 and across the aisle will result in the shortest cable run and the best
accessibility. The alternative location, labeled "worst case," will be provided for in the
cable design.
The preferred position will have both consoles on the normal cabin floor level, making it
necessary to provide the interconnecting cable with a sturdy protective cover. The
cabling to the flight deck, the electronic equipment bay, the rate gyro box, and the wing
accelerometers will all go forward from the consoles underneath the raised floor area, as
is normal for cabling in the flight test airplane cabin.
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Figure 41. Test ACT Console Placement-757 Main Cabin
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9.0 SYSTEM VERIFICATION
System verification is the process used to determine whether or not the Test ACT System
meets the requirements of the Specification Control Drawing (SCD), Volumes I and II.
9.1 VERIFICATION METHODS
Components of the Test ACT System were shown to meet the requirements of the SCD by
means of five verification procedures (fig. 42). Application of this process demonstrated
compliance with all SCD requirements, excluding the waivers noted in Section 9.6.2.
Figure 42 also shows the documentation provided at hardware delivery to demonstrate
compliance.
9.2 ANALYSES
Analytical methods were used to verify the following system features:
• Reliabili ty, dispatchabili ty, and safety
• Channel equalization
• Environmental impact
• Flightworthiness
Reliability analyses are treated in depth in Section 10.3. Environmental impact and
flightworthiness were based largely upon similarity to the Autopilot/Flight Director
System equipment for the 767 and 757 Programs.
9.3 INSPECTION
The Test ACT System hardware was inspected at appropriate steps in its manufacture by
Quality Assurance representatives of both Collins and Boeing. The Boeing Quality
Assurance department maintains a resident inspector at Collins in Cedar Rapids; he was
available to inspect and approve the system equipment as it progressed through the
system fabrication process.
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9.4 SOFTWARE VERIFICATION
The three software verification procedures included in Figure 42 were utilized to augment
the Active Controls Computer (ACC) software verification, which was obtained in the
System Acceptance Test (SAT). The following is a brief description of these procedures:
• Design "walkthroughs" verify that the software design, as documented in the Design
Implementation document (DID), complies with the SCD and includes no unintended
functions.
• The code inspections verify that the code faithfully implements the DID design.
• Analysis of the SAT coverage verifies that it executes all program branches.
The results of the software verification tasks were documented and submitted in the
Software Verification document.
9.5 UNIT ACCEPTANCE TESTS
The Unit Acceptance Tests (UAT) were performed on selected line replaceable units
(LRU) of the system and were designed to be capable of verifying that each LRU is fully
functional. This testing was applied to the following units:
• Active Controls Computer
• Pitch-rate gyro
• Preflight Test Panel
• Wing linear accelerometer
The System Acceptance Test provided verification of the other LRUs.
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9.6 SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE TESTS
The System Acceptance Tests verified the performance of the Test ACT equipment as a
system and certain of the LRUs as units. These tests had the following characteristics:
• They emphasized end-to-end testing.
• Verification was based on easily observed system effects, such as servo disconnects
and annunda dons.
• Measurements required were limited to those that could be made through the Test
ACT Console (TAC) breakout panel (which provides access to all the pins of the ACC
rear connector) and the CoUins Adaptive Processing System (CAPS) Test Adapters
(which provide access to the transfer buses).
• Fault insertion was limited to power interrupts, disconnecting of equipment cables,
simulated interface faults inserted at the breakout panel, and simulated processor
faults inserted via the CAPS Test Adapters.
9.6.1 TEST CONFIGURAnON
The System Acceptance Tests were performed with the test configuration shown in
Figure 43. AU of the airplane equipment and features necessary to provide inouts to and
accept outputs from the Test ACT System are represented by the simulators that surround
the ACCs in that figure.
9.6.2 ACCEPTANCE TEST RESULTS
The witnessed System Acceptance Test series was run at Rockwell-CoUins in Cedar
Rapids from 15 June through 24 June 1983. It included complete execution of the
approved System Acceptance Test Procedure, plus some Unit Acceptance Tests on a
complete ACC and phase and gain testing of an analog Essential computer. Those Unit
Acceptance Tests were required to demonstrate that the system satisfies procurement
specifications.
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Twenty-eight problem reports were recorded in the preceding procedure. Five of those
were ascribed to minor specification shortcomings and hence were not charged to Collins.
Several problems, most of them recorded in a single report, were traced to faulty jacks in
the TAC breakout panels; their correction required rewiring of the panels, and that task
carried over into the postdelivery period. The rest of the 28 problem reports were cleared
before the second test period on 29 and 30 June 1983. In the same interim period, five
additional problem reports were written; all of those were cleared except for one
software change that will be handled by the Collins Service Center in Seattle.
In the second period of witnessed testing, the effectiveness of corrections to the problem
reports per the previous listing was verified. Official acceptance notification was then
transmitted to Collins, and the system was delivered to Boeing.
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10.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
10.1 TEST ACT AND PRODUCTION ACT
As configured for flight testing, the Test ACT System is not expected to meet production
requirements for system and schedule reliability. This is because the test airplane has
insufficient redundancy in certain equipment that cannot be augmented cost effectively.
Test ACT includes a four-channel system of Primary and Essential computers and
actuators, designed to function optimally with quadruple sensors and power supplies. The
757-200 test airplane has only two Digital Air Data Computers (DADC), three Inertial
Reference Systems (IRS), and three hydraulic supplies. In addition, the Test ACT servo
installation operates through existing mechanical linkage and surface actuators. This
arrangement provides less jam protection and introduces greater hysteresis than a
prospective Production ACT System, which would incorporate closely coupled servo
control units and preserve complete isolation of left and right surface input paths.
In order to estimate the reliability of a Production ACT System designed for commercial
operation, it was necessary to specify the assumed redundancy level of associated airplane
systems. Because of the "brick-walled" architecture of four-channel Essential pitch-
augmented stability (PAS), any equipment required by the Essential system, down to the
summing bars, must necessarily be quadruplicated. This is not a requirement for the four-
channel Primary system, which is not brick walled nor required for safety of flight.
During Test ACT development, alternative configurations were examined as candidates
for a Production ACT System. These were:
• A system in which all Primary (as well as all Essential) components are
quadruplicated. This approach increases system reliability, airplane schedule
reliability, and safety but at the expense of higher initial and operating cost. As in
the Test ACT System, the probability of erroneous control surface commands is
minimized by disconnecting the Primary system if there is disagreement between the
last two remaining operational channels.
• A system with triplex IRSs and DADCs and therefore lower cost than the all-
quadruplex system. System reliability and schedule reliability are maintained by
allowing the Primary system to function with only a single sensor of each type.
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Protection against unacceptable surface transients, when degrading to single sensor
operation, is provided by three independent techniques:
• Inline monitors are used to give a high degree of assurance that any single sensor
selected will be the "correct" one.
• Hardware authority limiters in the Essential system limit the transient that can
be induced by the Primary computers.
• Software authority limiters in the Primary computers limit the transient that
can be caused by a malfunctioning sensor. Note that the signal selection
algorithms in the Primary computers will eliminate all initial faults by
comparison with the remaining "good" signals.
As shown in Table 3, the system with triplex IRSs and DADCs has been assumed as the
Production ACT System for reliability estimation purposes. Section 10.2 deals with the
Test ACT System; Section 10.3 is based upon the Production ACT System.
Table 3. Airplane Systems Redundancy for ACT
Item
Digital Air Data Computers
Inertial Reference Systems
Flap position sensors
Stabilizer position sensors
28-V dc power sources
Hydraulic systems
Air-ground logic units
Mechanical surface input paths
Test
ACTa
2
3
3
3
4
3
2
1
Production
ACT
3
3
4
3 b4
4 c
2
2
aThe redundancy shown in the Test ACT column is that of 757 NAOOL
bThe proposed fourth 28-V dc supply is a charger-floated battery.
c The proposed fourth hydraullc system is a small dedicated supply.
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10.2 CONTROL LAW SYNTHESIS
10.2.1 OBJECTIVES
A general objective of the PAS control system is to enable an unstable airplane to meet
the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), Part 25, Airworthiness Standards for Transport
Category Airplanes (ref. 11). In addition, PAS was required to satisfy the same gain and
phase margin requirements that have been imposed on the production 757 autopilot.
These are:
Gain Phase
Mode Frequency (fm) Margin Margin
(Hz) (dB) (deg)
fm < 0.06 +3.0 +20
0.06 < fm < 1st aeroelastic mode +4.5 +30
fm > 1st aeroelastic mode +6.0 +45
~
The modal frequency of the first aeroelastic mode of the 757 is approximately 2 Hz.
Additional constraints were applied to the airplane transient response to a step column
input, as shown in Figures 44 and 45. The resulting pitch rate, normalized with respect to
the steady-state pitch rate, was required to be within the specified boundaries. When a
steady-state pitch-rate response to a constant column input does not exist, a certain
amount of "engineering judgment" has to be used with this criterion.
As described in Section 10.2.2, the normally operating PAS is referred to as the Primary
PAS. A highly reliable submode, termed the Essential PAS, is also included to provide
get-home capability in the event of Primary PAS failure. Both augmentation modes have
been evaluated on a piloted moving-base simulator and were required to meet alternative
flying quality standards, as expressed in Figure 4. The Primary PAS was expected to
provide Level 1 flying qualities (defined in sec. 10.2.2.1) at all permissible center-of-
gravity kg) locations throughout the flight envelope. Similarly, the Essential PAS was
required to be at least Level 3.
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Objectives for the wing-load alleviation (WLA) control system were less stringent.
Whereas PAS was designed to be flight tested on a 757 airplane with artificially degraded
stability, the WLA control law was developed principally to size the Test ACT hardware
and software. Flight testing of WLA will be restricted to open-loop evaluation; Le., servo
commands will be derived from appropriate sensors but will not be used to drive control
surfaces.
10.2.2 METHODS
10.2.2.1 Pitch-Augmented Stability Synthesis
The production 757 has a cg range from 7% to 39% mean aerodynamic chord (MAC). PAS
synthesis was based on the assumption that a similar but aft-shifted cg range would be
required of an ACT airplane. The control law was therefore developed for the 757 with an
assumed cg range of 20% to 50% MAC. Table 4 indicates the flight conditions at which
PAS was evaluated. Included is a cruise flight condition with the cg at 55% MAC. This
was added since it is the probable aft limit achievable with the projected cg control
system to be used during flight testing. It is also the most unstable flight condition of
those evaluated.
PAS control laws were developed to provide the following features:
• Partitioning into critical and crucial functions
G Restoration of conventional stability
o Fly-by-wire (FBW) control
• Authority limiting of the critical elements
G Automatic offloading of long-term elevator commands to the stabilizer
o Compensation for excessive stick forces when in a banked turn
Partitioning Into Critical and Crucial Functions-Functional partitioning was selected to
be compatible with the reliability requirements of Section 10.3. An underlying assumption
was that it is not currently feasible to validate software with a confidence level that
would satisfy an "extremely improbable" (ref. 11) failure requirement of 10-9 failures per
flight hour. The crucial aspects of the stability augmentation, together with a minimal
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)Table 4. PAS Design Flight Conditions
HIGH-SPEED CONDITIONS
Weight Altitude qc cg
Condition 103kg (1 031b) 103m O03ft) Mach 103pa Ob/ft 2) (% MAC) Remarks
CRU 1 83.5 (184) 10.7 (35) 0.82 13.26 (277) 20
CRU 3 83.5 (184) 10.7 (35) 0.82 13.26 (277) 50
CRU 4* 83.5 (184) 10.7 (35) 0.84 14.03 (293) 20
CR.U 6 83.5 (184) 10.7 (35) 0.84 14.03 (293) 50
CRU 7 83.5 (184) 10.7 (35) 0.84 14.03 (293) 55 Probable flight test limit
CRU 11 74.8 (165) 3.0 (10) 0.46 10.68 (223) 50 Maximum thrust condition
CRU 14 83.5 (184) 7.6 (25) 0.50 6.51 (136) 50 1.2 V5
CRU 16 83.5 (184) 12.8 (42) 0.82 9.48 (198) 50 1.2 VS at maximum altitude
CRU 20 83.5 (184) 8.2 (27) 0.86 21.4 (447) 50 VMO/MMO corner
LOW-SPEED CONDITIONS
EAS
m/sec (kn)
APP 4 73.5 (162) 0.30 (1.0) 63.3 (I23) 2.44 (51) 50 Landing flaps
APP 5 89.8 (198) 0.30 (1.0) 68.9 (134) 2.92 (61) 20 Landing flaps
APP 6 89.8 (198) 0.30 (1.0) 68.9 (134) 2.92 (61) 50 Landing flaps
APP 8 73.7 (162) 0.30 (1.0) 68.9 (134) 2.92(61) 50 Go-around power
APP 11 99.8 (220) 0.30 (1.0) 74.6 (145) 3.40 (71) 50 Takeoff flaps
.... Also WLA design flight condition.
)
level of FBW control, were therefore implemented in an analog Essential controller, with
additional stability and control enhancement generated by a digital Primary control
system.
Primary PAS commands to the elevator are first transferred to the Essential controller so
authority limiting of the digital signals can be implemented independently in analog
hardware.
Restoration of Conventional Stability-The principal stability augmentation requirements
of the Test ACT System are restoration of acceptable short-period characteristics and
speed stability. Pitch-rate feedback to the elevators is used to provide the former, with
airspeed errors driving both elevators and the stabilizer to provide the latter. Control
laws were developed using classical root locus techniques. The procedure is illustrated in
Figures 46 through 48, which show the roots of the unaugmented airplane at a cruise flight
condition and successive closures of pitch-rate and airspeed control loops. As shown in
Figure 46, the principal result of shifting the aft cg limit from the production 757-200
value of 39% MAC to a Test ACT location of 50% to 55% MAC is to convert the pair of
short-period oscillatory roots into a pair of roots on the real axis. At a cg location of 50%
MAC, one of these roots is unstable, with a time-to-double amplitude of 8 sec. Included
in the figure are root location boundaries that correspond to various levels of predicted
handling qualities. These are shown as "Levels I, 2, and 3" and are defined as follows:
o Level I-Clearly adequate for the mission or flight phase evaluated
G Level 2-Adequate to accomplish the mission or flight phase but with objectionable
deficiencies
• Level 3-Controllable but deficient for mission performance
As shown in Figure 46, two types of boundaries are imposed on an airplane which has roots
that split into the classical short-period and phugoid complex pairs. It is evident that the
production 757 at its aft cg limit of 39% MAC meets the Level I short-period frequency
requirement of at least 1.2 rad/sec and satisfies the damping requirement of ~ > 0.35.
As the cg is moved aft, the criterion is not met, and pitch stability augmentation is
required.
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Figure 46. Effect of cg Location on Unaugmented Longitudinal Roots-Cruise
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Figure 47 shows the effect of adding "lagged" pitch-rate feedback when the cg is at 55%
MAC. In this case, the lag was provided by a first-order lag filter with a break frequency
of 10 rad/sec. As pitch-rate feedback gain is increased, the unstable unaugmented root is
driven toward the left half-plane but cannot be stabilized completely due to the "zero" at
the origin. At the nominal pitch-rate feedback gain, KQI = 1.25 deg/deg/sec for flaps up,
the. time-to-double amplitude has changed from 2.5 sec (unaugmented) to 12 sec
(augmented), thereby meeting the Level 2 stability requirement. Note that the roots
normal1y associated with the short period have been relocated (at nominal pitch-rate
feedback gain) such that their frequency is 6 rad/sec. Although this is considerably larger
than the Level I requirement of Figure 46, the higher value is necessary since the short-
period response is no longer dominated solely by the short-period roots; i.e., the roots on
the real axis now have significant residues.
Figure 48 shows the effect of adding airspeed error feedback to the partially augmented
system of Figure 47. As shown, the unstable root is stabilized at nominal gain, and a pair
of complex roots, similar to the original phugoid roots, is restored. The airspeed error
computation is derived in the digital control system and provides stability consistent with
Level 1 handling qualities. The pitch-rate feedback of Figure 47 is provided by the
Essential analog control1er such that Level 2 handling qualities are ensured in the event of
failure of the digital PAS.
Fly-by-Wire Control-Control inputs to the elevator are derived from force sensors on
both the pilot's and copilot's control columns. Because these fly-by-wire commands are
the only means whereby column deflections are routed to the elevator, the FBW system
must necessarily have ful1 authority. This requirement tends to conflict with the need
(discussed in the next paragraph) to limit the authority of the digital Primary PAS. If al1
of the required FBW gain scheduling resided in the Essential control1er, the high-
reliability requirements of this analog PAS would be difficult to meet. As a minimum
requirement, the Essential PAS must contain sufficient FB W gain scheduling to retain
adequate control after Primary PAS failure. Piloted simulation studies indicate that the
minimum Essential FBW gain scheduling should consist of a two-state gain change, with a
low gain when flaps are up and a higher gain when flaps are extended. The remaining gain
adjustments are provided by the Primary PAS. The flaps-up gain is 0.034 deg of elevator
per newton (0.15 deg per pound) column force and this increases to 0.10 when flaps are
down.
116
,-.. Authority Limiting of the "Critical" Elements-As mentioned previously, the control
system architecture evolved on the assumption that protection must be provided against
the possibility of generic digital control failures in which all channels simultaneously
produce an erroneous hardover elevator command. Because the probability of this fault
occurring cannot currently be quantified, the Primary PAS commands are limited in the
Essential PAS. The criterion selected to size the authority limit was that at any flight
condition and cg location within the normal operating flight envelope, the Primary PAS
should not be capable of producing more than a 19 increment in normal load factor in the
3 sec following fault occurrence. It is obvious that Essential PAS reliability would be
improved if this limiter could be implemented with a fixed value. Unfortunately, the
limit value necessary for protection at high speeds is less than the maneuvering authority
required at low speed. An acceptable compromise was found to be a fixed authority of
~2.5 deg of elevator when flaps are up, and limits of ~7 deg of elevator whenever the flaps
are in any of the extended positions.
Automatic Offloading of Long-Term Elevator Commands to the Stabilizer-Speed stability
is obtained from the Primary PAS by computing an elevator com mand that is proportional
to true airspeed "error." This error is first computed during climb-out and is initially
referenced to the climb speed. Subsequently, the airspeed reference is updated each time
the pilot activates the manual trim button. During periods of infrequent trim switch
usage, the possibility exists that the elevator command from airspeed error could exceed
the authority limit of the Primary PAS. Because this would cause the Primary PAS to be
temporarily ineffective, the airspeed error signal is automatically offloaded to the
stabilizer. This offloading occurs whenever the elevator command from airspeed error
exceeds ~O.5 deg.
Compensation for Excessive Stick Forces When in a Banked Turn-One of the consequences
of using pitch-rate feedback for short-period augmentation is that the steady-state pitch
rate in a maneuver tends to be proportional to the 'applied control column force. Pitch
rate associated with a symmetrical pullup maneuver is less than that for a banked turn
maneuver of equal normal load factor. Therefore, to maintain identical stick-force-per-g
characteristics in pullups and bank turns, pitch-rate compensation based on roll angle
must be introduced.
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10.2.2.2 Wing-Load Alleviation Synthesis
The WLA control laws were developed only to demonstrate the validity of the computer
architecture and were not intended to confirm control law effectiveness. Nevertheless,
sufficient analysis was done at a single cruise flight condition to verify the concept.
Maneuver-Load Control-The maneuver-load control (MLC) system was designed to drive
the ailerons such that wing bending moments are reduced during maneuvers. Normal load
factor, as measured by the IRS, is used to command aileron deflections so that wing loads
are transferred inboard when the airplane is out of trim. Gains were selected to fully
utilize the effective range of aileron deflection when maneuvering at limit load (1.5g
incremental). A lO-rad/sec low-pass filter was included to avoid exciting the wing first
bending mode (at approximately 12.5 rad/sec).
In a maneuver, the MLC-controlled ailerons deflect symmetrically to relieve wing
outboard bending moments. With wings of high sweep, these aileron deflections can
produce a significant pitching moment. To counteract this, the MLC aileron command is
also used to apply elevator balancing deflections.
Gust-Load Alleviation-The gust-load alleviation (GLA) system was designed to reduce
gust loads by suppressing the wing first bending mode. The system uses wing-mounted
accelerometers that sense accelerations normal to the wing and commands aileron
deflections that produce mode damping. The accelerometers are located to minimize the
sensing of elastic modes other than the first bending mode. Isolation from higher
frequency modes was also obtained by including a 20-rad low-pass filter in the command
path.
10.2.3 RESULTS
Table 4 indicates the flight conditions at which the PAS control law was evaluated.
Because the WLA control law is presently a conceptual study only (as opposed to the PAS,
which is intended to be flight proven), WLA was evaluated at just a single flight
condition-condition CRU 4 of Table 4.
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10.2.3.1 Pitch-Augmented Stability
Figures 49 through 51 summarize the Primary PAS stability margins at the flight
conditions evaluated. Margins were calculated for each of the individual feedback loops-
airspeed, pitch rate, roll and pitch attitude-and for the loops in combination. Only the
most critical stability margins are plotted on the figures. Also included in the figures are
the required gain and phase margin boundaries specified in Section 10.2.1. As shown, the
Primary PAS provides adequate stability at all flight conditions, except for conditions
APP 8 and APP 11. At APP 8, the low-frequency gain margin is -2.4 dB rather than the
required -3 dB. Thus, if the loop gain at APP 8 were reduced by 3 dB, the airplane would
have an unstable root with a time-to-double amplitude of 177 sec instead of being
neutrally stable, as implied by the gain margin requirement. For a trimmed flight
condition, this would be unacceptable. However, since APP 8 is an untrimmed
"go-around-power" condition, the margin deficiency is not significant.
APP 11 is a maximum weight takeoff condition. The configuration has speed stability but
with only a -0.2-dB gain margin instead of the required -3 dB. This will not compromise
the projected flight test program since takeoffs will be constrained to the nominal cg
range of 7% to 39% MAC. Furthermore, it is questionable whether or not speed stability
is meaningful at this flight condition, since at takeoff thrust the aircraft is untrimmed
and accelerating. If required, the margin could be met for a production system by
increasing airspeed error feedback by 35%, at the expense of a slight degradation in the
pitch-rate response to column commands.
Stability margins were not evaluated for the Essential PAS, since this PAS did not
completely stabilize the airplane at most of the extreme aft-cg flight conditions.
Because the Essential PAS is required to provide only "get-home" capability, the
acceptability of this mode was determined by piloted simulation rather than analytical
considerations. Results of the Essential PAS piloted simulation study are documented in
Reference 9.
10.2.3.2 Transient Response to Pitch Commands
The pitch-rate responses to step .-:olumn inputs were within the acceptable bounds of
Figures 44 and 45 at all flight conditions, when the airplane is augmented with the
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Primary PAS. Essential PAS responses were also within acceptable limits for all cases in
which a "steady-state" pitch-rate response to a step column command could be estimated.
Once a column comman~ is removed (at t = 5 sec in fig. 52), the airplane, augmented with
the Primary PAS, tends to return to the original trim condition· required in FAR, Part 25
(ref. 11), but with considerable overshoot in both attitude and speed. An additional pitch-
attitude-error feedback loop was therefore included to improve the damping in the
absence of column inputs. The prevailing pitch attitude when the column returns to the
detent position was selected as the attitude error reference. In Qrder that the airplane
might return to the trim conditions existing prior to the column input, the loop included a
washout circuit with a 5-sec time constant.
The column forces required to produce an incremental load factor of "lg" are listed in
Table 5 as a function of flight condition and cg location. Because no FAR requirement
exists for this parameter, the production 757 airplane requirement was used as an
objective for the Primary PAS. It states that "maneuvering stick force levels shall be
between 133 and 356N (30 and 80 Ib) at I-g incremental load factor." A less restrictive
objective of 67 to 490 N/g (15 to 110 lb/g) was assumed for the Essential PAS. As shown
in the table, these objectives were substantially met. Only two conditions were
significantly out of range, and both of them related to the Primary PAS: CRU 7 at 102
N/g (23 Ib/g) and CRU 20 at III N/g (25 Ib/g). Both of these conditions are at extremes
of the probable test envelope. Although gain adjustments to bring these conditions within
range can easily be made, this will tend to increase the maneuvering forces at more likely
flight conditions. Although still within range, the more probable operating conditions
would then approach 356 N/g (80 Ib/g). Because piloted simulation results have indicated
a preference for light column forces, the gain revision decision will be deferred to the
flight test phase. For the unstable Essential PAS conditions (i.e., no steady-state column-
force-per-g exists), the value of incremental load factor 3 sec after application of column
force was used for the computation.
Table 5 also lists the airspeed change per unit of column force for the Primary PAS.
Federal Aviation Regulations, Section 25.173c (ref. 11), states that lithe average gradient
of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less than 1 pound for
each 6 knots." This is equivalent to requiring t::.V/Fco1<0.7 m/sec (6 kn/lb) in the
N
table. As shown, the requirement was essentially met, with the only significant deviation
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Table 5. Column-Force-per-g and Column-Force-per-knot Data
Fcol/g V/Fcol
N/g Ob/g) m/sec (kn/lb)
cg N
Flight Location Essential Primary Primary
Condition (% MAC) PAS PAS PAS
CRU 1 20 205 (46) 178 (40) 0.567 (4.9)
CRU 3 50 102 (23) 133 (30) 0.717 (6.2)
CRU 4 20 196 (44) 173 (39) 0.428 (3.7)
CRU 6 50 80.1 (18) 129 (29) 0.405 (3.5)
CRU 7 55 62.3 (14) 102 (23) 0.463 (4.0)
CRU 11 50 182 (41) 249 (56) 0.567 (4.9)
CRU 14 50 227 (51) 191 (43) 0.705 (6.1)
CRU 16 50 107 (24) 169 (38) 0.382 (3.3)
CRU 20 50 80.1 (18) III (25) 0.278 (2.4)
APP 4 50 334 (75) 285 (64) 0.439 (3.8)
APP 5 20 454 (102) 298 (67) 0.254 (2.2)
APP 6 50 280 (63) 258 (58) 0.879 (7.6)
APP 8 50 236 (53) 205 (46) N/A
APP 11 50 254 (57) 182 (41) N/A
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at flight condition APP 6 where the value was 0.88 m/sec(7.6 kn/lb). It was not corrected
N
because of the belief that it would result in excessive stability at other conditions-a
potential problem not addressed in the FAR. Simulator results suggest that if AV/Fcol is
less than 0.23 m/sed2 kn/lb), the speed feedback opposes pitch-rate commands from the
N -
column such that the airplane is difficult to maneuver.
10.2.3.3 Wing-Load Alleviation Performance
The performance of the WLA was evaluated using Von Karman turbulence with an rms
isotropic gust level (a GUST) of 7.3 m/sec (24 ft/sed. A summary of the system
effectiveness is shown in" Figures 53 and 54. Percent changes in the rms levels of
incremehtal wing bending and torsion loads, with successive" closure of the PAS, MLC,. and
GLA control loops, are shown. The changes are referenced to the rms loads of the
unaugmented airplane. Also shown is the increase in the peak incremental value of
elevator and aileron displacement and rate.
The data show that PAS alone yields a 12.7% decrease in the incremental bending moment
near the wing tip (75% of wing span) compared to that for the unaugmented airplane. The
peak incremental demands on the 757 elevator are 2.2 deg in displacement and 9.8 deg/sec
in rate. Both figures are well within the capabilities of the elevator drive servos.
Adding MLC to the PAS yields a 23.6% decrease in the outboard incremental bending
moment, again compared to the valu~ for the unaugmented airplane. This additional
reduction in moment is obtained by symmetric deflection of the ailerons and has a
minimal effect on elevator servo activity. The peak demand on the aileron is 7.0 deg,
which is 58% of the trailing-edge-down authority limit at VMO' The rate demand is
60 deg/sec, which exceeds the current 55-deg/sec no-load rate limit of the. 757 aileron
drive system. This level of exceedance is not significant due to the extremely low
probabili ty of occurrence of the selected gust level.
As shown in Figure 53, the GLA system reduced outboard bending moments by approx-
imately 5% but at the expense of a 10% increase in inboard torsion-an acceptable trade.
However, the peak aileron rate rose from 60 to 173 deg/sec. It is therefore questionable
whether or not this particular GLA design could be justified for a Production ACT System.
It should nevertheless be adequate to meet the limited objectives of the WLA flight test
program, which is concerned more with verifying system architecture than with validating
WLA control laws.
126
PAS
PAS
& MLC
PAS,
MLC,
& GLA
O.....------r-----r-------r-----
Bending Moment -10
at 25% Span t-
-20 .....
10.3 10.6
21.7
0
-10 ~
Bending Moment 12.7
en at 75% Span
"0
-20 t-al
0 23.6
-oJ
28.2(ij
-30 ....
-cQ)
E
Q)
...
()
E 20 19.8c
Q)
10.4Cl 10c Torsion atal
.r::. 25% Span0
C 0
Q)
5.6()...
Q)
-10a..
20 r-
10 t-
13.0
18.1
Torsion at
75% Span 01--------,.---------1--------1- _
r-
-10 ~ 12.4
Note: u GUST = 7.3 m/sec (24 ft/sec). Flight Condition CRU 4'
Data relative to the unaugmented airplane response
Figure 53. Wing Loads in Turbulence Due to PAS and WLA Systems
127
PAS,
PAS PAS MLC,& MLC & GLA
Aileron, ] I10.4deg I 7.0
en
Q)
Cli
a:
"tJ 200
t 1
173cctl
en Aileron
c Rate, deg/sec
1
60
.
0.2(3
100
Q)
:;:: aQ)
0
Q)
u
ctl
-
~
::J
U)
(5
~
c
0() J(ij Elevator, 1 2.2 1 2.0 1 2.0C degQ)EQ)U
-=~
ctl
Q)
Q.
Elevator
Rate, deg/sec 1
0
5~_---'----J....-_t 19.8 19.5 1_9_._8 _
Note: rrGUST = 7.3 m/sec (24 ft/sec). Flight Condition CRU 4
Figure 54. Control Surface Activity in Turbulence Due to PAS and WLA Systems
128
10.3 RELIABILITY
As stated in Section 10.1, the reliability requirements, system and airplane schedule
reliability, apply only to the Production ACT System. The Test ACT System is not
configured to achieve such reliability nor can the projected flight test program be
expected to provide assurance of Production ACT reliability. This must therefore be
accomplished by the analytical methods of this section.
The summary of Production ACT reliability requirements and predictions is as follows:
Probability of loss of Essential PAS/FBW
in a 1-hr flight
Probability of loss of Primary PAS
in a 1-hr flight
Probability of loss of WLA
in a 1-hr flight
Number of interruptions per
100 000 departures
10.3.1 ESSENTIAL SYSTEM
Requirement
65
Prediction
0.69 x 10-9
0.16 x 10-5
0.17 x 10-5
53.7
Basic Requirement-The Essential system is required to provide sufficient pitch control
and augmented stability to permit continued safe flight and landing without exceptional
pilot skill or strength after any failure condition that has not been shown to be extremely
improbable (probability is less than 10-9 for a l-hr flight) (sec. 4.1.4). The performance
requirement of the Essential PAS is therefore to provide at least Level 3 handling
qualities (as defined in fig. 4) over the normal operating envelope. At least Level 2
handling qualities are to be provided over a restricted flight envelope that is sufficient for
continuation to the scheduled destination.
Design Consequences-In order to meet the reliability requirement using state-of-the-art
electronic components, the Essential system was configured to be quadruply redundant
and "brick walled" (i.e., each channel is completely independent of the others, from the
sensors to the output of the secondary actuators).
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Essential System Reliability-The calculated probability of total Essential system failure
in a I-hr flight is 0.69 x 10-9, as shown in Figure 55.
The reliability analysis for the Essential system is based on the following assumptions:
• Worst case ambient temperature of the equipment racks is 65 0 C.
• One Primary computer has been failed for 25 flight hours prior to dispatch.
• Dispatch is not permitted with a known failure in the Essential system.
• Failure rates of components are as shown in Table 6.
• Generic faults and false condemnations are considered negligible.
Figure 55 shows four sources of failure for the Essential System. The major contributors
to its failure (passive fault sequences leading to a "two-two split") refer to those failures
that may not be detectable by the detent monitor during flight (table 7). The "two-two
split" in a voted quadruple redundant control function is a possible failure pattern that
defeats the normal failure detection and reconfiguration plan. Normally the first failure
is identified by a three-versus-one vote and the discrepant channel is disconnected. A
second failure is then detected by a two-versus-one vote. However, if two of four
operating channels fail similarly and are detected simultaneously, the voter configuration
is two versus two with no sure way of identifying the failed pair. This is the "two-two
split." Such failures are detectable during preflight test. The rate of inhibiting failures
of inline monitors is small-on the order of 10-7 or 10-8 per hour. Consequently, even if
the inline monitors are not retested for 30 000 hr (assumed airplane life), passive fault
sequences involving inhibited inline monitors do not contribute materially to the
probability of a two-two split. The 7.1 x 10-6 failure probability shown in Figure 55 is
derived for passive faults for which there is no inline monitoring. The computation is
conservative since not all combinations of undetected passive faults cause two-two splits.
The conclusion that inline monitors are effective, despite 30 OOO-hr exposure times, IS
based on the assumption that the monitoring components are periodically tested. A
preflight test of the spin monitor has been developed and has been assumed to be available
for the Production ACT System.
Another failure mode results where one or more channels are disabled by a soft detent and
not detected because of a failed Primary computer. (The secondary actuators have a
connect-disconnect feature that enables them to be selectively engaged to the summing
link. Engagement results from applying hydraulic pressure to two pistons within the
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Table 6. Essential Channel and Essential Computer Failure Rates
Essential Channel
Component or Function
Loss of electrical power
Loss of hydraulic power channel
Servo (secondary actuator)
LVDTs (2)c
Engage logic (A9 card)b
Essential computer (A6 and AS cards)b
Secondary power loss (PS total)c
Force transducers (2)
Gyroc
Gyro monitorltorquer
Total AESS
Soft detent
Inhibiting failure of inline monitors
aNegligible.
bTotal component failure rate at 65°C. ambient.
cComponents having inline monitors.
dFactored from a Boeing piece-part analysis.
Failures per
106 flight hour·
24
32
14
18
33
62
22
50
7
262
7
0.02 to 0.2
Source
NASA CR-3519
757 estimate
NASA CR-3519
NASA CR-3519
Analysis
Analysis
Analysis
NASA CR-3519
Gyro spec
Analysis
d
Analysis
Essential Computer
Failures per Failures per
106 flight hour, 106 flight hour,
Component 500C 650C
Engage logic 11 18
(A9 card)
Computer 14 33
(A6, AS cards)
Power supply 42 62 ~
Total 67 113
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Table 7. Rate of Passive Failures Causing 2-2 Splits
Component or Function Classification
Hydraulic power A
Servo B
LVDTs C
Engage logic (A9) A
Power supply C
Force transducers C
Gyro (except pickoff) C
Gyro pickoff B
Gyro monitor torquer A
Failures per
106 flight hour
00
*1.1
00
00
00
00
00
*1.0
00
Subtotal 2.1
Estimate for Essential computations 5.0
Total: 7.1
Classification key:
A A 2-2 split requires a 3-fault sequence.
B Unmonitored and can lead to a 2-2 split.
C Component has high coverage inline monitor.
*Vendor FMEA for similar equipment.
power piston, causing them to clamp down on a roller on the output link, thus making the
output link follow the power piston. Any fault that prevents the pistons from clamping
down on the roller prevents engagement. This is called a "soft detent.") This failure
combination contributes 0.26 x 10-9 to the probability of Essential system failure, under
the assumption that a failed Primary computer at dispatch precludes soft detent detection
and that the detent validation is waived for a maximum of 25 flight hours. In this case, a
soft detent failure is not detected by the preflight check nor is it apt to be detected in
flight. The figure of 25 flight hours is based on 757 and 767 minimum equipment list
133
(MEL) requirements for the Yaw Damper System, which allows dispatch with one channel
inoperative for a maximum of 25 flight hours.
The system, as a result of failure of three channels in flight, has a failure rate of 0.07 x
10-9 per flight hour.
Negligible failure probability has been assigned to a three-fault sequence involving
preflight latent faults. It is assumed that any identified failure sequence of substance will
require modification of the preflight test procedure so that the condition would be
detectable.
10.3.2 PRIMARY SYSTEM
Basic Requirements-The Primary system, operating in conjunction with the Essential, is
required to provide Levell handling qualities. Loss of the Primary system does not
require diversion, although dispatch would not be permitted. Some change of flight
parameters, such as speed or altitude, may be required. To improve the schedule
reliability of this system without excessive redundancy, dispatch is permitted with any
one of the following items inoperative:
o One Digital Air Data System
o One Inertial Reference System
o One Primary Active Controls Computer
The reliability requirement of the Primary system is such that the probability of complete
failure of either the Primary PAS or the WLA shall be less than 10-5 in a I-hr flight.
Because loss of the Primary PAS or WLA affects only flight envelope modification, the
failure probabilities are averaged over all dispatchable flights.
Design Consequences-In order that the inflight requirements be met (with the predicted
component failure rate), the Primary PAS must be capable of operating with only a single
IRS or DADC. As discussed in Section 10.1, it is expected that this can be accomplished
with inline monitors and authority limiters. It is believed that inline monitors can provide
95% coverage, where coverage re-presents the percentage of component faults that are
correctly identified by the monitors and correctly reconfigured.
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Calculated Reliability of Primary PAS/FBW-The failure rate of a Primary computer,
excluding components dedicated to WLA functions, is estimated to be 22 x 10-5 per flight
hour. This is based on the failure rates listed in Table 8. Applicable failure rate
estimates from the 757 Autopilot/Flight Director System (AFDS) Program have been used,
and the remainder have been obtained by analysis.
Table 8. Primary Computer Failure Rate Estimate
Computer Card
Number - Function
A2 - I/ob
A3 - I/Ob
A4 - Analog in
A5 - Analog output
A5 -- PAS/FBW only
A7 - Monitors
AID - X-channel receiver
All - RAM
A12 - Logic
A12 -- PAS/FBW only
A13 - I/O controlb
A14 - I/O datab
A15 - CPU control
A16 - CPU data
Program memory (30 000)
Power supplya,b
Power supply without 400-Hz
inverter
Interconnect
Total
Primary PAS/FBW
Failure Rate
Per 106 Flight Hourc,d
8.9
9.9
13.4
1.8
8.9
11.4
30.7
1.4
10.8
11.6
12.9
8.6
38.8
37.0
18.3
224.4
Primary Computer
Failure Rate
Per 106 Flight Hourc
8.9
9.9
13.4
14.2
8.9
11.4
30.7
17.5
10.8
11.6
12.9
8.6
38.8
42.1
18.3
258.0
apower supply is counted against Essential.
bC ... homponents in senes Wit sensor.
CAt 500 C average equipment ambient.
dExcludes WLA-unique components and 400-Hz power supply for Essential computers.
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Certain Primary computer failures can intercept the flow of data from local channel
sensors to the other Primary computers. The involved components in Table 8 are
computer cards A2, A3, A13, A14, and the power supply. To account for such failures, the
. .
approximate failure rate of these components (8 x 10-5 per flight hour) is added to the
. .
failure rate of each sensor (table 9). Failure rates so adjusted are indicated by an asterisk
(e.g., A. *IRS).
The probability of total loss of Primary PAS/FBW functions is calculated to be 0.16 x 10-5
for a I-hr flight (fig. 56). Failures of the Primary computer do not contribute
significantly to this value.
Calculated Reliability of WLA-In Figure 57, the probability of total loss of WL~ is
calculated to be 0.17 x 10-5 for a I-hr flight. Again, neither the Primary computers nor
the dedicated sensors' contribute materially to the result. The most significant
contributor is the Inertial Reference System.
Table 9. Airplane Sensor and Sensor System Failure Rates
Component
Inertial Reference System
Digital Air Data Computer
Inertial Reference System (IRS*)
Digital Air Data Computer (DADC*)
Failures Per
106 Flight Hour
600
290
680
370
*The failure rates for IRS and DADC include the failure rate of input-output processing
of their signals by the Primary computers.
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) )
3DADCs
Fail in Flight
P = X"3DADC
A'DADC = 370 X 10-6
P = 3.9 X 10-11 0.96 = x 10-2
Failure rate of primary PAS computer
Failure rates of Inertial Reference System (IRS) and
Digital Air Data Computer (DADC) supplemented
to include parts of the computer that provide
input-output functions
Probability of an event occurring
Exposure time
Coverage; fraction of faults correctly attributed
to the malfunctioning component and correctly
managed by configuration control.
P
t
C
Total Loss
of
Primary PAS
p = X'3IAS
X"IRS = 680 x 10-6
P=3.1xl0-10
3 Primary
Computers Fail
in Flight
P = 3 A~PC
ApPC = 220 x 10-6
P = 1 X 10-11 <9 X 10-3
Notes:
a. It is assumed that dispatch may take place with one
Primary PAS computer or one Inertial Reference System
or one Digital Air Data Computer inoperative. The
probability that no additional module is inoperable is
one minus the probability that any additional module
is inoperable.
b. All failure rates (A'S) are expressed per flight hour.
Dispatch With 1
PPC and No Other
Module Inoperative
3 PPCs Fail
In Flight
Dispatch With 1
IRS and No Other
Module Inoperative
2 IRSs Fail
In Flight
Dispatch With 1
DADC and No Other.
Module Inoperative
2 DADCs Fail
In Flight
2
Fail
1 Fails
No
Coverage
p = 2~ADC( 1-C) P = X"bADc
A~ADC = 370 x 10-6 A~ADC = 370 x 10-6
C=0.95 P=1.37x10-7
P = 7.4 x 10-4(0.05)
P = 3.7 X 10-5
Note a
Nothing
Else Inop
1 Fails 2 1 DADe
No Fail Inop at
Coverage Dispatch
P = 2A;RS = (1-C) P = A;~S P == 3tADADC
C = 0.95 A;RS = 680 x 10-6 t = 9 fit hr
X;RS = 680 x 10-6 P = 4.6 X 10-7 X = 370 X 10-6
P = 1.36 x 10-3(0.05) P = 1.0 X 10-2
P = 6.8 X 10-S
Note a
Nothing
Else Inop
1 IRS
Inop at
Dispatch
P == 4t>';RS
t = 9 fit hr
A;RS = 680 x 10-6
P = 1.8 X 10-2
Note a
Nothing
Else Inop
1 ppe
Inop at
Dispatch
P = 4tX
t = 9 fit hr
X = 2.50 X 10-6
P = 9 X 10-3
Figure 56. Fault Tree for Total Loss of Primary PAS
Loss of
WLA
P = 0.006 X 10-5
I
Both Primary
Computers
Fail (Note a)
ACOMP= 250 X 10-6 (Note c)
P = A2COMP= 6.3 X 10-8
P = 5 X 10-8
I
One WLA Actuator
Channel and The
Opposite Primary
Computer Fail
0.17 X 10-5
P = 0.12 X 10-5
I
IRS Sensor Set
Inoperative
(See Fig. 56)
P = 0.035 X 10-5
I
DADC Sensor Set
Inoperative
(See Fig. 56)
P = 1 X 10-8
I
Two WLA
Actuator
Channels Fail
ACOMP= 250 x 10-6 (Note c)
ACHANA= 112X1?~6} (Note b)
ACHAN B= 88 x 10
P = ACOMP(ACHAN A + ACHAN B) Xt2
P = 5 X 10-8
Glossary:
WLA Wing -load alleviation
P Probability of an event
in 1 flight hour
AHYD MeaOl failure rate for
hydraulic supplies
AACT Actuator failure ,ate
ACHAN A}FailUre rates of
ACHAN B actuator channels A & B
t Exposure time, 1 flight hour
AHYD (PWR) = 24 x 10-6/flt hr
AACTU = 32 x 10-6/fIt hr
ACHAN A = 2(AHYD + AACT)
= 112 x 1O-6/fIt hr
ACHAN B = AHYD 2 + AACT
= 88 x 10-6/flt hr
PA&B}= ACHA~ A X CHAN B Xt2
PA&B = - 10 8
Notes:
a. Wing-load alleviation is connected to only two Primary
computers at a time
b. Channel failure rates computed elsewhere on this page
c. The WLA function uses computer components not used by
Primary PAS, thus the computer A is different
Figure 57. Fault Tree for Total Loss of WLA
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10.3.3 SCHEDULE RELIABILITY
Schedule reliability per the definition in Section 4.1.5 can be predicted in either of two
ways:
• By an analysis based on the probability of (1) a required ACT function being made
inoperable due to failure of a component and (2) an interruption of service due to
such failure
• By comparison to interruption rates experienced in commercial service resulting from
failure of components that are similar to the ACT components
Although it is possible to compute probability, the variables such as (l) the time a
malfunction occurs and (2) the available ground time (through-stop, turnaround, or
overnight) to trouble shoot, repair, or replace-coupled with whether or not the flight crew
will accept an airplane that is legally dispatchable with faults-make it a very
cumbersome task with questionable results.
The second method is based on actual airline service experience for components of similar
function and deferrability. Deferrability refers to the use of the minimum equipment list,
which identifies those components that can be inoperable without precluding dispatch.
Previous experience has shown that the second method provides good predictions, and it is
therefore used here.
• Basic Requirement-The Production ACT System shall add no more than 65
interruptions per 100 000 departures (sec. 4.1.5).
• Calculated Schedule Reliability-The Production ACT System interruption rate is
predicted to be 53.7 per 100 000 departures (table 10).
Table 10 is a tabulation of the Production ACT components to be analyzed, the compo-
nents currently in airline service chosen to approximate the ACT components, and
the airplane types from which the experience interruption rates were obtained. Each ACT
system component interruption rate is developed by factoring the data base component by
the following factors:
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Table 10. Schedule Reliability Calculation
Number Interruptions PerFlight Failure Defer- 100 000 Departures
Name at Part Added to Compar-
per Length Rate rability
the Baseline Airplane ison Comparison Part. Name
Airplane
Factor Factor Factor Remarks
Airplane Factor Comparison ACT
Part Part
A B C 0 E F=A·B·C·O·E
Essential Computer No MEL Dispatch
and Dedicated Pitch- DC-10 Digital Air Data 4/2 0.625 67/98 1 11.6 9.9 for Rate Gyro or
Rate Gyro Computer DADC
Elevator and Aileron No MEL Dispatch
Second?.: y Actuators 747 Elevator PCU 8/4 0.510 ' 32/17 1 2.77 5.3 for Secondary
(Note 2) Actuators or PCUs
ACT Requires All Flap
Flap Position 747 Flap Position Sensor 4/2 0.510 5/5 2 2.77 5.6 Position Sensors;
Sensor (Note 1) 747 Allows One
Inoperative Under MEL
Column Force No MEL Dispatch
Sensors (LVDTs) DC-10 Digital Air Data 8/2 0.625 7/98 1 11.6 2.1 for Column ForceComputer Sensors or DADCs
Preflight Test No MEL DispatchDC-10 Digital Air Data 1/2 0.625 33/98 1 11.6 1.2 for Test Panel orPanel Computer Oe-10 DADC
No MEL DIspatch
Control Panel DC-10 Digital Air Data 1/2 0.625 16.6/98 1 11.6 0.6 for Control Panel
Computer or DC-10 DADC
All DADCs Required
Primary ACT 0.5 for Dispatch; One
Computer DC·l0 Digital Air Data 4/2 0.625 224/98 (Note 1) 11.6 16.6 Primary Computer MayBe InoperativeComputer Under MEL
Note 1 A deferrability factor other than one is provided to account for those instances where the Component Total 41.3
comparison part has a different MEL requirement than does the
production ACT component. System
(1.3 x Component Total) 53.7
ate 2 Wing-mounted accelerometers will have sufficientN
dispatch flexibility to be considered negligible
contributors to schedule unreliability.
• Number per Airplane Factor-The ratio of the number of components in the ACT
airplane to the number of similar components in the experience data base.
• Flight Length Factor-Determined for the 757 and 767 Programs, it assigns a ratio of
time versus cycle-related failures for each two-digit AT A classification and provides
a formula for adjusting data base flight lengths to the flight length of the airplane
under study. The flight length of the airplane under study is assumed to be 1.25 hr
and is consistent with the expected average flight of the 767 and 757 fleets.
• Failure Rate Factor-The ratio of the anticipated failure rate of an ACT component
to the experienced failure rate.
• Deferrability Factor-A correction to allow for the fact that the ACT airplane
component and the reference airplane component are not treated alike by the MEL.
The sum of the interruption rates for each of the listed components represents those
interruptions that are traceable to the particular ACT components. Experience has shown
that all schedule interruptions for an automatic flight control system are approximately
equal to 1.3 times the sum of all interruptions traceable to particular components. To
account for this, the ACT System totals are computed at 1.3 times the sum of the
components.
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11.0 TEST PLANNING
Testing of the Test ACT System will be performed in two phases. The first will take
place in an avionics laboratory and a flight control test rig and will determine readiness
for flight tests. The second phase will be a flight test that will demonstrate the
performance and safety of the Test ACT System in a relaxed static stability-configured
airplane.
11.1 LABORATORY TEST PLAN
The primary objective of the Test ACT System laboratory tests will be to verify and
validate the system hardware and software in time to support the flight test currently
scheduled for 1985. The majority of the laboratory testing will be performed in the
Boeing Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory and a Boeing flight control test rig.
Other testing was performed by Collins in Cedar Rapids. The testing at Collins verified
that the system, as designed, meets the requirements; the testing at Boeing will validate
most of these requirements and prove the system is safe for flight.
The activities covered by the Laboratory Test Plan include tests of system hardware and
software, as well as system integration. The testing begins with the delivery of the Test
ACT Console (TAC) and system hardware and progresses through troubleshooting and
updating of hardware and software, as required to show full readiness for the flight tests.
11.1.1 LABORATORY TEST DEVELOPMENT AND SCHEDULE
11.1.1.1 Buildup in Test Complexity
The laboratory -t:est features a programmed buildup in the completeness and complexity of
the test setup. Starting with single-channel testing of an analog Essential computer, the
testing will build in complexity by slowly adding multiple channels, the digital Primary
computers, an airplane simulation, and finally a pilot with a simulated flight deck,
moving-base cockpit, and computer-generated imagery.
The earlier, simpler tests will be performed using general-purpose test equipment under
the control of an Eclipse S250 computer. In this case the Eclipse simply automates the
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testing. As the tests grow in complexity, the Eclipse will be used to simulate airplane
sensors and then the airplane dynamics themselves. At the highest levels of complexity
(i.e., those involving a pilot), the tests will switch to a Harris Series 800 computer that
will provide a higher fidelity model of the airplane aerodynamics, as well as provisions for
interfacing with the pilot and a flight deck simulator.
11.1.1.2 Test Design and Development
Review and analysis of system requirements documentation and the supplier's design and
verification documentation will be used to develop a test matrix. This matrix will be used
in turn to design the test cases (Plans of Test) for which procedures will be developed.
The test cases wi1l be chosen in a manner that covers the requirements in a balanced
fashion, with a minimum of duplication of previous verification testing. Plans of Test, as
well as Detailed Test Procedures (DTP), will be developed prior to the beginning of trial
test runs and finalized prior to the formal test runs.
The design and development process for step-by-step procedures, test drivers, comparison
checkers, and analytical programs will continue through the test period. The DTPs will
become more specific as familiarity with the laboratory facilities and operational
procedures increases; then the Plans of Test will be updated.
11.1.1.3 Analysis and Review
The analysis and review step of the test design process is critical to the selection and
preparation of detailed tests that wi1l adequately examine the features of the Test ACT
System within the constraints of time and other fixed resources.
The test analysis task begins with the development of laboratory test categories and the
determination of potential system error classifications. These will serve to direct and
order the test design effort. The next step is the preparation of a test matrix, relating
documented requirements to planned tests. This effort is intended to ensure that no
stated requirement goes untested. Further, it will aid in avoiding unnecessary duplication
of tests. The test matrix is also expected to provide insight into retest requirements of
new versions of the system, follow~ng revision or problem correction.
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~, 11.1.1.4 Laboratory Test Categories
The design of the test cases and the overall planning of the testing is aided by initially
dividing the requirements that must be tested into logical categories. These categories
will provide the first-level organization for the development of the test cases (Plans of
Test).
A set of categories that meets the needs of the Test ACT System laboratory test effort
follows:
• Open-loop hardware tests
• Open-loop software tests
• Failure detection tests
• System integration tests
• Closed-loop system performance tests
• Closed-loop failure response tests
.~ Table 11 illustrates the test categories and their contents, as envisioned for the Test ACT
System laboratory tests.
11.1.1.5 Test Matrix
The test matrix for each category will be developed by examining the requirements
defined by the Test ACT Specification Control Drawing. In addition, supplier design and
implementation documents will be examined for requirements generated by the system
design process. The specification paragraph number will be used to cross-reference the
various documents with the test matrix.
11.1.1.6 Development of Test Procedures
The general test philosophy will be first to verify that the system meets all requirements
given in the Specification Control Drawing and then to determine that they result in a
safe system that meets the performance requirements. To ensure this, the matrix
described in Section 11.1.1.5 will be used. It will indicate how each requirement will be
met (inspection, analysis, or test) and who (the vendor or Boeing) will perform the test.
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Table 11. Laboratory Test Plan Categories
OPEN-LOOP HARDWARE TESTS
• EMI, power transient, and quality susceptibility
• Control panel operation
• Input/output interface
• Primary system hardware monitors
• Essential control laws
• Essential PAS/FBW monitors
• Primary system output voting
OPEN-LOOP SOFTWARE TESTS
• Flight deck interface
• Pitch control laws
• Wing-load alleviation
• Signal selection and fault detection
• Output management
• Program control
• Fault reporting and recording
FAILURE DETECTION TESTS
• Power-up
• Preflight
• Periodic tests/monitors
SYSTEM INTEGRATION TESTS
• Test ACT/DADC integration
• Test ACT/IRS integration
• Test ACT/CSEU/FSEU integration
e Test ACT/secondary actuator integration
CLOSED-LOOP PERFORMANCE TESTS
• Closed-loop stability and response (unpiloted)
o Closed-loop stability and response (piloted)
CLOSED-LOOP FAILURE RESPONSE TESTS
• Airplane response to failures (unpiloted)
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Each requirement to be tested by Boeing will be covered by at least one DTP. In general,
each of them will verify several requirements.
The DTP will be developed in three parts or steps. Step one, as explained previously, is to
identify the requirements to be verified. Step two will be to write a short description of a
test that will verify those requirements. Step three, which will be performed in the
laboratory, will be to determine the procedures required to perform a repeatable test (a
primary requirement on DTPs is that they contain enough information to repeat the
procedure years later). It is in this period that the computer programs used to automate
the test will be developed for the Eclipse.
11.1.1.7 Test Schedule
Figure 58 gives the schedule for the initial phase of laboratory testing. Laboratory
development and test planning will proceed concurrently. Both are scheduled to be
complete on July 6, when the Test ACT hardware and software arrive from Collins. At
that time laboratory testing will begin. This phase of laboratory testing will be completed
by mid-December 1983. The need for system changes will be determined at that time.
Figure 59 is the full-term schedule. Test planning for 1984 is only preliminary, as the
data for software update and actuator availability are not firm. The major test events for
1984 are a test of the four actuator interconnectors and validation of the final Test ACT
Configuration.
11.1.2 LABORATORY FACILITY DESCRIPTION
11.1.2.1 Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory
All tests will be conducted at the Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory (DAFCL).
This laboratory is located adjacent to the Renton Flight Simulation Center (RFSC). The
primary function of the DAFCL is 757/767 flight control system validation, although
support is also provided to advanced technology programs, such as Test ACT, and to
software development. The laboratory layout is shown in Figure 60.
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Figure 60. DAFCL Laboratory Layout
The DAFCL contains work areas with digital simulation hardware, test consoles, analog
computers, interface equipment, and other support hardware. The ability is provided to
conduct real-time simulations with simulated control inputs. The complex can be
interconnected with the RFSC for testing with crew cabs and maximum fidelity
aerodynamic models.
11.1.2.2 Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory Simulations
The DAFCL Data General Eclipse S250 computers host simulations of the airplane
equations of motion, sensors, servos, airplane environment, and engine dynamics. The
sensor and servo simulation will include proper timing, scaling, and significant
nonlinearities.
The Eclipse aerodynamic model is derived from the maximum fidelity aerodynamic models
used in the RFSC. This process provides good configuration control of airplane data. The
Eclipse computers will be used in the early phases of testing to (1) provide an automated
test sequence, (2) record test results, (3) simulate sensors and actuators, and (4) provide
input and output simulation and failure models.
11.1.2.3 Renton Flight Simulation Center
The Renton Flight Simulation Center contains all components necessary to conduct man-
in-the-Ioop, real-time aircraft simulations. The components include (1) digital and hybrid-
analog computers, (2) cockpits with instrument displays, (3) computer-generated cathode
ray tube (CRT) displays, (4) visual displays, (5) a cockpit motion system, (6) an extensive
computer software library, and (7) an experienced simulation staff. The floor plan and
location of major elements of the RFSC are shown in Figure 61.
The Multipurpose (M2) Cab is equipped with a three-degree-of-freedom motion base and
an electrohydraulic force feel system. The M2 cab can be configured to represent any
Boeing commercial airplane. The cab has a complete captain and first officer
instrumentation set, modular aisle stands and dash panels, test conductor's station, and
out-the-window visual displays. The Guidance and Flight Display Cab and the Systems and
Work Load Cab are commonly called Configuration (C) Cabs. The C cabs support the 757
and 767 Programs. Included in the cabs is a complete digital interface system to the
RFSC laboratory computers.
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Figure 61. Boeing-Renton Flight Simulation Center
,~ A high-fidelity, fully nonlinear 757 simulation model, resident in Harris Series 800
computers, is provided in the RFSC. This facility will be used for system integration and
piloted simulation work in support of this test plan. The simulation cab facility is used for
tests that require pilot-in-the-Ioop control and display interaction. Most piloted
simulations will utilize the fixed-base C cab for system integration testing since that cab
configuration closely matches the cockpit layout of the 757 flight test airplane. The
moving-base M2 cab will also be used to a lesser extent, where motor cues are important.
11.1.2.4 Renton Flight Control Systems Hydromechanical Laboratory
The Renton Flight Control Systems Hydromechanical Laboratory (RFCSHL), located
adjacent to the DAFCL (fig. 60), is used for development, verification, and validation
testing of aircraft actuators and mechanical fixtures. The laboratory contains complete
electrical and hydraulic fluid distribution systems with convenient connect points. Large
environmental test and fluid flow benches are available, as is a protected operator control
arid data gathering room.
,~ Future plans call for building a special test fixture (mini-rig) in the RFCSHL to test the
servoactuators in a four-channel closed-loop configuration. This mini-rig will simulate
the mechanical interconnections between the actuators that will exist on the test 757
airplane. These actuators will be controlled, through the work station interface (WSI), by
the Active Controls Computers (ACC) located in the adjacent DAFCL.
11.1.3 TEST SUPPORT HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
11.1.3.1 Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory Test Support Equipment
In addition to the simulation host computers, the other equipment required for DAFCL
testing is shown in Figure 62. The major elements are described as follows:
• A front-end processor (Data General Eclipse 5230) is provided with each simulation
host. It has the capability to format the floating-point simulation data to or from the
equivalent fixed-point format that is compatible with the line replaceable unit (LRU)
interface equipment.
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Figure 62. TypicalDAFCL rest Configuration
• A WSI is provided for interfacing the Primary and Essential computers and TAC with
the rest of the laboratory. This device controls the buffering, conversion, signal
conditioning, and other required LRU interfacing. A patch panel is provided for
flexible interconnection to the TAC.
• A Simulation Control Console is provided for the test conductor interface. This
console includes a simulation control CRT and a panel of programmable controls and
displays (discrete switches, lamps, rotary input encoders, and numerical displays).
Figure 63 illustrates the interfacing required for the Test ACT work station.
11.1.3.2 Digital Avionics Flight Controls Laboratory Support Software
The DAFCL support software will include a real-time simulation and test executive,
plotting routines, test driver software (e.g., frequency response test), interface software
arid data bases, diagnostic software, and analysis programs. The real-time simulation and
test executive is a higher order language within which simulation models and open-loop
test drivers are combined to form a simulation package. It also provides a standard user
interface for simulation initialization, control, and data acquisition.
Supporting aids, such as LRU and Aeronautical Radic Incorporated (ARINC) data bases,
high-fidelity LRU models, comparison checkers, problem tracking, and report generation
capabilities, are also provided.
11.1.3.3 Work Station Interface Patch Board Preparation and Checkout
The test area of the DAFCL includes a WSI patch board development and checkout bench,
consisting of a work area and a microcomputer-based automatic patch board checkout
station. A patch board configuration control program is provided for interactive
maintenance and control of the patch configurations and for downloading the patch data
base for the checkout station.
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11.2 FLIGHT CONTROL TEST RIG TEST PLAN
Test ACT System and proof testing will be performed on the 757-200 Flight Control Test
Rig (FCTR) prior to installing the system in the airplane.
11.2.1 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM TEST
All mechanical and actuation components of the Test ACT System will be installed in the
FCTR and integrated with the normal airplane systems. The function of the ACCs will be
simulated by laboratory test drivers.
The objectives of the test are to:
• Verify elevator rate and deflection capability
• Determine system resolution in terms of deadband and hysteresis
• Determine frequency response characteristics
• Determine effects of asynchronous computer operation
• Determine system engage and disengage characteristics
• Determine system transient characteristics in response to failures
11.2.2 PROOF AND OPERATIONS TEST
A one-time limited mechanical and hydraulic system proof and operations test will be
conducted. This will be used to verify proper operation and adequate structural capacity
of Test ACT elements for operating modes that are beyond the scope of the system
functional test. This will subject Test ACT components, supports, and plumbing to limit
or near-limit load conditions. Component operating clearance under extra-normal
conditions, such as combined mechanical and electrical commands, will be verified.
The above testing will be conducted on the FCTR wherever practicable, with the
remainder accomplished upon the 757 airplane prior to first flight.
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11.3 PRELIMINARY FLIGHT TEST PLAN
This section presents the Preliminary Plan for the testing of the Test ACT System after
instal1ation in the test airplane. The plan includes engineering ground tests, as wel1 as the
actual flight test.
11.3.1 TEST OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the engineering ground tests are to verify:
• Correct operation of the instal1ed Test ACT System
• Correct operation of the flight test instrumentation system
• Flight test operational procedures and overall flight readiness before proceeding to
the flight test phase
The objectives of the flight tests are to validate:
• The performance and safety of the Test ACT pitch fly-by-wire (FBW) and stability
augmentation system on a test airplane configured for relaxed static stability
o The open-loop performance (sensor-to-control surface command signal) of the Test
ACT wing-load al1eviation (WLA) system
11.3.2 TEST AIRPLANE DESCRIPTION
11.3.2.1 General Description
The test airplane wiH be the Boeing-owned 757 (NAOO O. It is a new-generation, subsonic,
commercial transport aircraft, as shown in Figure 64, that wil1 be powered by two Pratt &
Whitney 2037 high-bypass-ratio turbofan engines. Its longitudinal control surfaces include
ful1-span elevators and trimmable horizontal stabilizer. The principal characteristics of
the aircraft are summarized in Table 12.
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Figure 64. General Arrangement of Test Airplane
Table 12. Principal Characteristics of the Test Airplane
Metric Units English Units
Maximum taxi weight 100 236 kg 221 000 lb
Maximum takeoff weight 99 792 kg 220 000 lb
Maximum landing weight 89 813 kg 198 000 lb
Maximum zero fuel weight 83 462 kg 184 000 lb
Engine thrust
P&W 2037 156 kN approx. 35 000 lb approx.
Passenger capacity-typical
Mixed class 178 178
All tourist 196 196
Fuel capacity 41 180 liters 10 880 U.S. gal
Cargo capacity
52.11 m3 1 840 ft 3All bulk
Maximum operating speed
CAS 180 m/sec 350 kn
Mach number 0.86 0.86
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11.3.2.2 Ballast System
The test airplane has a system of movable ballastenabling the center of gravity kg) to be
placed anywhere betw~en 7% and 39% mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), the normal
airplane cg range. Fixed ballast will be added to shift this range aft in order to attain
55% MAC. A description of the planned ballast system is presented in Appendix A.
11.3.2.3 Flight Test Instrumentation
The flight test instrumentation system consists of both airplane- and ground-station-based
equipment. The airplane equipment provides a data acquisition function by recording
selected test data from vari~us airplane subsystems and formatting the data as desired for
real-time monitoring. A telemetry link with the ground station allows real-time
monitoring of system performance during minimum crew flights. Recorded data include
subsystem performance parameters and pertinent aircraft states that are available for
engineering evaluation after postflight processing.
Test ACT System parameters available within the ACCs will be transmitted to flight test
instrumentation via ARINC 429 digital data buses. Real-time monitoring capability of
Test ACT performance will be' provided via CRT displays, hard copy printers, x-y plotters,
strip chart recorders, and frequency spectrum analyses.
11.3.3 GROUND TEST PLAN
Engineering ground tests will be performed to verify that the new and modified systems
associated with the Test ACT System function as intended. Functional and vibration tests
will be performed. Additionally, operational procedures relative to control system
reconfiguration and possible emergency scenarios will be verified.
11.3.3.1 Functional Tests
Functional tests wll be performed to verify correct operation of the modified primary
longitudinal flight control system, the FBW and pitch augmentation control system, the
WLA system, the cg management system, and the flight test instrumentation and data
~ acquisition system.
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11.3.3.2 Ground Vibration Tests of Test Airplane
Ground vibration testing will be performed, if necessary, to verify that the Test ACT-
configured. airplane wit~ the most aft cg does not have any unexpected or undesirable
characteristics compared with the basic airplane.
11.3.3.3 Oper:ational Procedures
Data Acquisition and Display-Procedures for acquiring and displaying system and airplane
performance data from the test instrumentation system will be verified.
Flight ~rogram Changes-Pr!Jcedures for reconfiguring the Test ACT control laws via the
flight test programmer will be verified.
Cg Management-Procedures for managing the location of the airplane cg by means of the
ballast system will be verified under both normal and emergency operating conditions.
Control System Reconfiguration-Procedures for shifting from the normal primary flight
control system operation to Test ACT System operation, and vice versa, will be verified.
11.3.4 FLIGHT TEST PLAN
The objective of the Test ACT System flight test is to validate the performance and
safety of the Test ACT pitch FBW and stability augmentation system and the open-loop
performance of the WLA system.
11.3.4.1 Test Scope
The scope of the flight test will include the following:
• Evaluation of relaxed stability airplane longitudinal handling qualities with the Test
ACT System not operating
• Development of the active control system, using the provisions for inflight software
program changes
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• Evaluation of the active control system stability and performance
• Evaluation of relaxed stability airplane longitudinal handling qualities with the Test
ACT System operat.ing
• Validation of the Test ACT System fault tolerance and safety
11.3.4.2 Test Ground Rules and Assumptions
Prior to flight test, the following will have been completed:
• All flight test conditions and tasks will have been simulated in the 757 engineering
flight simulator. A summary of predicted flight test performance will have been
prepared for use during real-time evaluation of flight test results.
• Engineering ground test of the Test ACT and associated systems will have been
completed.
The flight test plan assumes the following:
• Dedicated flutter testing will not be required. The airplane will be operated well
within flutter placards. Flutter engineers will monitor closed-loop testing for
absence of system coupling with airplane elastic modes.
• The WLA subsystem will have sensors and computers operational, but no actuators
will be installed. The operation of the sensors and control law performance will be
monitored, but no dedicated flight tests will be conducted for WLA.
• Initial flight tests will be performed with a minimum crew, necessitating
telemetering of flight test data to a ground station for real-time monitoring and
evaluation by the engineering team. Subsequent tests will have Test ACT and Flight
Test Analysis engineers on board.
• Access to the ACC software programs via the TAC keyboard will be prohibited in
,---- flight.
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• Loading of alternate, previously verified, control law software modules will be
allowed during flight.
• System fault toler~nce will be verified by inserting simulated faults at the TAC
interface. However, actual initiation of the fault will be controlled by the pilot.
• The greater part of the testing will be performed at aft cg locations that are
controllable via the mechanical reversion system, in the unlikely event that the
augmentation function is lost. The final phase of testing will ~valuate "flight crucial"
conditions after the reliability· and fault tolerance of the system have been
demonstrated.
11.3.4.3 Detailed Flight Test Phases
The flight test will consist of four phases:
1. Determination of handling qualities of the unaugmented and augmented airplane at a
benign flight condition; system development to correct any shortcomings discovered
during flight test
2. Continuation of phase I-type testing but with the flight envelope expanded to include
most critical flight conditions up to VMO/MMO and maximum aft cg locations that
allow safe control unaugmented; testing of takeoff, landing, and cruise configurations
3. Demonstration of Test ACT System fault tolerance
4. Demonstration of handling qualities with the cg location moved farther aft such that
the Test ACT System is performing a flight-crucial function; i.e., one required for
safe flight
11.3.4.4 Flight Test Results
Flight test results will be appropriately documented to describe the flight performance of
the Test ACT System.
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12.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The objectives of the Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Project were
threefold: (1) to establish a credible assessment of the potential benefit of Active
Controls Technology (ACT) applied to a commercial transport, (2) if there were a positive
potential benefit of ACT, to identify the risks that preclude its use today, and (3) to
initiate test and development activities to reduce the risk of such applications in a
commercial transport. The first two objectives have been accomplished; the third is well
under way with the completion and delivery of the Test ACT System described herein.
The test and development work necessary to prepare the ACT technology (represented by
this experimental system) for commercial application is just beginning.
12.1 TEST ACT SYSTEM STATUS
The Test ACT System, consisting of flightworthy hardware and software, was designed to
represent a potentially certifiable system. It implements the following active control
functions:
• Pitch-augmented stability
• Wing-load alleviation, including maneuver-load control and gust-load alleviation
Since the system is necessary for continued safe flight, a natural adjunct to the ACT
system is the use of fly by wire for control. Therefore the Test ACT System implements
both control and augmentation through the use of fly by wire.
Collins Air Transport Division of Rockwell International was selected to fabricate the
Test ACT System equipment, including all system sensors. The following equipment was
built, verified, and delivered:
• Four Active Controls Computers
• One Test ACT Control Panel
• One Preflight Test Panel
• One Flight Test Programmer
• Four pitch-rate gyros
• Two column force transducers with quadruple pickoffs
• Eight linear accelerometers
• One Test ACT Console·
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12.2 FUTURE WORK
The test phases began with installation of the electronics in the Boeing Digital Avionics
Flight Controls Laboratory and will proceed through addition of the servos, installation of
the servos and associated mechanisms in a Flight Control Test Rig ("Iron Bird"), and
installation and flight test in a Boeing-owned test airplane. This extensive laboratory and
flight test of the Test ACT System will identify solutions for the technical risk areas as a
step toward validating and establishing confidence that such a crucial system can be
developed for a commercial application.
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APPENDIX A
757 NAOOI CENTER-OF-GRAVITY MANAGEMENT FOR TEST ACT
A.I GENERAL
The Test ACT System will be flown at center-of-gravity kg) positions considerably aft of
the certificated limits for the 757 aircraft. In order to achieve the desired aft cg limits
for flight and remain within the certificated limits for takeoff and landing, a system of
fixed and movable ballast is incorporated. This system provides a cg forward of 39%
mean aerodynamic chord (MAC) for taxi, takeoff, and landing and enables a rearward shift
to 55% in flight.
A.2 TEST ACT BALLAST SYSTEM
The ballast system used is shown schematically in Figure A-I. The 757 Test Configuration
is achieved by removing passenger seats, aft lavatories, and passenger-related items. All
galleys except for the forward one, the class divider, and miscellaneous storage provisions
are removed. Flight test instrumentation racks plus 20 seats for test personnel are
installed. Approximately 6800 kg (15 000 lb) of fixed ballast, consisting of 23-kg (50-lb)
sand bags, are placed on the floor of the main deck and in the lower cargo compartments.
Center-of-gravity control during flight is accomplished by means of fore and aft water
barrels on the main and cargo decks; pumps and interconnecting plumbing are provided for
fore and aft wake transfer.
A.3 CENTER-OF-GRAVITY CONTROL
Figure A-2 shows the gross weight-cg diagram for the Test ACT 757 Configuration. The
cg for the operating empty weight is seen to be well forward of the certificated aft limit,
but loading the fixed ballast moves it to approximately that limit. The water ballast
system then allows the cg to be varied from within the certified limits for takeoff and
landing to 55% for flight testing.
Fuel only slightly affects the airplane cg, which ensures reasonable test duration for each
selected cg location.
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APPENDIX B
ELEVATOR CONTROL LINKAGE HYSTERESIS TESTS
This appendix reports on tests run in the 757 Flight Control Test Rig (FCTR, "Iron Bird")
facility. The tests investigate the hysteresis of the left elevator control linkage between
the aft quadrant and the middle power control unit (PCU) to evaluate its effect on
operation of the Active Controls Technology (ACT) fly-by-wire system proposed for
testing on NAOO 1.
B.1 TEST ASSEMBLY
The system tested was the complete elevator control system. The following special
equipment was installed:
• Elevator surface protractor
• Feel computer pneumatic system
• . Rig pins
These two procedures were executed per 757 specifications before the hysteresis runs
described in the following:
• Elevator system rigging
• Elevator system functional test
B.2 TEST PROCEDURES
Refer to Figure B-1 for the following test procedures used during the 757 Iron Bird
hysteresis investigations.
Test runs 1 through 5 were made to investigate the effects of proper tightness of
fasteners in the control system linkages under test. Runs 1 and 2 checked total hysteresis
(pitch autopilot input voltage versus elevator trailing-edge angle) and control linkage
hysteresis (movements of aft quadrant versus middle PCU input lever) before tightening
the fasteners in the linkage to H,e proper torque values. Runs 3 through 5 repeated the
.~ test after adjusting the linkage fasteners. All of these tests are grouped together and
labeled "TEST A" in Table B-1.
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Table 8-1. Hysteresis in 757 Elevator Control System
RUN NO. S~ PERIOD AMPLITUDE HYSTERESIS HYSTERESIS SYSTEM COMMENTS
(deg) (sec/cycle) (deg SE) AVERAGE OF MEASURED CONFIGURATION
RUNS (deg SE) BETWEEN d
TEST "A" RETORQUING LINKAGE JOINT BOLTS
1&2 +1 100 :'::0.25 0.0508 C&B,D&E* • NP driving Runs 1&2 take before retorquing
3-5 +1 100 :'::0.25 0.0274 C&B,D&E* • PACS servo Runs 3-5 taken after retorquing
groundedb Reduction in hysteresis
_ (0.0508-0.0274)x100 46.06%
0.0508
TEST "B" TOTAL LINKAGE HYSTERESIS
3-5 +1 100 :'::0.258 0.0274 C&B,D&E* • AlP driving Average of total hysteresis
0.0274 +0.0326 + 0.0398 + 0.0339
= 419&20 +5 105 :'::0.25 0.0326 C&B,D&E* • PACS servo
groundedb = 0.0334-deg BE
15·18 +10 93 ±0.25 .0398 C&B D&E* Feel unit disconnected to
16&17 +13 94 :'::0.25 .0339 C&B D&E* • Feel & cent. prevent NP disengaging
unit
disconnected
TEST "C" TEST ACT CONFIGURATION (PACS SERVO DRIVING)
28·30 +1.25 100 :'::0.258 0.0680 F&E* • PACS servo Represents Test ACT
driving configuration
• NP grounded
TEST "0" EFFECT OF CENTERING SPRING REMOVAL
6&7 +5 100 :'::0.25 0.0410 C&B,D&E* • AlP driving Runs 6&7 taken before spring
• Feel unit removal
8&9 +5 100 ±0.25 0.0759 C&B,D&E* disconnected Runs 8&9 taken after spring
• PACS servo removal
grounded b Increase in hysteresis due to
spring removal = 85%
TEST "E" EFFECT OF lOAD REVERSAL ON POGO SUPPORT BEARINGS
19&20 +5 105 :':: 0.25 0.0326 C&B D&E* • AlP driving Contribution to linkage
hysteresis of PCU bellcrank,
19&20 +5 105 ± 0.25 0.0207 C&A D&E* • Feel unit
and pogo support bearings down-
disconnected stream of centering springs.
15&18 +10 93 :':: 0.25 0.0398 C&B D&E*
BE = + 5 deg contribution
= 100 XE0326-.020~= 36.50%
• PACS .0326
15&18 +10 93 :'::0.25 0.0193 C&A D&E* grounded
b BE = + 10 deg contribution
= 100 XE0398-.Q19~= 51.51%
.0398
16&17 +13 94 :'::0.25 00339 C&B D&E* BE = + 13 deg contribution
= 100 XE0339-.019~= 42.77%
16&17 +13 94 :'::0.25 0.0194 C&A D&E* .0339
a Feel unit connected
b PACS system grounded
by existing springs
c Comparison of re~ults of test "B"
d See Figure B-1
B.3
* Overall hysteresis measured on x-y plotter
Table 8-1. Hysteresis in 757 Elevator Control System (Continued)
RUN NO. 5E PERIOD AMPLITUDE HYSTERESIS HYSTERESIS SYSTEM COMMENTS(deg) (sec/cycle) (deg 5E) AVERAGE OF MEASURED CONFIGURATIONRUNS (deg 5
E
) BETWEEN d
TEST "F" TOTAL HYSTERESIS (AlP HYSTERESIS NOT INCLUDED)
22&23 +1 100 ± 0.25 0.0945 G&E* • NP driving Runs taken to isolate surface
• Feel unit PCU hysteresis from total
disconnected At fiE =+ 1 deg : .0945 deg -.0274 deg
~ .0671 deg fiE PCU hysteresis
24&25 +5 100 ±0.25 0.0810 G&E*
• PACS At fiE = +5 deg : .0810 deg -.0326 deg
groundedb c " .048 deg fiE PCU hysteresis
TEST "G" OVERALL HYSTERESIS (AlP DRIVING)
19&20 +5 105 ± 0.25 0.0775 D&E* • NP driving
• Feel unit
disconnected
.PACS
groundedb
TEST "H" EFFECT OF PCU BIAS SPRINGS- PACS DRIVING
• Elev PCU Same as Test "C" with the
31-34 1.25 97 0.25 0.0448 F & E* bias springs addition of bias springs.
installed
• PACS driving Reduction in hysteresis
• Right NP 100 X [0680 - .0448j= 34.1 %
engaged .0680
• Feel unit
connected
• All hyd on
TEST "I" EFFECT OF PCU BIAS SPRINGS - AlP DRIVING
• Elev PCU Same as Test"G"with the addition
35-37 5 103 ±0.25 0.0912 D &E* bias springs of bias springs. Test "I" increased
installed hysteresis, under investigation.
• Center NP
driving
• Feel unit
38-39 1 37 ±0.25 0.1033 D &E* disconnected
• All hyd on
a Feel unit connected
b PACS system grounded
by existing springs
c Comparison of results of Test "B"
d See Figure B-1
* Overall hysteresis measured on x-y plotter
BA
Test. runs 6 through 9 were made to investigate the effects of removing the control
system linkage centering springs while cycling the elevator ~0.25 deg from 5 deg down.
Runs 6 and 7 recorded hysteresis data before spring removal, and runs 8 and 9 recorded
data after spring removal. They are grouped as "TEST D" in Table B-l. .
In test runs 10 through 14, mechanical dial gages were used to measure the movement of
the intermediate linkages from the aft quadrant to the inboard bellcrank. This would
allow the hysteresis contribution of the elevator PCUs to be determined from the overall
hysteresis measurements. Runs 10 and 11 recorded data cycling the elevator at ~0.25 deg
from 5 deg down, while runs 12 through 14 recorded data at +0.25 deg from I-deg down
elevator.
Test runs 15 through 20 were made to measure the effects of increasing linkage load on
hysteresis and were accomplished by disconnecting the feel and centering unit from the
aft quadrant and cycling the linkage ~0.25 deg at increasing elevator down angles. Runs
15 and 18 were taken at 5-deg down elevator, runs 16 and 17 at 10-deg down elevator, and
runs 19 and 20 at 13-deg down elevator (the pitch autopilot authority limit). These runs
.---- also utilized dial gages at the middle PCU input lever and the inboard bellcrank to
supplement the data of runs 10 through 14. These tests are grouped together and labeled
as "TEST E" and are then combined with runs 3 through 5 as "TEST B" in Table B-l. Run
,
21 was intentionally deleted.
Runs 22 through 25 were conducted to determine the hysteresis contribution of the driving
pitch autopilot servo. This was accomplished by plotting elevator trailing-edge angle
against autopilot servo output voltage instead of input voltage previously monitored.
Comparison of data from these runs with data from runs 12 through 14 at I-deg down
elevator and runs 15 and 18 at 5-deg down elevator resulted in the autopilot servo internal
hysteresis. These tests are grouped and labeled as "TEST F" in Table B-l. Runs 26 and 27
were intentionally deleted.
Runs 28 through 30 were made to gather hysteresis data while driving the control system
linkage at a point nearest that of the Test ACT System. By driving the linkage with the
Pitch Augmentation Control System (PACS) servoactuator, a portion of the linkage not
common to the Test ACT Systerr. could be eliminated. Since the PACS servo travel is
limited by mechanical stops internally, the cycling had to be performed at ~0.25 deg from
B.5
1.25-deg down elevator. The difference between this point and the I-deg down point of
previous tests is negligible. These tests are grouped and labeled as "TEST B" in Table B-1.
Test runs 31 through 34 were made to measure the effect of a PCU bias spring on the
elevator hysteresis. The runs were made with the PACS driving the system +0.25 deg
from 1.25-deg down elevator. These runs are grouped and labeled as "TEST H."
Test runs 35 through 39 were also made to measure the effect of a PCU bias spring on
elevator hysteresis. The runs were made with the autopilot servo driving the system.
Runs 35 through 37 drove the elevator .:!:.0.25 deg at 5 deg down. Runs 38 through 39 drove
the elevator .:!:.0.25 deg at 1 deg down. These runs are grouped and labeled as "TEST I."
B.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Satisfactory performance of the fly-by-wire system projected for the 757 elevator control
(Test ACT Program) depends largely on the level of hysteresis in the mechanical path
between the electric command servos and the input to the surface PCUs.
An analysis that considered the contributions of the Test ACT servos, the surface PC Us,
and the intermediate linkage resulted in a calculated hysteresis of 0.15-deg surface angle
(DE). In order to verify this value experimentally, measurements of hysteresis in the
control path between the pitch autopilot servos and the elevator surface were taken from
the 757 FCTR elevator control system. In addition, measurements were taken between
the PACS, an experimental series pitch augmentation servo, and the elevator surface. It
should be noted that the analysis included the effects of low temperature on bearing
friction, as well as the additional linkages of the Test ACT System, while the values of
hysteresis measured on the FCTR were exclusive of these elements.
The following measurements were recorded at approximately O.Ol-deg DE per second:
• Overall (PACS input voltage versus surface rotation) hysteresis measured was 0.07-
deg DE.
e Overall (PACS input voltage versus surface rotation) hysteresis measured, with PCU
bias springs, was 0.045-deg DE.
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• Total intermediate linkage hysteresis measured was 0.03-deg liE.
• Excluding local PCU input links, intermediate linkage hysteresis measured was 0.02-
deg liE.
• Across PCUs, hysteresis measured was 0.04-deg liE.
• Retorquing of linkage bolts reduced hysteresis from 0.0508- to 0.0274-deg liE (46%).
B.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Two methods were used to measure hysteresis in the elevator control system. One plotted
overall hysteresis loops on a plotter using a string potentiometer to measure surface
position versus autopilot or PACS servo input voltage. The other method took dial
indicator measurements of travel at points along the linkage (fig. B-l). Measurements
using both methods were taken simultaneously. To assess the effects of load increase in
the linkage on hysteresis, plots were taken at about four different elevator trim angles 0,
,--... 5, 10, and 13 deg) while cycling the surface at 2:.0.25-deg liE at a period of 100 seclcycle-
the maximum rate that allowed reading of the dial gages. Changes in elevator angles
were accomplished by applying sinusoidal and offset voltages to the center hydraulic
system autopilot servo. The results of these runs, shown in Figure B-2, illustrate that the
linkage hysteresis is not extremely sensitive to load increases.
To determine the effect on hysteresis of insufficient tightness of linkage joint bolts, two
runs were made-one before and one after tightening all bolts in the linkage. A reduction
in hysteresis of 46% was measured on the run subsequent to tightening (table B-1, runs 1
through 5, "TEST A"). The PCU pogo rod end bearings, because they are located
downstream of the centering springs, will be subjected to load reversals and will therefore
contribute a significant amount of hysteresis and backlash to the linkage system. Runs 15
through 20, "TEST E," showed a contribution of 36.5% and 51.5% to the total linkage
hysteresis.
Most tests, as noted herein, were run using the parallel autopilot servo to cycle the
elevator. To better represent tr.e Test ACT Configuration, hysteresis loops were also
/---- plotted using the series PACS servo input. Loops were plotted using inputs from the
B.7
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Figure B-2. Test ACT Program Hysteresis Study-757
PACS servo input voltage versus elevator trailing-edge string potentiometer output
voltage, "TEST C." These measurements were taken with one autopilot engaged in order
to increase the stiffness-to-ground of the aft quadrant. The hysteresis measured in this
case was 0.07-deg 0E and is shown in Figure B-3.
The elevator PCUs were modified by installing a 2.2-N (0.5-lb) servovalve bias spring.
The conditions of "TEST C" were repeated with the modified PCUs. This was labeled as
"TEST H." Under these conditions the average hysteresis was reduced to 0.045-deg 0E
and is shown in Figure B-4.
Runs 6 through 9 were made to determine the effect of removing the centering springs on
the linkage hysteresis and backlash (fig. B-l). Linkage measurements were taken at the
aft quadrant and the input point on the middle surface PCU. Removal of the springs
caused an increase of 85% in hysteresis and backlash in the linkage, "TEST D."
To obtain a hysteresis value for the surface PCU and its support bearings, additional runs
were made in which autopilot hysteresis was not included. Autopilot output linear
variable differential transformer (LVDT) voltage was used to plot hysteresis loops rather
than autopilot input voltage. PCU hysteresis was obtained by subtracting the total
linkage hysteresis. This was found to be between 0.048- and 0.067-deg 0E' "TEST F."
These measurements may be compared with those of a similar test performed on the 767
FCTR elevator in November 1982. Those results showed an overall hysteresis (from PACS
input to elevator output angle) of about 0.05-deg 0E' with the linkage contributing 0.03-
deg 0E and the PCUs showing O.02-deg 0E' The results from this system, which include
PCU valve bias springs, compare closely with those of the 757 system with bias springs
added, "TEST H."
B.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing results indicate that the eXistmg surface PCUs should be fitted with
servovalve bias springs to reduce the freeplay existing between the servovalve and linkage
downstream of the centering springs when used in the Test ACT airplane. The elevator
linkage joints must be maintained to proper torques throughout the flight test program.
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APPENDIX C
STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
C.l GENERAL
Preliminary structural design loads and flutter analyses have been conducted for the 757
Test ACT aircraft to assess the airframe structural capability during flight testing. These
analyses have considered the proposed Test ACT flight test envelope, as well as variations
in gross weight and center of gravity kg) provided by the ballast system. The results of
these studies consist of preliminary recommended operating limitations and placards,
ensuring that the structural capability of the 757 airframe will not be exceeded.
C.2 STRUCTURAL OPERATING LIMITATIONS
Preliminary structural operating limitations are presented in the following:
Takeoff and Landing
,---, • Maintain center of gravity within certificated limits
• Limit sink rate at touchdown to 1.8 m/sec (6 ft/sec)
Flight-Flaps Up
• Limit maneuver load factors to:
• +2.0g
• Og
• Do not operate in greater than moderate turbulence
Flight-Flaps Down
• Limit maneuver load factors to:
• +1.5g
• Og
Cl
C.3 STRUCTURAL LOADS ANALYSES
To accomplish the objectives of the flight demonstration program, it wi11 be necessary to
conduct flying quality tests at centers of gravity aft of certificated structural design
limits. An aft cg envelope that can be achieved in flight has been established using the
planned 757 flight test water ballast system, supplemented with 23-kg (50-lb) sand bags
piled in the aisles and around seats in the aft end of the airplane and the aft lower lobe.
For taxi, takeoff, and landing, the cg is maintained within design limits by storing all
water ballast in water barrels on the forebody main deck and in the forward lower lobe.
After takeoff, the desired aft cg is obtained by pumping water aft into barrels on the aft-
body main deck and in the aft lower lobe.
This arrangement requires appropriate flight placards to ensure that flight test loads
remain within existing structural design loads for the horizontal tail, aft-body monocoque,
and aft-body floor beams. Landing sink speed limitation may be required if design load
limits are not to be exceeded during landing operations.
Time history simulations were performed on the 757 engineering flight simulator to
substantiate the static maneuver envelope for aft cg positive check maneuvers, which are
the horizontal tail maximum up-load cases. The pitch-augmented stability (PAS) control
laws were included to provide airplane and tail load dynamic response due to combined
pilot and PAS commands. Figures C-l and C-2 show selected time history results for one
of the critical positive check maneuvers. Results are shown for both the Primary PAS
control law and the Essential PAS control law for the same column command. The action
of PAS on elevator deflection and airplane response is evident in these figures.
Figures C-3 and C-4 show body load envelopes for symmetric high-speed maneuvers and
indicate the effe:::t of the recommended flight limitations.
These analyses of structural design loads will be updated prior to flight test in order to
reflect the final Test ACT System Configuration and test requirements. Included wi11 be
consideration of balanced flight maneuver, pitch and yaw maneuver, gust, landing, and
assumed control system dynamic failure conditions for the final flight test envelope.
Critical combinations of speed, altitude, and loading configurations will be analyzed.
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All = 7300m (24000 tt). M = 0.91. VE = 193 m/sec (375 kn) equivalent airspeed
GW = 98400 kg (217000 Ib), Iyy = 9.9 kg'm2 (7.3 x 106 slug tt2 )
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Figure C-2. Tail Load Time Histories for Positive Check Maneuver at Dive Speed
Balanced and pitch maneuvers and gust conditions will include the effects of the Primary
plus the Essenti2.l system, as well as the Essential system alone, for the range of flight
conditions and' cg locations that will be flight tested. Loads analyses of critical
oscillatory and hardover Test ACT System failure conditions will use beam theory to
represent the structural flexibility of the test airplane. Lifting line aerodynamic theory,
with empirical corrections derived from wind tunnel and flight tests, will be utilized.
Final test limitations and placards based upon these loads analyses will ensure the
structural integrity of the test airplane while minimizing structural changes.
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APPENDIX D
MECHANICAL CONTROL SYSTEM MODIFICAnONS
This appendix presents an expansion of the material in Section 8.1.3. It is a more detailed
description of the mechanical changes to the flight deck under-floor and empennage areas
of the test airplane.
0.1 FLIGHT DECK INSTALLAnONS
The current 757 control column and tension regulator installation is shown in
Figure 0.1-1. A cam and follower breakout unit limits torque that can be transmitted
between columns in the column bus tube. Separated bearings in the bus tube overlap allow
independent rotation and provide bending continuity across the joint. The tension
regulator quadrants are driven by motion imparted to symmetrical cranks by rods from
each control column; rotations of the two quadrants are in opposite directions.
Test ACT flight deck installations are shown in Figure 0-2. Removal of the follower and
springs from the bus tube override allows the two columns to rotate independently on the
tube splice bearings, described previously. The first officer's column is disconnected from
the right tension regulator by removing the input rod, and the right and left tension
regulators are connected with a diagonal bus to preserve the stiffness of two cable loops
for elevator inputs from the captain's column (fig. 0- 3, 3 sheets).
The Test ACT pilot input mechanism, supported on truss-like brackets attached to flight
deck beams aft of the first officer's column, consists of a torque tube, mounted parallel to
the column bus tube, to which the feel cam and input force transducers are attached. The
column is connected to the unit through a rod fastened between the existing column crank
clevis and a crank pivoted on the input mechanism torque tube. The load path from this
crank to the feel cam is divided to pass through two four-channel force transducers such
that the sum of the signals in a single channel from each transducer is approximately
proportional to the column load.
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Figure 0-1. 757 Column and Tension Regulator Installation
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ACT..LO-FCD100 Parts List
QTY
-6 -5 2 -I Pf:IRT NO. DESCRIPTION STODC SIZE NOTES
BUS INSTt-
ACT-lO-FCD 100-1 TENSION REGULATORTEST ACT
-
I -2 ROD ASSY P2, P3
I -3 ROD 1.00 X 1.50 X 41.00 MI, FI, PI, P4, P5
I I -4 CRANK 3.00 X 3.00 X 11.00 MI, FI, PI, P4, P5
-
I
-5 CRANK ASSY
-
1 -6 CRANK ASSY
TENSION REGULATOR
I 25IN2013-1 INSTL.
TENSION REGULATOR
I 251N2013-2 INSTL.
I BACBIOAE-9B ROD END
I BACBIOAD-5K ROD END
2 2 BACB30NF-37 BOLT
2 BACB30NF-14 BOLT
QTY
-6 -5 -I PART NO. DESCRIPTION STODC SIZE NOTES
2 2 2 BACNIOJC4
2 2 2 AN960PD416
Ml: 15-5PH STAINLESS STEEL BAR PER AMS5659. HEAT TREAT TO 180 - 200 KSI
PER BAC-5619.
PI: MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECT PER BAC5424.
P2: COAT FAYING SURFACES WITH WET BMS .5-95, SEALANT PER BAC-5000.
P3: INSTALL FASTENERS WITH F-20.06.
P4: MARK PARTS PER BAC5307.
P5: PENETRANT INSPECT PER BAC5423.
Fl: F-16.01.
Figure D-3. Forward Bus Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD1OO)-Sheet 3 of 3
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The force-displacement program of the feel cam, follower, and springs arrangement was
designed to meet the requirements of Figure D-4. The degree of proportionality of the
transducer input force is shown in Figure D-5. The signal. is virtually linear for about two-
thirds of the column travel and falls off at the travel limits due to linkage geometry
effects. System gains are such that all elevator requirements for Test ACT, including full
travel ground demonstrations, are achievable within the linear range of transducer output
signal.
An adjustable hydraulic rotary rate damper is attached to the torque tube system through
a crank and link. The damping force is adjustable in the range of 113 to 226 N-m per
rad/sec (1000 to 2000 in.-Ib per rad/sec). This amounts to 1.8 to 2.6 N/cm (1 to 2
lb/in./sec) at the wheel.
Column and Force
Transducer Reaction Force, N (Ib)
(-100)
-400
-200 (-50)
44N {± 5% < 178N (40 Ib)
(10Ib)/deg ± 15% >178N (40 Ib)
-10.3
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Stop
(Elevator TED)
-5
200
18-N (4-lb) Breakout ±5%
5 10
Column Position, deg
(Elevator lEU)
(50)
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Aft
Stop
472N (106Ib)
400
(100) Force transducer tolerance:
less than :t 10% nonlinearity
Figure 0-4. Control Column Feel System Requirements
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Figure 0-5. Force Transducer Characteristics
Column inertial forces pass through the force transducers so column unbalance is a
concern. Each column weighs approximately 11+ kg (30 lb), with a cg of about O.25m
(lain.) above the pivot. Balance weight of about 8.6 kg (19 lb) was added on a special
support assembly, available from 757 flight testing, to bring the first officer's column
unbalance to approximately zero. The left column was also balanced in this way to
preclude any inputs or reduction of summing lever detents due to attitudes or
accelerations during fly-by-wire (FBW) flight modes. Flight deck installation details are
shown in Figure D-6 (9 sheets).
D.ll
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ACT-LO-FCD103 Parts List
QTY
PMT IND. STOCIC SIZEDESCRIPTION NOTES
-4 -3 -2 -1
ACT TRANSDUCER
-
ACT-LQ.FCD 10l-1 &: FEEL INSTL
ACT TRANSDUCER
- 1 -2 &: FEEL ASSY
TRUSS ASSY-
-
1
-3 INBD
TRUSS ASSY-
-
1 -4 aUTBD
BAC1501 -1145
1
-5 RECT.TUBE .625 X 1.5 X 10.0 F2 MI
BAC1.501 -1145
1
-6 RECT.TUBE .625 X 1.5 X 17.0 F2. MI
BAC1.501 -100033
1
-7 RECT.TUBE 1.00 X 1.50 X 12.00 F2. MI
BACI501 -100033
1
-8 RECT.TUBE 1.00 X 1.50 X 17.00 F2, MI
I
-9 PLATE 10.00 X 16.00 X 3.00 FI, M8, PI
DTY
DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZEPMT NO. IGTES
-20 -17 -4 -3 -2
1 -10 PLATE 10.00 X 16.00 X 3.00 FI M8 PI
1 -11 SPACER PLATE 6.00 X 12.00 X .625 Fl M8 PI
1 -12 SPACER PLATE 6.00 X 9.00 X 1.00 FI.M8 PI
1 -13 SPACER PLATE 6.00 X 7.00 X 1.00 FI M8 PI
1 -14 SUPPORT 8.00 X 28.00 X .071 FI, M2
I -15 SUPPORT 6.00 X 7.00 X .071 FI, M3
I -16 SUPPORT 6.00 X 7.00 X .071 FI,MJ
-
-17 INPUT CRANK ASSY
I -18 INPUT CRANK '.00 X 12.00 X 4.00 FI, M6, PI
WIRE SUPPORT
I -19 BRACKET 8.00 X 9.00 X .071 Fl. M3
-
- I -20 FEEL CAM ASSY
1
-21 FEEL CAM 3.00 X 4.00 X 8.00 F7, M9, P2
Figure D-6. Transducer and Feei Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD103)-Sheet 5 of 9
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( ACT-LO-FCD103 Parts ListQTY
PNtT NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NlTES
-4 -28 -25 23 -2 -1
1 -22 LOAD CRANK 1~.OO X 1~.OO X 5.00 FI M~
-
1 -23 CRANK ASSY
1 -24 CRANK 3.00 X 8.00 X 2.75 FI M6
-
4 -25 HOOK SUPPORT ASS)
1 -26 HOOK SUPPORT 2.50 DIA. X 1.50 FI M7
2 -27 EYE BOLT 1.75 X 1.75 X 6.00 F5 M9 P2
FOLLOWER ARM
I
-
-28 ASSY
1 -29 FOLLOWER ARM 3.00 X 12.00 X 4.00 F7, M9, P2
2.000 D X .08 WALL
1 -30 SHAFT X 22.00 F2, MI
2 -31 SPRING F6, MIO
1 -32 CRANK 3.00 X 8.00 X 1.00 F3, M6, PI
1 -33 FILLER 1.50 X 1.50 X .625 FI, M8
QTY
STOCK SIZEPMtT NO. DESCRIPTION NOTES
-3 -37 -35 28 -2 -1
-34 FILLER 1.5 X 1.5 X .625 FI, M8
-
I -35 ROD ASSY
1 -36 ROD .75 DIA. X 16.00 FI, M4
COLUMN BALANCE
-
2 -37 ASSY
10 -38 COL. BALANCE WT. 6.0 X 6.0 X .30 F5, M9
7 -39 XDCR BALANCE WT. 3.0 X 4.0 X .30 F5, M9
AND I0134-1406
.4 -40 ANGLE 1.25 X 1.50 X 3.50 FI, M5
BACl.511-3701
1 -41 FILLER 1.28 X .12.5 X 2.00 Fl, M5,PI
2 -42 PLATE 9.0 X 13.0 X .25 FI, M8
I -43 SPACER PLATE 3.0 X 6.0 X .125 FI, M2
Figure 0-6. Transducer and Fee/Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD103)-Sheet 6 of 9
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ACT·LO-FCD103 Parts List
QTV
~ND_ DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
-28 -2.5 -23 -20 -17 -2 -I
I BACR24N653 Ron ASSY
I 544N5037-1 C:OI.. RAt A~rp Il'oJ,TI
I -2 COL. BALANCE INSTL
2 GM7197 TRANSDUCER vrl
1 P/NA-16928-1 HYD. DAMPER VC2
1 6NBF817YJTT TRACK ROLLER V~3
2 BACBIOAC4 BEARING P3
2 BACB20AC4A BEARING P3
1 1 BACBIOAC6 BEARING P3
I NAS72-6EI02 BUSHING P4
2 NAS77-9-4S BUSHING P4
1 BACB28AK03-048 BUSHING P4
QTV
PMrr NO. DESCR IPTI ON STOCIC SIZE NOTES
-35 -28 -17 -4 -3 -2 -1
I BACB28AK04-032 BUSHING PlL
1 BACB28AK04-037 BUSHING PlL
2 BACB28AKD6-030 BUSHING P4
1 BACB28AK04-214 BUSHING P4
2 BACNIOJC3 NUT
12 BACNIOJC4 NUT
1 4 BACNIOJC6 NUT
2 BACNIOJCIO NUT
1 BACBIOAD-8 ROD END P7
1 BACBIOAD-5 ROD END P7
1 AN316-IO NUT
1 2 AN316-6 NUT
Figure 0-6. Transducer and Fee/Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD103)-Sheet 7 of 9
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ACT-LO-FCD103 Parts List
QTV
PlART MD. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
-4 -3 -2 -1
2 BACB)OLL4-41 BOLT
I BACB30LL4-16 BOLT
I BACB30NE4-44 BOLT
.5 BACB30MY6K-24 BOLT
.5 BAC B30M Y6K- 31 BOLT
8 BACB30M Y8K-2 BOLT
8 BACB30MY8K-3 BOLT
4 BACB30M Y.5K-2 BOLT
8 BACB30MY6K-20 BOLT
3 BACB30NF4-24 BOLT
3 2 BACB30NF4-18 BOLT
3 BACB30NF4-21 BOLT
QTY
PlART IND. OESCR IPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
-28 -17 -4 -3 -2 -I
2 BACB30NE3-9 BOLT
2 BACBJONE3-16 BOLT
.5 BACB30NF4-12 BOLT
3 BACB30NF4-20 BOLT
1 BACB30NF40-24 BOLT
2 BACB30NF4-32 BOLT
J BACB30NF4-35 BOLT
I BACB30NF40-62 BOLT
1 BACB30NF6-13 BOLT
I BACBJONF 60-20 BOLT
2 SACB30:"JF60-19 BOLT
1 BAC B30Nf"60-87 BOLT
Figure 0-6. Transducer and Fee/Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD103)-Sheet 8 of 9·
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ACT-LO-FCD103 Part List and Notes
QTY
PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCIC SIZE NOTES
-4 -3 -2 -1
2 BACB30NF4-4 BOLT
1 BACB30LL4-16 BOLT
AN960PD416 WASHER
AN960PD416L WASHER
AN960PD616 WASHER
AN960PD616L WASHER
AN960PDI016 WASHER
BACC30M5 COLLAR
BACC30M6 COLLAR
BACC30M8 COLLAR
Ml: 2024-T3 Ale ALLOY TUBE PER BMS 7-196 P6: FILL WITH EPOXY RESIN PER BAC-5432
COMPOUND NO.8 OR NARMCO 3119 AND CURING
M2: 2024-T3 ALe ALLOY SHEET PER QQ-A-250/4 AGENT 7103 PER NARMCO DATA SHEET SRDS JI.
M3: 2024-0 Ale ALLOY SHEET PER QQ-A-250/4. P7: COAT FAYING SURFACES WITH WET BMS 5-95
HEAT TREAT TO 142 PER BAC5602. SEALANT PER BAC-5000.
M4: 2024-142 AL. ALLOY ROD PER QQ-A-225/6 P8: INSTALL FASTENERS WITH F-20.06.
M5: 2024-13511 AL. ALLOY EXTRUSION PER QQ-A-20013. Fl: F-17.04 + F-20.02
M6: 7075-T7351 At. ALLOY PLATE PER QQ-A-250/12. F2: F-18.07
ULTRASONIC INSPECT PER BAC5439, CLASS B. F3: F-17.04 + F-20.03
M7: 7075-T7351 At. ALLOY ROD PER QQ-A-225/9. F4: F-16.03
F5: F-20.02
M8: 2024-T351 Ale ALLOY PLATE PER QQ-A-250/4.
ULTRASONIC INSPECT PER BAC5439, CLASS B. F6: F-16.03
M9: 15-5 PH, BAR PER BMS7-240 TYP I, HEAT F7: F-16.01
TREAT TO 180·200 KSI PER BAC5619.
YCI: KA VLlCO CORPORAnON
MID: 17-7 PH PER MIL-5-25043 HEAT TREAT TO 180-200 KSI. CHATSWORTH, CA. 91311
PI: PENETRANT INSPECT PER BAC-5423, CLASS B. ye2: HYDRAULICS HOUDAILLE INC. (SEE ATTACHMENT)
BUFFALO, NY. 14211
P2: MAGNETIC PARnCLE INSPECT PER BAC5424.
YC3: TORRINGTON
P3: INSTALL BEARING PER BAC-5435. TORRINGTON, CONN.
P4: INSTALL BUSHING PER BAC-5435.
P5: ROLLER SWAGE PER BAC-5lt35.
Figure D-6. Transducer and Fee; Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD103)-Sheet 9 of 9
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( D.2 EMPENNAGE INSTALLATION
Figure D-7 shows the unmodified 757 test airplane elevator linkage arrangement. Dual
cable quadrants are linked to a dual feel unit, which in turn is grounded through an
override and cam to the stabilizer. Stabilizer motions provide a programmed elevator
input to augment nose-down trim effectiveness. Triple autopilot servos also attach to the
cable quadrants, and right and left output linkages transmit quadrant motions through a
summing mechanism near the side of the body to elevator surface actuator linkages on the
stabilizer spar. Triple-parallel hydraulic surface actuators are positioned by conventional
mechanical closed-loop controls. These actuators are the balanced, moving piston type.
A body-mounted valve is positioned by a summing lever attached to the piston for
feedback and, through a collapsible link (pogo), to a spar-mounted bellcrank for input.
The three bellcranks are linked together in parallel and driven by a pushrod system from
the aft quadrant.
(
~valve Pogo (3)Valve Shearout (3)Left Elevator CablePCU (3) ... Quadrant(2)
PACS Summing Mechanism (Left)) ·
Stabilizer
~J
Neutral
Shift Mechanism
'">~+--Decentering
Springs
Feel Unit
\
(Dual)
To Right Elevator
Figure 0-7.757 Empennage Instal/ations-Unkage Schematic
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Centering springs are fitted between the bellcrank and ground at the two outboard
actuator positions. These springs maintain the elevator in a near-faired position in the
event of a disconnect of an inboard component.
The input pogo links are provided to protect against a jammed valve. In such a case, the
pogo associated with the offending valve collapses with an additional column load of about
53N (12 lb). This allows the two healthy actuators to bring full load to bear on the
immobilized one, which bypasses at its relief valve setting of about 24.1 x 103 Pa (3500
Ib/in.2). Normal single system pressure is 19.3 x 103 to 20.7 x 103 Pa (2800 to 3000·
Ib/in.2). Thus, continued surface control is available with reduced hinge moment
capability. In the event of a frozen or corroded pogo, the pilot can bypass a jammed valve
by shearing out the special fused joint in the associated bellcrank with a one-time load of
about 178N (40 lb) at the column.
The Pitch Augmentation Control System (PACS) summing mechanisms near the side of
body were established early in the 757 design to meet an anticipated need for
augmentation during stall approaches. Flight testing proved the augmentation
unnecessary, but the mechanisms remain deactivated in early airplanes, including the test
airplane. These sites are used to mount a similar summing mechanism for introduction of
the Test ACT FBW servo mechanical commands into the elevator actuator input linkage.
The pitch feel unit features decentering springs that neutralize the effect on pilot feel
schedules of the two centering springs in each elevator surface linkage. This arrangement
is retained in the Test ACT Configuration to ensure the same feel characteristics during
mechanical-mode flight.
The Test ACT empennage linkage arrangement is shown in Figure 0-8. Changes to the
757 cable system input and surface actuator installations are:
o Reduction from three to one modified autopilot servo
• Grounding of the neutral shift input
o Addition of a solid bus link between right and left quadrants
• Addition of small bias springs (not shown) in the surface actuator valves
0.26
(
Autopilot/
Detent
Decentering
Springs
ACT Servos (4)
To Right Elevator
rFrF------...
Valve Pogo (3)
Valve Shearout (3)
Cable
Quadrant (2)
Voting Detent
( Figure 0-8. Test ACT Empennage InstaJlations-Unkage Schematic
Fly-by-wire and augmentation inputs are provided by four added Test ACT servos, force
summed on a single shaft to which a centering mechanism is attached in order to provide
a fifth force vote. Servo shaft motions are delivered by pushrods to a right and left Test
ACT summing mechanism where electrical and mechanical commands to the elevator
actuators are combined. The summing link ratio has been chosen to preserve the full
elevator authority of the mechanical control system while allowing nearly full authority in
the Test ACT flight mode. Figure D-9 illustrates the electric control input-output
characteristics of the summing mechanism for two ratios. The chosen ratio provides a
reasonably linear and symmetrical elevator output close to the d.esired travels of +20 deg,
-30 deg.
(
In the Test ACT summing mechanism the, summing lever, combined with a parallel motion
idler crank, has the same length and airplane location as the equivalent member on the
current PACS summing mechanism. Thus, with the Test ACT servos in the detent (Test
ACT "off") position, the summing rnechanism reproduces current 757 gearing between the
aft quadrant and the elevator actuator input linkage.
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Elevator Angle, deg
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
29.5deg__
Nominal
Effective
,
~servo
/ Tolerance~
'f'v'?r:o~~~+' f'v'
, +'
I
Servo Position, deg
20 15 10 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30
10
4.73 Quadrant
15 t, ~Surface
20 r',
---20.5degR
L Nominal
Effective
R 25
L Servo
Figure D-9. Empennage Installations-Summing Ratio
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((
A major requirement in the design of the Test ACT servo linkage was the assured
availability of adequate elevator control in either input mode and under both normal and
failure conditions. The important parameter in this regard is the detent level of the
reactive end of the summing lever. This defines what load can be transmitted to the
elevator surface linkage by one control mode before the summing lever begins to
"back out" against the detent provided by the other control system. Also of interest is the
authority remaining when the surface load exceeds the detent setting and when a
complete disconnect of the summing lever has taken place.
After consideration of several multichannel active locking designs, a passive summing
lever spring arrangement was chosen that effectively neutralizes the normal operating
surface input load encountered during the Test ACT inputs. When the mechanical mode is
in use, the spring -imparts no· load since its line of action is maintained along the summing
lever center line. A functional model of the mechanism is shown in Figure 0-10.
Figure 0-11 shows the reactive load for zero backout required by electric-mode control
for various operational conditions, including a jammed surface valve in which the valve
input pogo is compressed. The loads are shown in terms of an equivalent control column
reaction force. Also illustrated is the neutralizing effect of the summing lever springs.
The detent levels available for reaction of Test ACT operational loads are shown in
Figure 0-12 superimposed on the load curves of Figure D-ll. The total reaction is made
up of two load components: that from the feel unit and system friction, totaling about
22N (5 lb), and that from the specially modified autopilot servo, about 58N (13 lb),
expressed as equivalent column force. The combined 80-N (18-lb) detent will cover
normal and valve-jammed Test ACT control requirements, as shown.
Autopilot servo modifications that provide a detent function are described later in this
section. The fUllction is activated through switching procedures during initiation of the
Test ACT flight mode.
Since the autopilot detent control is single channel, the feel unit, which is a dual
hydromechanical device, r{'lust provide a reaction level sufficient for normal Test ACT
operation during the period of time following an autopilot servo disconnect. As shown in
Figure D-13, a small backout occurs in the nose-down direction with autopilot servo loss;
however, elevator travels are sufficient for any requirement encountered in Test ACT
flight.
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Figure D-13. Electric Control Authority-Effect of Autopilot Detent
(
Because of the neutralizing effect of the summing lever spring, very little elevator
authority is lost following a complete disconnect of one summing mechanism from the
cable quadrant. As shown in Figure 0-14, the affected elevator is shifted a small amount
in the nose-up direction. The null transient would be equivalent to a step input of about
0.5 deg of elevator deflection (oE). Of course, mechanical-mode control authority would
be reduced by half after such a break.
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Figure 0-14. Electric Control Authority-Effect of Quadrant Rod Disconnect
Figure 0-15 shows the operational load reactions when pitch control is in the mechanical
(Test ACT "off") mode. In addition to normal operating and valve pogo loads, the
requirement for a bellcrank shearout is shown. Because of its low probability of
occurrence, shearout capability js a strict requirement only in the mechanical control
mode. At all except very low spe(-~ds, the electric control mode is capable of effecting a
shearout.
D.34
Backout loads:
--- Normal operating
-- -- Valve pogo
-- - - Valve shearout
..-----
Reaction at
Servo Shaft,
N-m (in.-Ib)
~
50
3020
/
---------'"
,,'
~
----:'
""
""
'(-100)
(-300)
(-400)
//
/
/
-40
-30
(300)
30
,.",."
,.
-----
~_ 1(40~~
40
..,.,.- 20
//
"
,.
,.
,/'<20
,.,,.,., r:-200)
,e--- ~,." - _~
,.,."
,.
",.
"
,,.
"
"",.
,",.
,.' -10,. /
__-7'--- - ---r'./
,,' //
,.
"", //
" //
",' /
,." //
"" /
,.' //
," //
//
//
//
//
/
Without summing
lever springs:
---- Nominal operating
-------- Valve pogo
(
Figure 0-15. Summing Lever Loads-Mechanical Control
(
D.35
The reaction requirements shown in Figure 0-15 are given in terms of equivalent torques
at the Test ACT servo shaft. Again, as in the electric control mode, the summing lever
springs produce a significant reduction in reaction loads, illustrated by the curves of loads
with springs omitted.
Loads for normal operation and valve pogo compression during mechanical control are
reacted by the servo centering unit detent (also called the "voting detent"). To meet the
force voting requirement, this detent should be about 17 N-m (150 in. -lb), nose up and
nose down. This value is satisfactory for reaction of nose-up loads; however, nose-down
load reaction must be about 28 N-m (250 in.-Ib). Accordingly, an asymmetrical detent has
been incorporated in the servo centering unit torque program (fig. 0-16).
30 (250)
25
Torque, N-m (Ib-in.)
20 )
(150)
15
(100)
10
5
(50)
Servo Travel
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20
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10 0 10
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Servo Shaft Rotation, deg From Rig
20 30
I
Figure 0-16. Servo Centering Unit Torque
D.36
As shown in Figure D-17, the voting detent covers all normal and valve pogo loads with
zero backout. The out-of-detent gradient, provided by the summing lever spring and servo
centering unit torques, reacts shearout loads with a backout of less than 50% servo travel.
Once a shearout is effected, the system returns to center, and the control loads return to
the normal range.
----20~---/~
/
3020
/
(300)
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50
30·,
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(
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-------
Figure D-17. Summing Lever Reactions-Mechanical Control
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Figure D-18 shows the effect of a servo rod disconnect on mechanical control. The result
is a net elevator authority of approximately 80%, following a null shift equivalent of
about 1.0-deg liE.
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Figure 0-18. Mechanical Control Authority
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Figure D-19 shows Test ACT servo torque requirements for normal control. All elevator
travel requirements, including ground demonstration of full travei, are within the
combined minimum torque capability of two servos. Single servos would cam out at
somewhat greater than half travel. However, operation is applicable only to single-servo
ground tests, which will require travels of less than ~5-deg 0E. See Figures 0-20 (10
sheets) and 0-21 (16 sheets) for empennage installation details.
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ACT-LO-FCD101 Parts List
QTY
STOCIC SIZE NOTES
-6 -4 -3 -I PMT NO. DESCRIPTION
QUAD SERVO
- -I INSTALLAnON
I -2 BRACKET 5.5 X 6.0 X 8.0 MI,PI,FI
I
-3 OUTPUT SHAFT ASSY
I
-4 UPPER CRANK ASSY
I
-5 UPPER CRANK 1.8 X 4.3 X 8.0 MI.PI.FI
I
-6 LOWER CRANK ASSY
I
-7 LOWER CRANK 1.8 X 4.3 X 8.0 MI,PI,FI
I I BACBIOAR6 BEARING P3
I 1 69-38919-18 SLEEVE P4,P5
I
-8 SHAFT 1.6 orA x 8.2 LONG Ml,PI,FI
OUTPUT
2
-9 CRANK HALF 1.0 X 3.0 X 3.7 MI,PI,FI
I
-10 CAM SUPPORT 1.0 X 2.0 X 3.7 MI,PI,FI
QTY
PMT NO. DESCRIPTION STOCIC SIZE NOTES
-13 -3 -I
I -II CAM .3 X 2.5 X 5.0 M2,P2,F2
MAKE FROM
I -12 ANGLE ANDI0134-1407 M3,PI,FI
FOLLOWER
I -13 ARM ASSY
1 -14 FOLLOWER ARM 1.0 X 1.5 X 7.8 Ml PI Fl
? _I ~ 'POI"lr. r.ll1nl' I n nT A " to n"lr. II PIl'I
n
I 'n on ,~ P~P~
? n ~n~o 'n, _055
"'" '''" Jr.
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n -~~ ",nIT
17 "'nIT
MIT
Figure 0-20. Test ACT Servo Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD101)-Sheet 7 of 10
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ACT-LO-FCD101 Parts List
QTY
-23 -13 -1
PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
1 3 BACNI0JC6 NUT
1 1 AN960PD616 WASHER
2 -16 SPRING .146 DIA X 32 LONG M4,P2,F2
2 -17 SPRING ANCHOR .6 DIA X 1.7 LONG M2,P2,F5
2 -18 END FITTING 1.9 X 2.0 X .5.1 M1,Pl,Fl
2 -19 CENTER FITTING 1.9 X 2.0 X 5.1 Ml,Pl,Fl
2 -20 WEB .063 X 6.5 X 8.5 M.5,F1
2 -21 ANGLE .063 X 3•.5 X 8.5 M.5,F1
1 -22 SPACER .090 X 2.0 X 2.5 M7,F4
4
-23 ROD ASSY-SER VO
.7.5 DIA X .0.3.5 WALL
1 -24 ruBE x 6.2 LONG M6,F3
1 -2.5 ROD ASSY-R.H.
QTY
-27 -25 -23 -1 PART NO. DESCHI PT ION STOCK SIZE NOTES
.75 D1A X .035 WALL
I -26 ruBE x 11..5 LONG M6,F3
1 -27 ROD ASSY-LH.
1.25 DIA x .035 WALL
1 -28 TUBE X 30.7 LONG M6,F3
1 1 1 BACBIOAD12 ROD END
1 1 1 BACBI0AD13 ROD END
1 1 1 NAS.509-6 NUT
1 1 1 NAS509-7 NUT
1 -29 SPACER .090 X 1.2 X 2.5 M7,F4
1 S250N 101-1 SERVO
1 5250N101-2 SERVO
I S2.50NI01-3 SERVO
1 S250NI01-4 SERVO
Figure D-20. Test ACT Servo Installation (Drawing: AC7=-LO-FCD10l)-Sheet 8 of 10
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ACT-LO-FCD1 01 Parts List
'lTV
PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
-1
2 251N2484-15 FITTING
1 BACB28AK04-025 BUSHING
1 BACB28AK04-048 BUSHING
12 BACB30NF4-15 BOLT
1 BACB30NF4-23 BOLT
1 "A I:. ROLT
1 RA 8 BOLT
16 NAS6604-12 BOLT
16 NAS620A416 WASHER
12 AN960PD416 WASHER
I UfA"HFRAN.,,.,, 'JI. .~ ~b.
R BACF3T03E5-12 TAPFRFn FTLLFR
UTY
-1 PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
2 BACS40RI0CIIF LAMINATED SHIM
2 BACS40R 11 C 18F LAMINATED SHIM
AR AN960PD416L WASHER
16 BACNIOKE4D NUT PLATE
1 S2.50NI02-1 SERVO
1 BACB30NF5-63 BOLT
Figure 0-20. Test ACT Servo Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD101)-Sheet 9 of 10
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Notes for ACT-LO-FeD 101 Parts List
Ml 7075-T7351 BAR PER QQ-A-225/9. ULTRASONIC INSPECT PER
BAC5439 CLASS B.
M2 15-5 PH BAR PER AMS5659. HT TR 180-200 KSI PER BAC5619.
M3 2024-T42 EXTRUSION PER QQ-A-200/3
M4 17-7 PH WIRE PER AMS5678. HT TR TO CONDITION CH900 PER
BAC5619.
M5 7075-0 BARE SHT PER QQ-A-250/I2. HT TR TO T6 PER BAC5602.
M6 2024-0 TUBE PER WW-T-700/7. HT TR TO T42 PER BAC5602.
M7 2024-T42 CLAD SHT PER QQ-A-250/5.
PI PENETRANT INSPECT PER BAC5423 AFTER MACHINING.
P2 MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECT PER BAC5424.
P3 INSTALL PER BAC5435.
P4 ROLLER SWAGE PER BAC.5435.
P5 FILL GAP IN SLEEVE WITH DOW-CORNING Q3-0121 SEALANT PER
BAC50QO AFTER SWAGING.
F1 F-18.13
F2 F-17.09
F3 F-18.07
F4 F-18.06
F.5 F-16.01
Figure D-20. Test ACTServo Installation (Drawing: AC"T-LO-FCD101)-Sheet 10 of 10
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ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List
QTY
STOCIC SIZE NOTES
-3 -2 -1 PART NO. DESCRIPTION
SUMMING MECHANIS ~(SeeSheet
-
-1 INSTALLAnON 15 of 16)
SUPPORT ASSY-
-
1 -2 LOWER P9
I -4 SUPPORT 4.5 X 6.8 X 8.5 MI FI
BUSHING-
I BACB28W6C023 FLANGED
SUPPORT ASSY-, -~ 1 nU!J:::J) OQ
I -5 SUPPORT 4.5 X 6.6 X 8.0 Ml, FI
BUSHING-
I BACB28W6C023 FLANGED
SUPPORT-
1 -6 UPPER 1.1 X 3.1 X 6.5 Ml, FI, F3
SUPPORT-
1 -7 UPPER 1.1 X 2.9 X 5.6 Ml, Fl, F3
TENSION SPRING-
2 -8 INNER .125 DIA X 52 LG M3, F5
TENSION SPRIN~-
2 -9 OUTER .177 DIA X 50 LG M3, F5
ADJUSTER-
2 -10 SPRING 1.7 X 1.7 X 2.8 M5, P2, F4
QTY
STOCK SIZE NOTESPART NO. DESCRIPTION
-14 -1
NUT-
2 -11 ADJUSTER .75 HEX X .5 LG M5, P2, F4
SPRING P3, P4, P5
- 1 -14 LINK ASSY P6, P8, F3
OPPOSITE -57
1 -56 LINK MI, PI, Fl
1 BACBI0AP6 BEARING
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-19 BRG RETENTION
COUNTER BALANCE
2 -58 PLATE .25 X 2.50 X 7.0 M9, P2 F5
1 BACBI0AP8 BEARING
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-38 BRG RETENTION
Figure 0-21. Summing Mechan/.3m Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD102)-Sheet 8 of 16
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ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List
QTY
.-MY NO• IESCRIPTlmt STOCK SIZE NOTES
-18 -1.5 -I
SPRING P3, P4, P5
-
1
-1.5 LINK ASSY P6, PS, F3
I
-57 LINK 2.5 X 4.0 X 7.5 Ml, PI, Fl
1 BACBI0AP6 BEARING
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-19 BRG RETENTION
2
-59 MASS BALANCE 2.0 DIA X 2•.50 LG M9, P2, F5
1 BACBIOAP8 BEARING
SLEEVE
1 69-38919-38 BRG RETENTION
ERECTION LINK
- 2 -18 ASSY P3, P4, P.5
I
-19 LINK 1.2 X 1.3 X 6.1 MI, PI, FI
1 BACBIOAP4 BEARING
'lTV
-I
PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
:22 -20 18
SLEEVE-
2 69-38919-3.5 BRG RETENTION
1 BACBIOAC4 BEARING
DRAG LINK
-
2 -20 ASSY P3, P4, P5
I -21 LINK 1.3 X 2.3 X 5.7 MI, PI, FI
2 BACBI0AP4 BEARING
SLEEVE-
2 69-38919-35 BRG RETENTION
1 BACBIOAR4 BEARING
SLEEVE-
I 69-38919-20 BRG RETENTION
LINK ASSY-
-
1 -22 OUTPUT P3
1 -24 LINK 1.4 X 3.0 X 7.2 MI, PI FI
I BACBIOAP6 BEARING
Figure D-21. Summing Mechanism Installation (Drawing: AC"FLO-FCD102)-Sheet 9 of 16
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(ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List
OW
27 26 23 -I PART NO. DESCRIPTION STODC SIZE NOTES
- LINK ASSY-
1 -23 OUTPUT P3
1 -25 LJNK 1.4 X 2.9 X 7.2 MI, PI, Fl
1 BACBIOAP6 BEARING
SUMMING LINK OPPOSITE -27
- I -26 ASSY P9
OPPOSITE -29
I -28 SUMMING LINK 3.0 X 4.0 X 6.9 MI, PI, FI
BUSHING-
I BACB28W4C013 FLANGED
BUSHING-
2 BACB28W4COII FLANGED
SUMMING LINK
I -27 ASSY P9
I -29 SUMMING LINK 3.0 X 4.0 X 6.9 Ml PI FI
BUSHING-
1 BACB28W4C013 FLANGED
BUSHING-
2 BACB28W4COII FLANGED
QW
30
PART NO. DESCRIPTION STODC SIZE NOTES
-49 -32 -46 -I
TORQUE TUBE
-
1 -30 ASSY F3, P6, P8
-
1 -46 TUBE ASSY P7
1.625 00 X .065 WALL
1 -47 TUBE-INNER X 9.8 LG M4, PI
1.625 ID X .065 WALL
1 -48 WBE-OUTER X 9.8 LG M4, PI
LUG ASSY- F3, P3, P4
-
1 -32 UPPER PIVOT P5, P6, P8
1 -34 LUG-UPPER 1.1 x 4.0 X 6.5 MI PI FI
OPPOSITE -34
1 -36 LUG-LOWER 1.1 X 4.0 X 6.5 MI PI FI
1 BACBIOAR6 BEARING
SLEEVE-
I 69-38919-18 BRG RETENTION
LUG ASSY- F3, P3, P4
-
I -49 LOWER PIVOT P5 P6 P8
2 -50 LUG .9 X 2.3 X 4.4 MI, PI, Fl
1 BACBIOAR6 BEARING
Figure 0-21. Summing Mechanism Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FC0102)--sheet lOaf 16
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ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List
QTY
-42 38 49 30 -I PART NO. DESCRI PTIOt STOCK SIZE NOTES
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-18 BRG RETENTION
LUG ASSY
-
1 -38 UPPER SUMMING P3, Pit, P5
1 -itO LUG .9 X 3.0 X 6.5 MI, PI, FI
I BACBIOAN4 BEARING
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-20 BRG RETENTION
LUG ASSY-
-
1 -42 LOWER SUMMING P3, P4, P5
1 -44 LUG .9 X 2.3 X 6.5 MI PI FI
1 BACBIOANit BEARING
SLEEVE-
I 69-38919-20 BRG RETENTION
18 MS 90354-6 RIVET
QTY
,!+'J r"-' ·'feb ,-'1 -1 PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
TORQUE TUBE
-
1 -31 ASSY F3, P6, P8
-
I -it6 TUBE ASSY P7
1.625 00 X .065 WALL
I -47 TUBE-INNER X 9.8 LG M4, PI
1.625 ID X .065 WALL
1 -48 TUBE-OUTER X 9.8 LG M4, PI
LUG ASSY- F3, P3, P4
-
I -33 UPPER PIVOT P5, P6, P8
I -35 LUG-UPPER 1.1 X it.4 X 6.3 MI, PI, FI
OPPOSITE-35
I -37 LUG-LOWER 1.1 X 4.4 X 6.3 MI, FI, PI
1 BACBIOAR6 BEARING
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-18 BRG RETENTION
LUG ASSY- F3, P3, P4
-
I -49 LOWER PIVOT P5, P6, P8
2 -50 LUG .9 X 2.3 X 4.4 MI, PI, FI
1 BACBIOAR6 BEARING
Figure 0-21. Summing Mechanism installation (Drawing: AC"T-LO-FCO102)-Sheet 11 of 16
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ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List
QTY
-43 1--"1 -q~ .•)1 -J. PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
SLEEVE
1 69-38919-18 BRG RETENTION
LUG ASSY-
-
·1 -39 UPPER SUMMING P3,P4,P5
1 -41 LUG .9 X 2.8 X 6.4 MI,PI,FI
I BACBI0AN4 BEARING
SLEEVE-
1 69-38919-20 BRG RETENTION
LUG ASSY-
-
1 -43 LOWER SUMMING P3,P4,P5
1 -45 LUG .9 X 2.3 X 6.4 MI,Pl,FI
1 BACBIOAN4 BEARING
SLEEVE-
I 69-38919-20 BRG RETENTION
18 MS90354-6 RIVET
QTY
-53 -52 -1 PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
2 -51 SPRING GUIDE 1.38 DIA X .4 LG M5,P2,F4
CONTROL ROD
-
1 -.52 ASSY P8,F3
1.00 DIA X .03.5 WALL
1 -.54 TUBE X21.6 LG M2,F2
BEARING-
2 BACBIOAE-91\ ROD END
CONTROL ROD
-
1 -.53 ASSY P8,F3
1.00 DIA X .03.5 WALL
1 -.55 TUBE X 21.6 LG M2,F2
2 BACBI0AE-9A BEARING ROD END
8 BACB30NF4-6 BOLT
2 BACB30NF4-10 BOLT
4 BACB30NF4-14 BOLT
2 BACB30NF4-22 BOLT
Figure D-21. Summing Mechanisn: Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD102)-Sheet 12 of 16
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ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List
QN
X -1 PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SIZE NOTES
-
4 251T0200-X DUAL BOLT ASSY
1 BACB30LJ6-18 BOLT-OUTER
1 NAS670lt-19 BOLT-INNER
1 AN960PD416 WASHER
1 BACNIOJC6 NUT
1 RA N NUT
2 .... i. c ROLT
2 BACB30NF6-47 BOLT
t~ "'IM. N NllT.'+
f. BACNIOJC6 NUT
QTY
-1 PART NO. DESCRIPTION STOCK SiZE NOTES
12 AN960POlt16 WASHER
8 AN960PD616 WASHER
4 BACB30FM4-11 BOLT
2 BACB30FM4-12 BOLT
4 BACB30FM4-15 BOLT
10 BACC30M rnllAJ)
2 BACBIOAP6 BEARING p~
2 BACBIOAP4 BEARING P'3
AR AN960PD416L WASHER
6 BACB28AK04-022 Po'I~l...Hf'Jr..
l4 PoAf'"R"O .vnl, n.,o: 1"\1 "'H N'
2 RACR28AK04-069 Rllc;;.HTNr.
Figure 0-21. Summing Mechanism Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO·FC0102;-Sheet 13 of 16
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( ACT-LO-FCD102 Parts List and NotesU1V
STOCK SIZE
-1 PART NO. DESCRIPTIC»I NOTES
2 BACB28A.K06-07.5 BUSHING
2 BACB28AK06-08.5 BUSHING
2 BACB28AK06-286 BUSHING
6 BACB28AK06-02.5 BUSHING
2 BACB28AK04-060 BUSHING
2 BACB30FM4-24 BOLT
2 BACB30FM4-18 BOLT
2 BACB30LL4-38 BOLT
MI ALUMINUM ALLOY 7075-T7351 BAR PER QQ-A-22.5/9. ULTRASONIC
INSPECT PER BAC5439, CLASS B.
M2 2024·0 ALUMINUM ALLOY TUBE PER WW-T-700/3. HEAT TREAT TO
T42 PER BAC5602.
M4 2024-T3 ALUMINUM ALLOY SEAMLESS TUBING PER WW-T-700/J TYPE 1.
( M3 9254 STEEL WIRE PER ASTM A401.
(
M5 15-5 PH BAR PER AMS 5659. HEAT TREAT TO 150-170 KSI PER BAC5619.
PI PENETRANT INSPECT PER BAC542J.
P2 MAGNET1C PARTICLE INSPECT PER BAC5424.
P3 INST ALL BEARING PER BAC5435.
P4 ROLLER SWAGE SLEEVE PER BAC5435.
P5 FILL END GAP IN 69-38919 SLEEVE WITH DOW-CORNING Q3-0121
SEALANT PER BAC5000 AFTER SWAGING.
P6 FAYING SURFACE SEAL WITH BMS 5-95 SEALANT PER BAC5000.
INSTALL RIVETS/FASTENERS WITHIN CURING TIME OF SEALANT.
P7 CLEAN WITH M.E.K. PER BAC5750 AND BOND OVER CURED BMSlO-ll
PRIMER PER BAC5010 TYPE 70. SWAGE OR DRAW OUTER TUBE OVER
INNER TUBE (AFTER APPLICATION OF PRIMER AND ADHESIVE) TO
MEET REQUIRED OUTSIDE DlA. OPTIONAL FINISH MACHINE AFTER SWAGING.
Figure 0-21. Summing Mechanism Installation (Drawing: ACFLO-FCD102)-Sheet 14 of 16
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Notes for ACT·LO-FCD1 02 Parts List (Continued)
P8 INSTALL FASTENERS WITH F-20.06
P9 INSTALL BUSHING PER BAC54J5. FAY FILLET SEAL WITH BMS 5-95
SEALANT PER BAC5000.
Fl F-18.1.3. OMIT PRIMER ON FINSHED HOLE DIAMETERS.
F2 F-18.07
FJ AFTER MACHINING F-17.10.
F5 F-20.03
[2C> ACT SUMMING UNIT RIGGING PROCEDURE
This procedure should be used in place of 251N2001 Sht. 2 Para. 15.0 P. C. U. input rod
adjustment. (757 Elevator Control Rigging Instructions)
A. Summing Lever Spring Adjustment
Depressurize all Hydarulic Systerns
1. Remove all tension from the R. H. summing lever spring. (ACT-LO-FeD 102)
2. Insert rig pin 117 (251N2001) at aft quadrant.
J. Disconnect the control rod between the R. H. summing mechanism and the R. H.
idler lever.
4. Remove the control rod between the L. H. summing mechanism and the quad
shaft. (ACT-LO-FeD 101)
5. Remove all spring tension from the voting cam follower arm.
(ACT-LO-FCD (01)
6. Rotate the quadshaft clockwise by applying a force to the L. H. quadshaft output
arm. Force should be increased to a level at which the R. H. ACT rig Pin can be
inserted between the sum ming lever and sumshaft. Force applied at the
quadshaft input arm to allow insertion of the rig pin should be 7 lb. ! 2 Ibs.
Figure D-21. SummIng Mechanistn Installation (Drawing: ACFLO-FCD102)-Sheet 15 of 16
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( Notes for ACT-LO-FCD1 02 Parts List (Concluded)
7. To obtain the correct force at the quadshaft input arm, adjust the summing lever
spring tension by rotating the nut provided at the spring anchor.
8. Remove Rig Pin ill and R. H. ACT Rig Pin.
9. To adjust the L. H. summing lever spring, repeat steps 1 thru 8 substituting
"L. H." for "R. H." and HR. H.I! for "L. H.lI in all cases.
10. Replace voting cam follower arm spring.
11. Replace all control rods.
B. Summing Mechanism Rigging
Depressurize all Hydraulic Systems
1. Complete R. H. Summing lever spring adjustment.
2. Insert Rig Pins II 7 &: II 9. (251N200l)
3. Remove the new control rod connecting the R. H. summing mechanism to the
quadshaft. (ACT-LO-FeD 101)
(
4. Adjust the existing control rod between the inb'd R. H. P.C.U. belle rank and the
R. H. idler lever until the R. H. ACT Rig Pin can be freely inserted.
(
5. With the R. H. ACT Rig Pin inserted, install the control rod between the R. H.
summing mechanism and the quad shaft and adjust the rod length until the rod
end bolts can be freely inserted.
6. Remove Rig Pins 7,9, and R. H. ACT Rig Pin.
7. To rig 1.. H. summing mechanism repeat steps 1 thru 6 substituting ilL. H." for
"R. H.1t in all cases.
Figure D-21. Summing Mechanisrn Installation (Drawing: ACT-LO-FCD102)-8heet 16 of 16
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D.3 SECONDARY ACTUATORS (S250NIOl)
A survey was conducted to determine if a servoactuator in current use on a Boeing
airplane could meet the restrictions of electrical compatibility and physical envelope
while providing adequate output torque and angular authority. The unit selected for use
as the Test ACT elevator secondary actuator is the 757 rollout guidance servoactuator,
part number S251N312-4, primarily because of its output torque, authority limits, and
physical envelope.
To create the Test ACT secondary actuator from the 757 rollout guidance servo, the
following modifications must be made:
• Replace the existing electrohydraulic servovalve (EHSV, 10-60813-1) with one that
will provide sufficient flow to operate the actuator at a rate of 55 deg/sec. The
replacement EHSV must have mounting and hydraulic provisions compatible with the
existing actuator manifold. Electrical characteristics (excitation voltage, resistance,
inductance, connections, etc.) must be the same as those of the existing valve.
• To accommodate the increase in flow rate through the unit, some drill passages in the
actuator manifold need to be enlarged and the flow restrictors omitted.
• Replace the existing output shaft with a solid shaft of larger diameter at both the
outer seal and outer bearing locations. These changes increase the stiffness of the
driving elements, as a means of reducing the compliance and overall hysteresis of the
actuator, to meet the requirements of Figure D-4.
o Increase the size of the outer bearing to further reduce actuator compliance.
o Increase the size of the outer shaft seal to accommodate the previously mentioned
shaft diameter change.
• Because of 757 space constraints, the actuator installation necessitates a different
output lever for each of the four units. The material of the levers will be changed
from aluminunt to 15-5 PH stl~el to achieve additional stiffness.
D.80
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• The effect of the changes to the output shaft and levers will increase the actual
stiffness values of the output drive train from 698 kN/m (3990 lbf/in.) to 1136 kN/m
(6500 lbf/in.).
• A fifth actuator will be procured for use as a spare unit to support the Test ACT
flight test program. Since all four actuators are unique assemblles by virtue of their
output lever differences, the existing permanent fasteners used to secure the levers
to the output shafts will be replaced with bolts and locking nuts to facilitate
adaptation of the spare unit to any installation position.
D.4 AUTOPILOT SERVOACTUATOR (S250NI02)
The requirement for a single autopilot channel during mechanical flight will be rnet by
retaining one of the 757 pitch autopilot servos. The following modifications will be made
to satisfy additional requirements levied against the mechanical control system:
• The addition of a centering valve to the pitch autopilot servo, sandwiched between
the EHSV and the actuator manifold, provides a solenoid-controlled hydraulic bypass
of the mod-piston chambers. Figure D-22 shows the autopilot hydraulic schematic
and the functional relationship of the centering valve. The valve is in the
deenergized or bypass position during fly-by-wire flight, preventing transmission of
autopilot position signals, while the actuator is serving as an added detent. During
mechanical flight, the valve is in the energized or transmitting position, allowing use
of the actuator for conventional autopilot functions.
• To provide a detent force sufficiently high to react the FBW-mode linkage loads, the
existing centering springs in the autopilot servoactuator will be replaced with springs
and a retainer that result in a nominal breakout force of 452.9N (102 lb) at the mod-
piston center line. This enhances the existing feel unit centering force by the
equivalent of 57.7N (13 lb) at the control column.
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Figure D-22. Autopilot Servo Functional Schematic
((
D.5 PRIMARY ACTUATORS
Measurements on the 757 Flight Control Test Rig (FCTR) indicate the hysteresis of the
elevator mechanical control system may be too high to satisfy the Test ACT requirements
during the aft cg flight conditions. These and similar 767 FCTR tests indicate the surface
power control unit (PCU) contribution to overall hysteresis is significant and can be
reduced by the addition of a bias spring to the PCU control valve spool, as shown in
Figure D-23.
To create the Test ACT primary actuators from the existing 757 elevator peus, the
following modifications are required:
• Add a 2.2-N (O.5-lb) bias compression spring behind the control valve spool
• Add spring retainers at both ends of the bias spring to ensure positive application of
load and to prevent generation of contaminants in the valve cavity
Added Bias Spring
Figure D-L..1. PCU Bias Spring Installation
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